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Numerous scholars and press critics have asserted that American news coverage of 
the run-up to the Iraq war was less skeptical than British coverage. This thesis 
explores the validity of that claim in the television news coverage of one key event: 
Colin Powell’s February 5, 2003 address to the United Nations in which he made the 
case for war. How effective was the Bush administration in using Powell’s 
presentation to set the news agenda in America and Great Britain? Contrary to 
expectations, a qualitative content analysis found British network ITV framed the 
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Preface 
I joined Independent Television News of London (ITN) as a member of its 
Washington Bureau staff on January 28, 1986...the same day Space Shuttle 
Challenger exploded over Florida after liftoff.  That unforgettable event set the tone 
for what has been a fascinating journalistic journey. For over a quarter of a century 
I've had the privilege of covering a great many of the major political events, breaking 
news stories, natural disasters and cultural trends which have affected not only the 
United States--but the entire world. 
I found myself working for Independent Television News of London (ITN) having 
already gained valuable experience editing and producing news stories for local 
television stations in Tampa, Phoenix and Dallas before joining NBC News in 
Washington, D.C. The opportunity to work for television news organizations on both 
sides of “the pond” has afforded me a rare vantage point from which I have been able 
to closely observe the unique approach taken by journalists in each nation as they 
crafted their stories and produced their nightly newscasts.  
In culture and values, Britain is comparable in many ways to the United States but in 
just as many ways it could hardly be more different.  In interviews I conducted for this 
thesis, several of my British colleagues expressed their perception of a gulf between 
Americans and Britons that applies to the journalists in both countries.  The 
Americans tend to be optimistic and believe in the ideals of the Republic while their 
British counterparts are more jaded and skeptical. British reporters are less inclined 
to report in a patriotic mode than American journalists. 
The British were America’s staunchest ally when the invasion of Iraq was launched in 
2003. I work with many of the journalists who were assigned to cover that conflict.  
Some were embedded with U.S. and British military units. Some reported from 
Washington, London, Baghdad and other capitals of the nations involved.
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Some were not assigned to specific military units and roamed unilaterally throughout 
the war zone. One, ITN’s John Irvine, was stationed in Iraq's capital and became the 
first television correspondent to greet U.S. troops as they rolled into Baghdad for the 
first time. 
As I listened to accounts of their experiences on the front lines, I was always 
fascinated by the differences in which my colleagues from Great Britain viewed the 
war in comparison to my American colleagues. It intrigued me that while these 
colleagues were all covering the same conflict, it seemed at times as though they 
were reporting about an entirely different war.   
My purpose in writing this thesis was to investigate whether British and American 
reporting were as different as my first impressions suggested and if so, what was the 



















This thesis would not have been possible without the guidance and the help of 
several individuals who in one way or another contributed their valuable assistance in 
the preparation and completion of this study. 
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knowledge, advice, guidance, encouragement and sense of humor enabled me to 
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Chapter 1: The Key Moment of Public Salesmanship on the Path to War  
It was the day the Bush administration played its ultimate trump card.  An event tailor 
made for television.  The cameras captured Colin Powell’s every move as he entered 
the United Nations Security Council chamber at 10:30 a.m. on Wednesday, February 
5th, 2003, and quickly worked the crowd.  Powell was smiling, winking, shaking hands 
and gently slapping the backs of the representatives of the world community 
assembling to hear what had been skillfully promoted in advance by the Bush 
administration as its “most compelling case for war made by arguably their most 
credible spokesman.” 1   At the request of President George W. Bush, Powell arrived 
at the Security Council equipped with secretly recorded audio tapes, satellite images 
and a simulated vial of anthrax to argue that Iraq possessed and was concealing 
weapons of mass destruction.  This high stakes spectacle was intended to convince 
skeptical allies and reluctant Arab regimes that disarming Saddam Hussein --- by 
force if necessary --- was essential.  Powell’s performance was to be the pivotal 
moment in America’s run up to war with Iraq. “We've really got to make the case 
against Hussein”, President George W. Bush told Powell in an Oval Office meeting in 
late January, 2003, "and I want you to make it." Bush added, "Maybe they'll believe 
you,” because only Powell had “the credibility to do this". 2  
Vice President Cheney weighed in as well. After a discussion of the upcoming U.N. 
address Cheney is said to have jocularly poked Powell in the chest saying, “You've 
got high poll ratings, you can afford to lose a few points.” 3  
"With war hanging in the balance, and the power and prestige of the United States on 
full display, it was a moment of high drama that owed as much to the player as to the 
play.” 4  Opinion polls taken at the time clearly demonstrated that in the eyes of many 
                                               
1 Miller, Greg, “Flaws Cited in Powell’s U.N. Speech on Iraq”, Los Angeles Times,  (July 15, 2004) 
2
 De Young, Karen, “Falling on His Sword”, Washington Post, (October 1, 2006) 
3
 De Young, Karen, “Falling on His Sword” 
4






Americans, this “player” was both trustworthy and credible.  A nationwide survey 
released that morning found that when it came to formulating U.S.  policy toward Iraq, 
Americans trusted Powell more than President Bush by 63 to 24 percent. In a Gallup 
poll conducted the week prior to Powell’s U.N. appearance, almost 9 out of 10 
Americans said the presentation would be an important determinant in their opinions 
about an attack on Iraq. 5 
Television, the Most Influential Medium 
In “The Enemy Within”, Michael Massing argues that the second Iraq War was the 
most important and controversial story covered by the U.S. press in a generation. 
Massing believed it showcased the media's strengths as well as its many 
weaknesses, “Especially the way in which political realities shape, define, and 
ultimately limit what Americans see and read.” 6   The drama and intrigue surrounding 
Powell’s star turn made it a natural television news story.  His extraordinary high tech 
“show & tell” came complete with visual pyrotechnics, including what he claimed were 
satellite images of Iraqis hiding weapons from U.N. inspectors, secretly recorded 
audio tapes of Iraqi military personnel engaged in a game of cat and mouse with 
those same inspectors, evidence of a mobile biological weapons facility and a stage 
prop vial of simulated anthrax.  
It was a stunning performance, the likes of which had not been witnessed  since  
Adlai Stevenson, (U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations during the Kennedy 
administration), revealed before the Security Council and a nationwide television 
                                               
5Moore, David. “Powell's U.N. Appearance Important to Public, Secretary of State enjoys 











audience, secret aerial surveillance photos in order to convince the world  the Soviet 
Union was installing nuclear missiles in Cuba aimed at the United States. 
Many scholars believe the manner in which television news covers major events such 
as the Iraq War is highly influential in shaping the public’s perception of that event.7  
The focus of this thesis is the methods used by American and British television news 
organizations to frame their coverage of Powell’s critical moment on the world stage. 
By 2003, revolutionary advances in technology, (including the advent of the internet), 
presented the public with the most wide-ranging choice of alternative news sources 
ever offered.  These news outlets combined to generate a greater volume of 
information about the run-up to the war, Powell’s presentation and the ground war 
which followed than any conflict in world history.  Yet what set television apart from all 
other mediums was its capability to provide live, unedited, real-time coverage.  In 
fact, once the ground war began, viewers were able to witness, “the world's first real-
time video from a battlefield”.8  This held tremendous appeal for the millions of news 
consumers who preferred watching video images to reading the written word.  No 
matter how people viewed its merits, “the Iraq war was something of a blockbuster, a 
must see event.” 9  
In early 2003, during the initial phases of the Iraq War, the Pew Research Center 
conducted a survey that asked respondents to choose which medium enabled them 
to best understand major news events.  55% of those surveyed expressed a 
                                               
7
 Scholars theorize that specific news story selection,(often referred to as “agenda setting” ) by the 
mass media is the process by which media present certain issues frequently and prominently resulting 
in large segments of the public perceiving those same issues as more important than others. This 
theory of “agenda setting” was originally developed by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw in their 
groundbreaking work, “The Agenda Setting Function of Mass Media” and has been the subject of a 
vast amount of additional scholarly research. 
8
 Hiebert, Eldon, “Public Relations and Propaganda in Framing the Iraq War”, The Institute of 
Communications Studies, (2003). 
 
9 Rutherford, Paul, Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War Against Iraq. 






preference for seeing pictures or watching video footage of those news events. 
During that same period in 2003, roughly one third of the American public regularly 
watched one of the nightly network news broadcasts. 10   
The case was much the same in the United Kingdom.  According to figures published 
in 2003 by the Independent Television Commission, television served as the main 
source of international news for 67% of the British public 11  These impressive 
viewership figures, which translate into a nightly news audience of over 30 million 
viewers, 12 present a compelling case for studying how British and American 
television news organizations prepared and delivered news of Powell’s presentation 
to those millions of viewers.   
The fact that so many people on both sides of the Atlantic depended on television for 
their news about Iraq is the principal reason it is widely considered the most 





                                               
10
 According to the Pew Research Center, 16% of those surveyed regularly watched the CBS Evening 
News with Dan Rather; 16% watched ABC’s World News Tonight with Peter Jennings; and 17% 
watched the NBC Nightly News with Tom Brokaw.
 
 




 According to the Independent Television Commission 16% of those surveyed chose newspapers, 
13% radio and 1% the internet.  Independent Television Commission. “Massive Increase in TV 











The Bush Administration Frames the News Agenda 
The Bush administration devoted extraordinary resources and expertise to framing 
the news coverage before, during and immediately after Powell’s presentation in an 
attempt to set the news agenda and advance its case for war. An essential line of its 
narrative detailed how Secretary Powell spent much of the week and weekend prior 
to his U.N. appearance entrenched within the confines of CIA headquarters in 
Langley, Virginia,  rigorously scrutinizing highly classified materials to present the 
world with evidence of Iraq’s WMD program.  That evidence would be, in the words of 
several members of the administration, “compelling”. 13  
In his February 3, 2003 daily White House press briefing, Press Secretary Ari 
Fleischer said of the upcoming Powell presentation, “The process has been a week-
long… interagency collaboration that involves the CIA, the NSC, the State 
Department, the DOD… so that the people of the United States and people around 
the world can have as much information as is possible about why we feel so strongly 
and know that Iraq has biological and chemical weapons… I think it will be 
compelling.” 14  Other officials within the Bush administration provided background 
briefings to reporters in which they claimed Powell would provide definitive and 
undeniable proof that Iraq continued to produce and conceal an arsenal of weapons 
of mass destruction in open defiance of U.N. mandates that it destroy them.  
Time magazine reported that high level administration sources confirmed to them that 
Powell would, “Attack on three fronts, presenting evidence of elusive weapons of 
mass destruction, persistent obstructions of inspections and links to terrorism. The 
                                               
13 In his memoir “At the Center of the Storm”, former CIA Director George Tenet wrote that “Colin 
asked to come out to CIA headquarters...to work through the speech and make sure it was as solid as 
possible.”  
14







drama is likely to come as much in the delivery--high-tech photos, raw audiotapes--as 
in the substance.”15  
Members of the Bush team were not subtle about pushing their message on 
members of the press. ITN’s David Smith covered the White House for British 
television during this period and was the recipient of phone calls from the White 
House Press office. “The people around Bush were extraordinarily effective at 
pounding their message.  Making journalists feel that if they didn’t pound on that 
message they were not with the program, not with the story, and somehow missing 
it.  They were real pros at one message and kept pounding on it.”16 
The choice of Colin Powell to publically put forward the Bush administration’s war 
agenda was a stroke of public relations genius. In an administration filled with “neo-
con” war hawks, Powell was generally seen as the dove of the group. ITN’s David 
Smith believed, “When people saw a formidable case being laid out by the dove of 
the administration that was a very careful calibration on the part of the White House 
to make sure the media bought into the idea. The choice of Colin Powell was a way 
of inoculating the Bush administration against anybody saying this is ‘not credible’ 
because if Powell was the front man, it had to be true.”17 In his memoir “Decision 
Points”, George W. Bush recounted, “I asked Colin to make the presentation to the 
U.N. He had the credibility as a highly respected diplomat known to be reluctant 
about the possibility of war. I knew he would do a thorough, careful job.”18 
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 David Smith was an award-winning television correspondent for ITN Channel 4 News. He is 
currently Director of the United Nations Information Office in Argentina.  Smith was based in 
Washington D.C. at the start of the Iraq War and covered Colin Powell’s presentation for ITN. This 
interview was conducted on April 18, 2009 at his home in Washington, D.C. 
 
17
 David Smith was interviewed on April 18, 2009. 





As I will demonstrate in Chapter 4, the Bush administration pushed three frames: 
#1: Colin Powell is highly trustworthy, thoroughly prepared, effective and 
credible 
#2: Colin Powell will present/presented strong evidence that Iraq possessed or 
was acquiring WMDs. 
#3: Colin Powell will present/presented strong evidence of a link between the 
Iraqi government and Al Qaeda. 
Numerous books and academic studies have analyzed the media’s coverage of the 
run-up, Powell’s presentation and the war which followed. Each of these publications 
scrutinized the journalistic practices of the various American and international news 
organizations that reported on the conflict. They frequently praised the skeptical and 
hard-hitting nature of the British coverage while at the same time criticizing the 
American press for being “incredibly soft”, “patsy-like” and overwhelmingly accepting 
of war as a foregone conclusion.  A refrain that echoed throughout was, “Why 
couldn’t American journalists have acted more British?”19  Some observers claimed 
that unlike their American counterparts, British journalists demonstrated “an 
unwillingness to accept official claims at face value”. 20  
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 Hansen, Susan, “Superiority Complex, Why the Brits Think They’re Better”, Columbia Journalism 




  Robinson, Piers, “Pockets of Resistance: Theorising media-state relations and the case of British 
media and the 2003 Iraq Invasion”, Presented at the International Studies Association Annual 






Others claimed British journalists reporting on the Iraq story seized the opportunity to 
corral facts and ask tough questions about hugely consequential events while 
American reporters viewed the war as an opportunity to present an "exciting" story 
within narrow limits.21   
BBC reporter John Kampfner offered his observation on the key difference between 
American and British reporters. “You can see the difference between American and 
British journalists at summits. The American journalist stands up when the President 
comes in, backs rigid, at attention, and the British are slouched in their chairs. The 
impression I have from the U.S. media is it regards the people in authority, the people 
in government, as good men who need to be proved otherwise. In Britain, we work 
from the assumption that they need to prove to us that they're telling the truth.”22 
Many American television journalists who covered Powell’s presentation bristle at the 
notion that they failed to exhibit sufficient skepticism and simply followed the 
administration’s lead. When asked if he believed American journalists failed to 
analyze the material Powell presented with enough skepticism, ABC’s Ted Koppel 
replied, “I’ve always maintained there’s a difference between facts and 
truth.  Journalism deals in facts—not truth.” Koppel said both British and American 
spy agencies believed Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. “That was a fact at the 
time…it just didn’t happen to be true. But if we’re going to wait until we can 
demonstrate the truth of everything we report, we’re never going to get on the air. 
The sad reality of it is that when most of the world’s intelligence agencies are under 
the mistaken impression that Saddam Hussein still has weapons of mass destruction, 
it would take a fairly extraordinary journalistic enterprise to be able to say, ‘You know 
something, they’re all wrong and I have proof that he does not have those weapons.’ 
“Proving a negative is an incredibly difficult thing to do.”   
                                               
21
 Baker, Russ, “The U.S.vs.The U.K.” The Nation,(April 28, 2003) www.thenation.com/article/us-vs-uk 
22





Koppel added, “We don’t deal in truth.  Truth takes much too long to affirm.” 23 
NBC’s Tom Brokaw echoed Koppel’s sentiments. “Part of our obligation is not just to 
be skeptical, but to present other evidence and in fact we didn’t have anything that 
we could point to that said that he (Powell) was dead wrong. He had the director of 
the CIA sitting behind him and the U.S. United Nations Ambassador sitting behind 
him and he said this represents the best intelligence that we have.”24  
However, former BBC correspondent Matt Frei believes the British media did view the 
events surrounding Powell’s presentation and the rationale for war through a very 
different prism than their American counterparts. “There was a much greater 
skepticism in the British public and the British media about the reasons for going to 
war.  There is an instinctive, almost knee jerk skepticism in the British media. We just 
don’t believe what we’re told. There was a feeling that with WMD there was 
something fishy, something didn’t quite smell right. In Britain they smelled something 
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 Ted Koppel worked as a correspondent at ABC News for over 40 years—25 of those as anchor of 
ABC’s Nightline.  In 2003 he was embedded with the US Army’s 3rd Infantry Division as it crossed 
from Kuwait into Iraq after the U.S. invasion began. A colleague and I interviewed Koppel on March 
16, 2004 in his Nightline studio in Washington as part of an ITN Ch. 4 series we were producing on the 
one year anniversary of the invasion of Iraq.   
 
24
 Tom Brokaw was anchor of NBC Nightly News for 21 years and had visited the Iraq region several 
times.  ITN Channel 4 News interviewed him on March 16, 2004 in his studio at Rockefeller Center as 
part of their coverage of the one year anniversary of the Iraq invasion.   
 
25
 Matt Frei is currently ITN CH. 4 News Washington D.C. correspondent after a long career at the 
BBC as correspondent and anchor of BBC World America. He was interviewed in the ITN Washington 






The Purpose of This Study 
The Purpose of study is twofold: 
 1. To explore whether this supposed split in American and British coverage was 
evident in reportage of Powell speech, the most important news event in the run-up to 
the war.  
 2. To assess the effectiveness of the Bush administration in imposing the news 
frames it wanted on Powell speech coverage, both American and British, in order to 
make the case for war. 
 
As explained in detail and justified below, this study is a qualitative content analysis 
of commercial broadcast evening news coverage over a five day period 
encompassing the administration’s promotion of Powell’s speech, the speech itself 
and the immediate aftermath.  
 
The findings were not what I expected, as I explain in Chapter 5. 
 
In Chapter 2, I present a literature review in order to put this study into context and 
demonstrate that gaps in the research remain to be filled. In Chapter 3, the precise 
research questions I intend to answer are listed and an explanation of the methods I 
will use to answer them is provided. In Chapter 4, I will explain how the Bush 
administration sought to control the news agenda and frame Powell’s presentation in 
a manner which pushed their war agenda.  In Chapter 5, I conclude with my findings, 
provide an analysis of those findings, their significance, what they say about the 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Several categories of literature cast light on this study. As far as I can tell from my 
research, this is the first systematic comparison of American and British broadcast 
television news coverage of Colin Powell’s presentation to the United Nations.  
 
First I will present literature that examines the “Rally Round the Flag” effect.  Scholars 
have noted, “The history of press coverage in wartime shows that the norm is a 
patriotic, servile press once the shooting starts”, 26 and during war times the public 
will often "rally round the flag" and expect the media to do the same.27  The second 
category of literature examines the relationship between the military and the media.  
Although this relationship has always been contentious, each side reluctantly 
concedes that it needs the other in order to operate effectively and successfully.  
A short history of the perpetually evolving relationship between television news and 
the military is examined.  Interestingly, this relationship originated during the Korean 
War.  Literature which examined American and British media coverage of Colin 
Powell’s presentation and the Bush administration’s selling of the Iraq war is then 
reviewed. Many authors leveled criticism against the American press and heaped 
praise upon the British press for the divergent manner in which journalists from each 
nation covered the lead up to the Iraq War and the ground war which followed.   
                                               
26 Aday, Sean, Livingston, Steven & Hebert, Maeve, “Embedding the Truth: Cross Cultural 
Analysis of Objectivity and Television Coverage of the Iraq War”, Harvard International 
Journal of Press/Politics. (2005) 
27
 Hafez, Kai. “The Iraq War 2003” in Western Media and Public Opinion: Case Study of the Effects of 








A great deal of this literature provides possible explanations for why the British and 
American media performed as they did. Some authors suggest reporters were merely 
reflecting the mood of their nations at that time.  
Others claim that a combination of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the 
subsequent actions of the Bush Administration coupled with its adept use of public 
relations techniques created an environment of fear and patriotic fervor that many 
journalists had no previous experience navigating.  As a result, critics claim some 
journalists and news organizations responded by acting as patriots unwilling to 
question their government’s motives. Others claimed most British journalists seemed 
able to balance support for their armed forces while at the same time expressing a 
degree of skepticism about the reasons those soldiers were being sent to fight in Iraq.  
The “Rally Round the Flag” Effect 
The authors of “Embedding the Truth” write that the public depends on the press to 
act as a watchdog and serve as the public’s eyes and ears on the battlefield and in 
the halls of policymakers. However, “The history of press coverage in wartime shows 
that the norm is a patriotic, servile press once the shooting starts.” 28  
Research by German academic and author Kai Hafez found,  “As a lesson from 
history we have learned that once a country gets militarily involved, large parts of 
public opinion support the government and differences in opinion that are visible 
before the war become irrelevant.”   In the case of the Iraq War, with the September 
11th terrorist attacks as a backdrop, public support for American action to prevent 
another terrorist attack, this time fueled by fears that Saddam Hussein possessed 
WMD, led to the creation of a journalistic environment some have dubbed “the rally 
round the flag” effect. Hafez explained that at times of war, the public will often "rally 
round the flag" and expect the media to do the same.  He noted that several news 
                                               
28 Aday, Sean, Livingston, Steven & Hebert, Maeve, “Embedding the Truth: Cross Cultural 
Analysis of Objectivity and Television Coverage of the Iraq War” Harvard International 





organizations not only rallied “round the flag”, but went a step further when they, 
“Helped stir public emotions with special reports entitled ‘Countdown Iraq’ on MSNBC 
or ‘Showdown with Saddam’ on CBS.”   “Especially for big U.S. networks, it seems 
that any attempt at objectivity was abandoned once the war had started.” 29 
Overtly patriotic journalism is not a uniquely American phenomenon tied to the Iraq 
War.  There is also a body of work which criticizes British journalists for a past history 
of blatantly patriotic news coverage in times of war, specifically during coverage of 
the Falklands/Malvinas War.  When the home nation of a media organization is 
directly involved in the fighting, research shows that reporters offer supportive 
coverage of their armed forces. The Glasgow University Media Group described   “an 
acquiescent, patriotic, and jingoistic British media during the 1982 Falklands 
Conflict”.30  Robin Luckham found during Falklands War coverage, British "reporters 
came to identify closely with the military. The patriotic imperative so deeply rooted in 
the political and media culture, together with journalistic self-censorship and the 
hyper-jingoism and crude ‘enemy’ baiting"…all (served) to transform new militarism 
into spectator sport with the war consumed as a form of entertainment." 31  
 In “War Policy, Public Support and the Media”, William Darley writes that a notable 
example of the “rally round the flag” phenomenon was observed when monitoring 
British public opinion polling during the Thatcher government’s handling of the 
Falklands/Malvinas  War. At the beginning of the conflict, both the British public and 
the British press were highly critical of the Thatcher government for its lack of 
                                               
29
 Hafez, Kai. “The Iraq War 2003” in Western Media and Public Opinion: Case Study of the Effects of 





30 Glasgow University Media Group, Bad News, (Routledge & Kegan Paul,1980) 
31







preparedness and handling of the initial stages of the Falklands confrontation.  
“However, as the crisis unfolded, and as the Thatcher government took decisive 
steps to retake the islands from Argentina by armed intervention, the level of public 
support in Great Britain steadily grew—from 44 percent approving military action to 
reassert control over the Falklands in early April 1982 to more than 80 percent in late 
May 1982.”32  In "Pockets of Resistance", Piers Robinson explained, "In the context 
of war, patriotism acts as a fundamental driver of supportive coverage. Even when a 
newspaper adopts an overtly oppositional stance toward government war policy the 
need to show patriotic support for the nation’s troops in action overrides this.”33 
However, a show of support for the men and women fighting on the front lines does 
not necessarily translate to a show of support for the policies and people who sent 
them into battle and this is where British and American coverage of the Iraq War 
began to deviate. 
The Relationship Between the Military and the Media 
 
“There can be few professions more ready to misunderstand each other than 
journalists and soldiers.”34 
 
In “Military and Media”, Anil Singh introduces the notion that these two institutions are 
forever linked while operating in a state of perpetual opposition.  The media will 
always insist on having open access to the battlefield while the military always wishes 
to prevent disclosure of classified or sensitive information and deny the enemy any 
useful intelligence. 35   Singh provides an excellent example which occurred during 
the American Civil War.  
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 Robinson, Dr. Piers, “ Pockets of Resistance: Theorising Media-state Relations and the Case of 
British Media and the 2003 Iraq Invasion.”  Presented at the International Studies Association Annual 
Convention, Montreal. Panel:  “Media, War and Accountability”, (Thursday March 17th, 2011). 
 
34
 Singh, Dr. Anil Kumar, Military and the Media. (Lancer Publishers & Distributors. 2006)  
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Union General William Tecumseh Sherman disdained reporters whom he felt were 
''spies'' and whose dispatches were ''false, false as hell.''  Sherman was dismayed 
that reporters were, in effect, providing the enemy with detailed information of his 
battle plans.  His complaints did have merit. The advent of a revolutionary new 
communication technology being developed at the time of the Civil War, the 
telegraph, greatly accelerated the reporting process.  There were several instances 
where this technology enabled war correspondents' dispatches about preparations 
for a battle to appear in Northern newspapers before the actual fighting had begun.  
Sherman complained that these newspapers were then forwarded to Confederate 
operatives before his forces had a chance to attack.36 Sherman became so enraged 
by a New York Herald reporter’s dispatch from Vicksburg that he had the reporter 
court-martialed for violating Sherman’s order prohibiting battlefield reporting.37  
 According to Philip Knightly in “The First Casualty”, the aims of the military and the 
media are forever irreconcilable.  The military wants to win the war as quickly as 
possible and prefers to do so away from the public eye because the face of battle is 
often horrific.  The news media want to observe the military in action, bear witness 
and record the first draft of history. Knightly asks, “If doing that as objectively and 
truthfully as possible means writing and broadcasting stories damaging to their 
nation’s war effort, what are correspondents to do?  Does the journalist within the 
correspondent prevail, or the patriot?  And what if reporting patriotically involves 
telling lies. Is this journalism or propaganda?” 38  But Thomas Rid writes in “War and 
Media Operations” that the military does in fact need the media.  According to Rid, 
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aside from providing the public with information, media coverage of war also serves 
two separate military functions.  
On one hand, media reports can be used defensively as an instrument of “counter 
information” to shield the public from enemy propaganda, and on the other hand 
media reports can be offensively used as an instrument of “perception management” 
and psychological warfare against the enemy.39  
 In “Pen and Sword”, Mary Mander contends it is inaccurate to suggest the media and 
the military are antagonistic cultures.  She believes readers should understand war 
journalism as one culture being integrated into a second culture which incorporates 
the military and its sense of system. Mander illustrates her point by citing the fact that 
when situated in the field reporting on the troops, correspondents are required to 
wear military uniforms, are often granted officers’ privileges and are otherwise “fully 
integrated into the military system” 40 
Manuel Torres writes that most major developments in journalism can be traced back 
through the history of war reporting.  He suggests that as far back as Colonial times 
the many communications technologies used to deliver reports to the public were 
developed to their maximum potential during wartime.  “The media’s desire to cover 
conflicts has stimulated the growth of the press… and coverage of wars has 
contributed to characteristics that define journalism.” 41  
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Television Goes to War 
The first conflict to occur in the television age was the Korean War (1950 to 1953), 
although it is generally not considered a television war.  At that time, less that 20 
percent of American homes owned a television set.42  The percentage was much the 
same in Great Britain.43 Satellite technology for transmission of video images had not 
yet been invented.  This meant film shot by news teams in Korea needed to be 
transported by aircraft back to studios in the United States or Great Britain before it 
could be broadcast. Under these conditions immediacy or the delivery of “breaking 
news” was impossible because the equipment to do so only existed on the pages of 
science fiction magazines.  However, this situation suited the military because of 
concerns that operational security would be compromised by sensitive information 
such as troop movements being ‘’leaked’’ to the media and immediately broadcast 
were non-existent.  The result was an era in which the broadcast media and the 
military operated in a relative state of harmonious co-existence.  This harmony ended 
after telephone links were established between Korea and the U.S. enabling 
correspondents to deliver live audio reports from the war zone.  In August of 1950, 
CBS reported an infantry landing as it was in-progress.  This live report sent shock 
waves through the upper ranks of the military which claimed operational security had 
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been breached. The media, as is generally the case, countered that the public had a 
right to the information as soon as it was available.44   
Press coverage of warfare and military attempts to censor that coverage was not a 
new phenomenon. Throughout world history military leaders have attempted and at 
times succeeded in limiting press accessibility to combat zones. As the technology 
available to the media improved, the ease and speed of transmitting news from the 
front increased exponentially.  From this point forward, technological advances would 
only serve to intensify the struggle between the military’s ability to wage war and 
television’s ability to cover the battle.   
Attempts at press censorship were not exclusive to the American military.  During the 
1956 Suez Crisis which followed Egypt’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal, 
British broadcast correspondents were only allowed limited access to the war zone 
and all media reports bound for radio and television were first cleared by military 
censors. All media operating in the war zone were also assigned a public relations 
officer or a minder, “Whose job it was to point the media in the right direction.”45 
Labeled by most scholars as “America’s first television war”, The Viet Nam War 
dominated television news coverage more than any other event in that era, (1965 to 
1975).46  From 1965 to 1970, the height of American involvement in that war, nearly 
thirty percent of national news coverage--- per day--- was devoted to the Viet Nam 
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War on the nightly network newscasts.47  So important was the coverage of this 
conflict that the major broadcast networks, NBC, ABC and CBS went so far as to 
establish news bureaus in Saigon, the capital of South Viet Nam.  
Technological advances including portable color cameras and lightweight sound 
equipment enabled news crews to provide viewers with powerfully dramatic and vivid 
images of warfare which had never before been broadcast on American television.   
These images were usually delivered to T.V. sets in living rooms across the nation 
within 48 hours of the event.  In a situation unique from all other wars, reporters had 
virtually complete and unencumbered access to the combat zones of Viet Nam. The 
sole requirements for media accreditation consisted of a valid passport, proper 
immunizations and a letter of certification from their home office.48   
Early coverage of the conflict tended to reflect official U.S. government declarations 
of military successes. However, as the war progressed, the tenor of the coverage 
changed dramatically as the media began to openly challenge American war policy.  
By the end of American involvement in 1975, many in the military were blaming 
negative news coverage for the loss of public support for the Viet Nam War. The 
media in turn blamed the military for attempting to mislead the public about the war.  
The end result was a mutual mistrust that would, from that point forward, have an 
impact on all media coverage of future military conflicts. 49 
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The 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War, in which Great Britain successfully regained 
control of the South Atlantic islands that Argentina's military government had invaded 
has been mockingly described as “the worst reported war since the Crimean War”.50 
Media reports from the war zone were tightly controlled by the British government. 
There were no direct television transmission links available and for the first 54 days of 
the 74 day war no photos that had been taken by members of the British media were 
published.51  “Reports were censored, delayed, and occasionally lost.”   
This caused relations between the press and the British Navy to sour, become tense 
and uncooperative. In one instance, two British correspondents who had prefaced 
their news stories by stating that they were being censored had that very fact 
censored from their reports. 52 
Post Viet Nam, three notable “small scale” American military operations were 
launched, each tainted by the atmosphere of mistrust that now lingered between the 
military and the media.  
Operation Urgent Fury was the controversial October 1983 mission that followed a 
bloody coup on the island nation of Grenada.  The mission was launched under the 
guise of rescuing U.S medical students caught in the crossfire on that Caribbean 
island.  However, it also provided the Reagan administration with an excuse to 
eliminate a Marxist regime allied to Fidel Castro's Cuba.53  During this operation the 
U.S. military was said to be so concerned with potential negative coverage they 
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attempted to eliminate all media participation in the invasion.  In fact, all civilian 
reporters were excluded entirely from the invasion force.   
This virtual media blackout resulted in a firestorm of criticism from news organizations 
and members of Congress that forced the Pentagon to adopt a pool system that was 
to be activated during future U.S. military operations.54   In a “pool system” a limited 
number of news media are allowed to cover an event or specified activity with the 
stipulation that they then must share or distribute their reporting of that event as well 
as any audio or video they have gathered with all the other members of the pool.  
Grenada still stands as the first American military operation ever to exclude the press 
with the explicit aim of assuring that only the official version of combat was released 
to the public. 55 
By most accounts this newly created pool operation failed during its first deployment 
as part of Operation Just Cause.  In December of 1989, U.S. military forces invaded 
Panama with orders to depose Dictator Manuel Noriega and restore a democratic 
form of government to that strategic ally.  Ahead of the invasion, the U.S. military 
activated an American press pool for the first time but failed to provide the logistics 
necessary to have reporters accompany troops into battle.   
One member of the press pool reported that by the time reporters were able to gain 
access and conduct independent inquiries, the action was largely over and to the 
extent the media “got any news at all, it was pretty much by accident.” 56  
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Operation Desert Storm was launched in 1991 to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi forces 
that had invaded and incorporated that nation as Iraq’s 19th province.  As in previous 
wars, a pool system was implemented and the media once again needed to rely on 
military forces for access to the battlefield. This pool system restricted journalists to 
group meetings with selected military units under the accompaniment of a military 
minder.  The military also instituted a security-review procedure which dictated the 
media were allowed no "unilateral coverage" and at times pool coverage of events 
and that all stories and photographs had to be cleared by the Pentagon.57   
The American military showcased the war as a marvel of U.S. military technology, 
providing television with official footage of precision guided missile strikes.  Patriot 
missiles were shown streaking into the sky, jet fighters were launched from the decks 
of aircraft carriers and smart bomb videos were replayed incessantly at military news 
briefings.  All of this “war porn” made ideal televisual images but very few journalists 
had up close access to the battlefield where real people were actually dying during 
the ground invasion that rousted Iraq from Kuwait. 58 
In 1992’s Operation Restore Hope, scores of international media positioned 
themselves in Somalia to cover a year’s long factional civil war that inflicted  
starvation and intense suffering upon millions of innocent Somalis attempting to flee 
the battle zones.  Coverage of this conflict was unique because these journalists 
were able to maintain a degree of independence and operate freely throughout the 
country. They were not forced to rely on the military for communications and logistical 
support.   
This unfettered access created the bizarre situation whereby U.S. Marines came 
ashore in Somalia only to be confronted-- not by the enemy-- but by “one of the most 
surreal interactions between military personnel and television crews” ever witnessed 
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on live television.  As the initial wave of U.S. forces made a nighttime landing on 
Somali beaches they were fully illuminated by the television lights of the international 
news organizations waiting for their arrival. 59 
Literature Written on Iraq War Television Coverage 
As stated earlier, In “The Enemy Within”, Michael Massing argues that the second 
Iraq War remains the most important and controversial story covered by the U.S. 
press in a generation.  "It showcased the media's strengths as well as its many 
weaknesses…especially the way in which political realities shape, define, and 
ultimately limit what Americans see and read.” 60 The set of events that ranged from 
Powell’s appearance at the U.N. to the invasion and capture of Baghdad were perfect 
news stories for the television networks to cover. The time frame in which these 
events occurred was short enough to allow television to devote considerable 
manpower and resources to it and the Pentagon and British Ministry of Defense 
provided journalists with front row seats to the action. 61  
In most every piece of literature written about media coverage of the run-up and initial 
stages of the Iraq War, American journalists have been criticized for their patriotic 
“boosterism”.  Many authors maintained there were profound differences in the tone 
and manner in which British and American reporters framed that conflict.  Some 
researchers attributed the patriotism displayed by the American press to a desire to 
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appear patriotic in a time of national crisis. One of the key challenges journalists 
encounter when covering a war in which their home nation is involved is how to 
provide a balance between patriotism and neutrality.  According to many authors, 
finding this balance was especially challenging for American journalists covering the 
march to war with Iraq.  
One often stated explanation for this challenge is that in late 2002, a perfect storm of 
international incidents was brewing, causing a unique convergence of events.  These 
events included the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a fear of further terrorist attacks, the war in 
Afghanistan and an administration lead by President Bush who had defiantly 
proclaimed to the world, “You are either with us or with the terrorists”.62  Left in its 
wake were journalists who, when asking probing questions of the Bush or Blair 
governments about their rationale for a war with Iraq, were labeled as unpatriotic, or 
worse, accused of siding with the enemy. “Who can forget when simply questioning 
the evidence of WMD made you appear weak kneed --even ‘French.” 63   Other forms 
of pressure also effectively inhibited the press. The President held few press 
conferences and rarely submitted to truly open exchanges. The Bush administration, 
very disciplined and well known its secrecy,  deftly managed to employ the threat of 
denied access as a means of intimidating journalists who dared step out of line.  
This threat of denied access included an end to one-on-one interviews with 
government officials, being frozen out or ignored in press conference question-and-
answer sessions and threats of exclusion from important presidential trips. 64  It 
seemed as though the reporters who stayed in Washington, not the reporters who 
                                               
62
 Dowd, Maureen, Bushworld: Enter at Your Own Risk. (The Berkeley Publishing Group. 2004). 
 
63
 Mitchell, Greg, So Wrong for So Long: How the Press, the Pundits--and the President--Failed on 
Iraq. (Sterling Publishing. 2008) 
 
64
 Schell, Orville. “Why the Press Failed”. TomDispatch.com. (Published July 14, 2004). 






were travelling with the troops in Iraq, were the “embedded” ones forced to operate 
under fear of censorship or sanctions for stepping out of line.65  
 
Lehmann wrote that at times such as 9/11 when a nation is in a period of acute crisis 
and feels itself directly and continuously threatened, the political leadership can more 
easily enlist the media in building support for its policies. “The media, especially those 
in the nation’s capital, accept governmental cues with less skepticism than in more 
“normal” times.” 66 
 In “Reporting War, Journalism in Wartime”, Allen and Barbie suggest it is precisely at 
times like these that, “A reporter’s sense of national identity, however defined, needs 
to be considered in a way that sheds light both on how it can underpin journalism’s 
strengths while, simultaneously, recognizing the constraints it can impose on the 
integrity of practice.”67  Most of the literature on media coverage has criticized the 
American press for not finding the balance that Allen refers to, at least in the run up 
and initial stages of the war. In “So Wrong for So Long”, Greg Mitchell sharply 
chastised the American media for, at first, aiding in persuading the nation war was 
necessary and then for waiting too many years before attempting to point the way 
out. In a twist on the famous Will Rogers quote, “The first thing you do when you find 
yourself in a hole is to stop digging," Mitchell wrote, “In regard to the Iraq catastrophe, 
the media not only helped create the hole, it did not do enough to help America dig 
out.”  68 Continuing his condemnation of journalists whom he felt did not ask enough 
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tough questions of government officials thereby shirking their  responsibilities,  
Mitchell advised, “What journalists need to know is that ‘governments lie’, better to be 
overly skeptical than overly credulous.” 69 
In “Beyond the Front Lines”, Philip Seib claimed the tendency to succumb to 
“boosterism” during times of war, while often common among members of the press 
corps, was at an abnormally high level during Iraq War coverage.  “The Iraq war 
offered more than the usual amount of boosterism, partly because the competition 
among news organizations, especially on television, was so fierce.” 70  The fierce 
competition was fueled by the growth of news on cable television.  Cable TV 
siphoned from traditional networks what little remained of an ever shrinking pie of 
advertising revenue.  Some observers claimed that in their effort to keep viewers from 
fleeing to cable, American network news began to choose style over substance. In 
"Weapons of Mass Persuasion”, Paul Rutherford put a positive spin on this by writing 
that although its journalistic practices were open to criticism, television news at least 
succeed in serving up a dose of “infotainment” with its war coverage. “The news 
media did weave a series of sometimes compelling stories about the invasion, the 
weaponry, the coalition soldiers and the downfall of a regime.” 71   Justin Lewis 
believed the television networks, “Set the moral complexities and debates about the 
motives and justifications for war to one side as they focused on a war to topple the 
most demonized leader of recent times." 72 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
69




 Seib, Philip, Beyond the Front Lines: How the News Media Cover a World Shaped by War. 
(Palgrave Macmillan.2004).  
 
71
 Rutherford, Paul,  Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War Against Iraq. ( University of 
Toronto Press. 2004) 
 
72






In early 2002, almost a year before Colin Powell’s speech, military training for 
correspondents who would be covering a conflict with Iraq had already begun.  
Technological advances now made it easy and inexpensive for individual journalists 
to transmit material and provide live transmissions from virtually anywhere on the 
globe. Thus began a new chapter in the tumultuous relationship between the media 
and the military. As was the case with all previous conflicts, these new technologies 
forced the military to reassess its relationship with the media. 73  Admiral ‘T’ 
McCreary, the Navy’s Chief of Information, recognized the landscape had shifted 
again, “Once somebody decides to start a war and you start shooting, from the 
uniform perspective we need the support of the American people for our troops and 
what better way for people to understand that than to put the face of the troops as the 
face of the war." 74   
Lt. Col. Rick Long, former head of media relations for the U.S. Marine Corps, stated, 
"Frankly, our job is to win the war. Part of that is information warfare.  So we are 
going to attempt to dominate the information environment.75 
This led to the creation of “embedding”, a system in which U.S. and U.K. journalists 
would be assigned to specific military units and have the ability to report directly from 
the battlefield under combat conditions.  However, there would be several 
preconditions to these arrangements.  Before being assigned to a unit, the journalists 
intending to work as embeds were required to receive media boot camp training in 
preparation for rugged desert conditions and possible WMD attacks.  
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They were also required to sign an agreement not to broadcast or publish, “Specific 
information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments and dispositions 
which would jeopardize operational security or lives.”76  But with its promise of 
dramatic and immediate coverage of coalition soldiers in action, embedding was quite 
attractive to most news organizations. 77  While there is nothing new about journalists 
travelling with military units, the scale and technological sophistication of the embed 
operation for the over 600 journalists taking part was unprecedented. 78   Some 
media observers worried that this arrangement would result in heavily jingoistic 
coverage, a loss of journalistic independence and objectivity and a fear that embeds 
would in effect "be in bed" with their units. 79 Others worried embedding would be yet 
another example of stage managed war coverage because of the military’s wish to 
control the ‘big picture’.  
Military brass did openly hope it would lead to positive stories about individual 
soldiers, the type of stories that would engender support for the war by putting a 
human face on the American war effort. 80  
Pentagon officials also acknowledged another public relations aspect of the program 
embeds would be using embeds to wage “information warfare” against Saddam 
Hussein.  They believed embeds would act as independent observers on the ground 
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to counter any Iraqi claims that U.S. and Coalition forces had engaged in atrocities.81  
Studies have shown that concerns journalists working as embeds would lose 
objective independence while reporting on their military units were not realized. An 
analysis conducted by Sean Aday, Steven Livingston, and Maeve Hebert entitled 
“Embedding the Truth”, found that although many media critics feared embedded 
journalists would adopt a form of “Stockholm Syndrome”, (sympathizing with their 
units and producing fawning coverage of the U.S. war effort), they determined there 
was no evidence to support these fears. 
Aday and his co-authors established that, in fact, embedded reporters had among the 
highest percentage of neutral stories (91 percent) of any category of reporter82 and 
that embeds were no more likely than other reporters to be supportive in stories 
about battle, strategy, or tactics.83   
A study of British embeds by Justin Lewis found that during British television 
newscasts a majority of the news reports sent from the region were reports from 
embeds and, for the most part, British reporters were acutely aware of the need to 
maintain a sense of distance. Lewis found that few embeds experienced overt 
attempts to censor their reports. Not only did embedded reporters often provide 
accounts that contradicted official military claims, in important respects their reports 
did not differ significantly from those filed by reporters acting unilaterally. 84 
Some media critics claimed the sanitized version of combat presented to western 
viewers distorted those viewer’s perceptions and understanding of war’s gruesome 
                                               
81
 Katovsky, Bill and Carlson, Timothy. Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq. (First Lyons Press. 2003) 
 
82
 The categories of reporters included embeds, unilaterals, those in fixed positions such as various 
nation’s capitals or those assigned to cover a specific government beat. 
 
83 Aday, Sean, et.al. “Embedding the Truth”. 
 
84
 Lewis, Justin. “Television, Public Opinion and the War in Iraq: The Case of Britain”  International 






consequences to a much greater degree than stories produced by correspondents  
“in bed” with military units.  While the U.S. networks focused "on the technologically 
advanced nature of the American military armada, the Arab and Muslim press tended 
to focus on the destruction and suffering visited on Iraq by this military armada." 85   
By early 2003, relatively inexpensive high tech tools developed for journalists 
operating in the field enabled the production and broadcast of these vastly different 
portrayals of the war.  The revolutionary digital gear that America and her allies 
possessed was now also easily obtained by Middle Eastern broadcasters whose 
audience possessed very different perceptions of the events unfolding in their region 
of the world.  This meant, for the first time, television news operations in Arab 
countries had the means to provide an alternative perspective of the conflict. Quite 
often Arab broadcasters offered a dramatically different narrative than that presented 
by their western counterparts. 
This alternative “pro-Arab” point of view allowed start-up television networks such as 
Qatar based Al Jazeera the ability to wield tremendous influence over the Arab street 
and an ever growing Muslim audience. 86 In contrast to most western news 
broadcasts, Al Jazeera did not hesitate to show dead Iraqi soldiers and dead Iraqi 
civilians, including men, women and children. 87 Two iconic images illustrate the 
dramatically different manner in which this war was portrayed in the Arab world and in 
the west. “The American image was of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s statue being 
toppled from its plinth in a Baghdad square—a symbol of victory. The Arab image, 
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shown mostly in the Muslim world, was of an Iraqi woman digging with her bare 
hands a shallow grave for her husband and son---a symbol of suffering.” 88 
 
Literature Written on Colin Powell’s U.N. Presentation and WMD 
Much has been written about the “kid glove” treatment the American press offered 
Secretary Powell.  In “A Dubya in the Headlights: President George W. Bush and the 
Media”, Joseph Hayden writes that since journalists trusted and admired Colin 
Powell, they were not predisposed to questioning his integrity or his presentation to 
the UN.  According to Hayden, “The press wigged out on Beatlemania” over Powell’s 
dramatic presentation.  Hayden recounts the impression left by what he termed 
Powell’s “forensic tour-de-force” on the editor of a Pittsburgh newspaper.  The editor 
wrote: 
“I don’t know how the United Nations felt about Colin Powell’s ‘J accuse’ speech 
against Saddam Hussein. I can only say that he convinced me, and I was as tough as 
France to convince.”  
 
Hayden writes that Hearst columnist Marianne Means recalled,  
“Until Secretary of State Powell’s convincing exposure of Iraq’s sneaky efforts to hide 
weapons of mass destruction, I was opposed to the administration’s sword-rattling. I 
believe Powell, Solid stuff.”89   
 
In his critically acclaimed book “Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq”, 
Tom Ricks recounts similar reactions from journalists.  
“Powell was one of the nation's most trusted figures, especially to moderates and 
liberals. Liberal columnists such as Mary McGrory and (William) Raspberry, who 
would be highly skeptical of assertions by (Vice President) Cheney were more willing 
to listen to someone like Powell.” “What persuaded more than anything was Powell's 
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personal credibility ‘he persuaded me',  Mary McGrory wrote in the Washington Post 
immediately after Powell’s speech…Around the country, other editorials were even 
more glowing. ‘Impressive’ said the San Francisco Chronicle. ‘Masterful' said the 
Hartford Courant.”90  
In his presentation to the U.N., Powell claimed Iraq maintained a robust WMD 
program. Although this claim would later prove to be false, at the time it was used 
repeatedly by the Bush administration as the foundation for launching the war on 
Iraq. In her on-line study “Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Susan 
Moeller suggests the reasons the Bush administration was able to frame an agenda 
based on WMD were due in part to the climate of fear in the U.S. after the September 
11th terrorist attacks. “Media reporting on the President amplified the administration’s 
voice: when Bush said to the country that Americans are vulnerable to WMD in the 
hands of terrorists, the media effectively magnified those fears.” The net effect of this 
was to keep the administration’s message dominant.   
The “inverted pyramid “ style of news presentation often used by journalists helped 
the White House shape news coverage  In this method, reporters create a story that 
leads with a statement by the  most “important” player, (for instance  the President or 
the Prime Minister).  According to Moeller, many journalists think inverted pyramid 
journalism is impartial, (“just the facts, ma’am”) reporting”, when in effect it is anything 
but “objective”.  91  
Moeller writes, “The tendency of the U.S. media to lead with the most “important” 
information and the most “important” players gave greater weight to the 
administration’s point of view on WMD issues, at the expense of alternative 
perspectives, which were deemed less important because they were unofficial.  Many 
stories “stenographically” reported the administration’s perspective on WMD, giving 
too little critical examination of the way officials framed the events, issues, threats 
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and policy options.  When journalists did take on the administration, especially when 
the White House’s perspective formed the “conventional wisdom”, their stories were 
often buried or their criticism was more implicit than explicit.” 92  
 “Established operating principles of the American media make it easier for the 




Moeller’s research suggested that although the U.S. and U.K. coverage tended to 
repeat the Bush administration’s assertion that a core objective of the “War on Terror” 
was to prevent WMD from falling into the hands of terrorists, the British reported more 
critically on public policy than did their American colleagues. “The British press folded 
in more news “analysis” and even commentary into stories that in the U.S. were 
treated in an inverted-pyramid-style, breaking news fashion.”  The U.S. media 
presented relatively few alternative perspectives to those of the White House partly 
because U.S. politicians and other Americans critical of the Bush administration 
supported President Bush’s declaration and articulation of the “War on Terror”. 
Moeller suggests that U.K. journalists openly disputed the messages and the 
assertions of the Bush administration about the purported Iraqi WMD while American 
reporters appeared more muted in their coverage — most often relying on quotations 
from Democratic politicians to make the opposing case.94 
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Marshall McLuhan notably observed that, “The Viet Nam war was lost in the living 
rooms of America, not on the battlefields of Vietnam."  McLuhan’s writings are often 
cited by those who believe television can, and in fact did, play an influential role in 
shaping viewer’s perceptions of that war. According to McLuhan, “Television brought 
the brutality of war into the comfort of the living room”. 95 
Others disagree with McLuhan’s observations and claim that the influence of 
television in shaping public opinion and Viet Nam War policy has been dramatically 
overstated. These observers believe the press did not so much create public 
opposition as reflect it.  
Edward Bickham served as former Special Advisor to Former British Foreign 
Secretary Douglas Hurd during the first Gulf War. 
 “As a medium (television) plays too much to the heart and too little to the head. It 
presents powerful, emotive images, which conjure strong reactions. Anecdotes about 
individual suffering make compelling television, but they rarely form a good basis to 
make policy. Foreign policy should be made by democratic governments… not in 
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reaction to which trouble spots the news gathering organizations can afford to cover 
from time to time.” 96 
Whether or not television coverage influences government policy or merely reflects 
those policies continues to be debated among scholars and authors.  The question as 
to whether or not television coverage played a role in shaping public perceptions of 
the prelude to war, Colin Powell’s presentation at the U.N. and the war with Iraq 
which followed remains unanswered.  However, the power of a televised video image 
to create a visual and emotional experience for the viewer remains the dominant 
force in generating public awareness. 
 
This thesis, as far as I have been able to ascertain from my research, is the first 
systematic comparison of American and British television news coverage of 
Secretary Powell’s presentation.  In interviews I conducted while researching this 
topic, several British journalists told me they believe Americans are, by their very 
nature, optimistic while the people of Great Britain are deeply skeptical---almost to 
the point of being cynical.  As a result, the British believed their journalistic coverage 
of Powell’s speech was more skeptical and hard hitting than that of their American 
counterparts. 
The findings of my research suggest when it came to American and British television 
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Chapter 3:  Hypothesis and Research Questions 
A number of scholars who have analyzed news coverage of 20th Century wars 
concluded the following:  When a western democracy goes to war, its news media 
initially tend to reflect the positions of the government and the sentiments of its 
citizens. 97  When the branches of government and public opinion are in sync, the 
mainstream news media will tend to echo rather than question these prevailing 
opinions. 98 But when the branches of government and the opinions of its citizens are 
divided, news coverage of the rationale for and the conduct of a war will be more 
skeptical, reflecting the divisions within the government and society.99    
                                               
97 Entman, Robert M. , Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. 
Foreign Policy, (University of Chicago Press, 2004) 
 
98
 In “Visualizing Deviance, A Study of News Organizations” the authors note that “the media serve to 
construct an order that is consonant with the needs and interests of dominant groups" Baranek, 
Patricia,; Chan, Janet and Ericson, Richard, Visualizing Deviance: A Study of News Organization,     
(University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1987,). 
 
99





This thesis examines whether or not American and British television news coverage 
reflected these tendencies in their coverage of Colin Powell’s pre-war presentation to 
the United Nations Security Council detailing U.S. claims that Iraq possessed and 
was hiding weapons of mass destruction in defiance of U.N. mandates that it disarm 
itself of these weapons.  As noted earlier, this war was initiated by the Bush 
Administration and was initially supported overwhelmingly by Congress and the 
American public. 100   
 
 
In Great Britain there was no such consensus.  According to opinion polls taken at 
the start of the war in 2003, only 29 percent of the British public supported taking 
military action against Iraq. 101  Yet despite this opposition, Prime Minister Tony Blair 
led his nation into the war while echoing the Bush Administration’s rationale.  
Blair also did so while strong elements within the three major British political parties, 
his own Labour Party, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Conservative Party 
opposed his actions and stridently voiced their objections in Parliament. 102  
 
Hypothesis 
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My hypothesis in this study is that television news coverage of Colin Powell’s 
appearance would reflect these Anglo-American contrasts. In other words, U.S. 
television news coverage would strongly reinforce the Bush Administration frames in 
reporting on Secretary Powell’s presentation to the United Nations, but British 
television news coverage would be more skeptical.  In order to examine the validity of 








1. How did the Bush administration specifically frame the story leading up to Colin 
Powell’s appearance before the United Nations Security Council on February 5, 
2003? 
2. To what extent did American television news coverage reinforce these frames? To 
what extent did this coverage raise questions about these frames?  
3. To what extent did British television news coverage reinforce these frames? To 
what extent did this coverage raise questions about these frames? 
4.  How effective was the Bush administration in setting its news agenda via Powell’s 
presentation in the U.S. and British media?  
5. Was the British television news coverage more skeptical than the American 
coverage? 








The core of this study is a qualitative content analysis examining how, over a five day 
period, American and British television nightly network news broadcasts framed U.S. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s February 5, 2003 presentation to the United Nations 
Security Council.   The objective of this analysis was to assess the degree to which 
the networks utilized the frames promoted by the Bush administration.   I reviewed 
official government statements, news reports quoting official government sources and 
editorials authored by members of the Bush administration, all of which preceded 




I determined the Bush administration was pushing three main frames—the themes 
repeated most often in their preliminary statements: 
#1: Colin Powell is highly trustworthy, thoroughly prepared, effective and 
credible. 
#2: Colin Powell will present/presented strong evidence that Iraq possessed or 
was acquiring WMDs. 
#3: Powell will present/presented evidence of a link between the Iraqi 
government and Al Qaeda. 
 
Two coders, myself and a colleague, (a television news producer with several years 
of experience producing network television news stories) analyzed the newscasts of 
American networks ABC, NBC, CBS and British network ITV that aired during the 
week which began Monday February 3rd and ended Friday February 7th of 2003.  This 
one week period was chosen in order to ascertain the manner in which each network 
previewed Powell’s appearance, reported on his actual presentation and then 
analyzed and dissected his evidence in the two days which followed.  We determined 





United States and Great Britain made reference to Powell’s presentation.  These 63 
stories were then partitioned into 708 individual “sentences”. 103 I collected and 
studied the “sentences” from each news story that mentioned frame number one. I 
tallied the number of these sentences that, #1,Endorsed the frame. #2, Were neutral 
or disseminated information about the frame without editorializing. #3, Raised 
questions about the validity of the frame. I went through the same process with 
“sentences” that mentioned frames two and three.  
Why These Networks Were Chosen For Study 
This study examined the coverage of Powell’s presentation that appeared on the 
primary evening news broadcasts of American networks, CBS, ABC and NBC and 
the British network ITV.   
NBC Nightly News is the flagship evening television news program of the NBC 
television network. ABC World News Tonight is the flagship evening news program 
of the ABC television network. CBS Evening News is the flagship evening television 
news program of the CBS television network. Each of these news programs were 
broadcast live by most of their affiliated stations on weeknights between 6:00 p.m. 
and 7:00 p.m. Eastern time. In the early stages of the Iraq War, NBC Nightly News 
had an average viewership of 11.4 million viewers, ABC's World News Tonight 
registered 9.9 million viewers and the CBS Evening News registered just over 8 
million viewers per newscast. 104 
ITV News at 10 is the flagship nightly news presentation of Britain’s ITV network. 
Broadcast later at night, (10 p.m.) than the American newscasts, it is produced by 
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ITV’s news content provider Independent Television News of London (ITN).105  
During the early stages of the Iraq war ITV News at 10 had nightly viewership of 
approximately 4.7 million viewers. 106 
 
These four news programs were chosen for comparison for a variety of reasons. 
They are the primary daily news broadcasts for their networks and are supported by 
advertising revenue.  Each had viewership figures numbering in the in the millions. 107 
All of these newscasts were generally thirty minutes in length.  This study omitted the 
other British broadcast network, BBC, for two reasons. BBC News is government 
funded, thus is not subject to the same mix of pressures as the commercial networks. 
Furthermore, the BBC does not make available to the public transcripts or video of 
the newscasts broadcast during this time period thus making a transcript comparison 
with the other networks impossible. 108 News providers such as CNN, MSNBC, Fox 
News and Britain’s Sky News were not included because they are cable outlets. Their 
viewership figures were considerably smaller in comparison to the broadcast 
networks selected for this study.  
 It is difficult to compare cable news programming with a network evening newscast.  
Cable news offers a continuous news broadcast (sometimes referred to as “rolling 
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  ITV also airs an early evening newscast but its 10 pm bulletin is regarded as their flagship 
presentation. http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b007mplc 
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news”) that is stretched throughout the day. By contrast, the nightly network 
newscasts are only offered once per day. This is an important distinction because a 
single newscast forces a unique and difficult task upon the producers, editors and 
journalists charged with producing these programs. Of the multitude of news events 
that occur in a single day, they must decide which select few were the most 
compelling and interesting. They must then determine the most important aspects 
and salient points of those selected few stories and produce and edit the stories into 
a coherent newscast of less than 30 minutes (when commercial breaks are factored 
in).    
 
Through these editorial decisions, the journalists, consciously or unconsciously, are 
framing the story. Framing is a device commonly utilized by journalists to interpret 
and provide context to a particular story.  As scholars have defined it, in the world of 
journalism framing news stories, “Is a question of slant, structure, emphasis, 
selection, word choice and context,” 109 and the method reporters use to ‘‘bundle key 
concepts, stock phrases, and iconic images to reinforce certain common ways of 
interpreting developments.’’110  The impact of these decisions on viewers cannot be 
ignored. Many scholars have determined that issues which receive extended 
coverage by national news organizations become more important to viewers while 
issues which are ignored lose credibility.  111   
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Limitations of this Research  
This study has several limitations which will make my conclusions tentative. 
Because I am analyzing a relatively small number of news reports, my numerical 
findings are essentially qualitative. They lack statistical significance, although they 
provide insights and a starting point for further research. 
Written transcripts provide only a single dimension of what was a multi-dimensional 
event.  Therefore, the greatest limitation of this study was the inability to capture and 
compare the nuances of the audio and visual elements involved in a television news 
story.  Everything a television viewer experiences-- seeing and hearing a government 
official speaking, various facial expressions, the tone of a reporter’s voice, the 
multitude of video images which are edited into the news piece and the background 
sounds that accompany those images-- are what make a television news story 
distinctive from a newspaper or radio story.   
 
                                                                                                                                                   
work, “The Agenda Setting Function of Mass Media”.  “Agenda setting” has been the subject of such a 







The use of only one British television network necessitates caution in drawing    
cross-national comparisons.   
 
Limiting the study to coverage of Powell’s speech is another clear limitation. Further 
study would be needed to determine if the coverage patterns I perceived are also 
present in coverage of other key events in the run-up, outbreak, and fighting of the 
Iraq war. Some media observers claim the British were quicker than the Americans to 
recognize the Iraqi insurgency and to dispute the Bush administration claims that all 
was going well after the combat phase of the war had ended.  Further study and 
research would have enabled a comparison of coverage to see if the critics were 
correct.  
Confining the study to broadcast outlets is a similar limitation. More study is needed 
to determine if the patterns I perceived in broadcast coverage were also evident in 
other news media. 
Future Research 
The scope of this research was very limited and cannot be generalized beyond this 
single case.  Examining only the ABC, CBS, NBC and ITV television coverage of 
Colin Powell’s appearance before the U.N. offers only a snapshot in time, an 
incomplete picture of the media coverage of a much larger and complex event.  The 
coding of a much greater number of news broadcasts aired by a greater variety of  
media outlets encompassing the build up to the war, WMD claims by the American 
and British governments, the military campaign, the post war occupation and the 
insurgency which followed is required.  Only then can a fuller determination be made 
as to whether the British broadcast media were more adversarial and exercised a 
greater degree of autonomy than their American counterparts--- and if so, how those 

















Chapter 4:   
Powell’s Presentation, 
The Key Moment of Public Salesmanship for the War 
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the administrations of 
American President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared 
the greatest threat to world security was posed by Iraq in the person of Saddam 
Hussein. In order to eliminate the threat, government officials in the U.K. and the U.S. 
began constructing a case for war.  President Bush frequently stated America 
remained vulnerable to further terrorist attacks, a hostile regime in Iraq was willing to 
share their WMD or weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, nuclear 
technology) with terrorists and that preemptive action was the only method of 
prevention.  The President laid the groundwork for American action in a televised 





“We have seen that those who hate America are willing to crash airplanes into 
buildings full of innocent people,” Bush said. “Our enemies would be no less willing, 
in fact they would be eager, to use biological or chemical or a nuclear weapon. 
Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun that 
could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.” 112 
 
Prime Minister Tony Blair stated, “Given the post 9/11 climate, if there was any 
possibility that Saddam Hussein could develop weapons of mass destruction, we 
would stop him.”113  
The stage was now set for Colin Powell and the pivotal moment in the run up to war. 
Heavily promoted in advance by the Bush administration as a high tech secret 
intelligence “show and tell” containing information prepared by America’s premier spy 
agencies, Powell’s presentation was framed by the administration as the event which 
would reveal definitive evidence that Iraq continued to produce and conceal an 
arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in open defiance of UN mandates.  “It was 
intended to be the Bush administration’s most compelling case for war made by, 
arguably, their most credible spokesman.”  George Bush believed it was only Powell 
who had the credibility to lay the evidence before the American people and the world.  
“We've really got to make the case against Hussein and I want you to make it” 
President Bush said to Powell during an Oval Office meeting before his U.N. 
appearance. 114 
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 Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair appeared before Britain’s Official Iraq Inquiry on January 









At the request of the President, Powell entered the U.N Security Council chamber 
accompanied by CIA Director George Tenet on the morning of February 5, 2003. 
They brought secretly recorded audio tapes, satellite images, a vial of simulated 
anthrax and reports from Iraqi defectors.  In his book, “Legacy of Ashes, The History 
of the CIA”, Tim Weiner writes, “Colin Powell had spent days and nights with Tenet, 
checking and rechecking the CIA's reporting. Tenet looked him in the eye and told 
him it was rock solid.”115  With CIA Director Tenet sitting at his shoulder, Powell told 
the Council members and a worldwide television audience,  
"Every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not 
assertions. What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid 
intelligence. There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons 
and he has the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can 
cause massive death and destruction."  
Powell went on to detail a “sinister nexus" between Baghdad and the Al Qaeda 
terrorist network, stating that Iraq's denials of any ties with the organization were not 
credible.116 
We now know Powell’s high-profile presentation included several claims-- Iraqi links 
to Al Qaeda, hidden biological weapons and a nuclear arms program-- which have 
since been discredited.  In fact much of the evidence revealed by Powell in his 
attempt to convince the world military action against Iraq was necessary was false. 
Iraq did not possess movable biological weapons facilities, was not involved in a 
"sinister nexus" with al-Qaeda and no evidence of active WMD production facilities or 
usable stockpiles was ever found. 117  
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In his book, ‘It Worked For Me, In Life and Leadership” (Harper Collins, 2012), Powell writes, "A 
failure will always be attached to me and my U.N. presentation,"  "I am mad mostly at myself for not 
having smelled the problem. My instincts failed me."  He also faulted U.S. intelligence officers for 
lacking the "courage" to alert him that he was receiving bad data on Iraqi WMD. "Why did no one stand 








Evaluating the News Coverage 
 “Paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part 
of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to 
die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell”. (Justice Hugo Black)118 
 
The public relies on the media to separate facts and tangible realities from 
assumptions and spin.119  Critics of American news coverage have suggested that in 
reporting on Powell’s presentation the American press effectively acted as a 
mouthpiece for the Bush administration, bought into Powell’s presentation “lock, 
stock, and barrel”120 and did not sufficiently investigate the evidence he presented 
while the British media appeared more skeptical of his claims concerning Iraqi WMD. 
                                                                                                                                                   
later wrote books claiming they were shocked that I had relied on such deeply flawed evidence." 
Powell said he relied on the CIA to help develop his U.N. presentation but that he was not aware at the 
time that "much of the evidence was wrong.” 
In an interview promoting his book, Powell explained,   “I had every assurance in the intelligence 
community that the information in that speech, which we went over and over for four straight days and 
nights, was solid. It was the same information that had been presented to Congress. It was the basis 
upon which Congress had passed a resolution authorizing war if the president thought it necessary. 
It's the same information the president had when he'd put similar things to what I said into the State of 
the Union address a few weeks before my speech. And so we all had that same base of knowledge 
but mine was the most visible, the most symbolic of all the presentations. And when I gave it, people 
stopped and listened.  And so when it all started to come apart because the sourcing turned out not to 
be good and there were things in there that were simply wrong, with respect to the existence of WMD, 
I just watched it all fall apart before my eyes and I became sort of the symbol of it all. And I have been 
asked about it almost every day now for nine years. And I have to live with it.”  “What Colin Powell 
Learned From Iraq”, U.S.News and World Report, June 14, 2012, 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2012/06/14/what-colin-powell-learned-from-iraq 
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In their book “Bring, ‘em On: Media and Politics in the Iraq War”,  Artz and 
Kamalipour suggest the American media deemed the Bush administration’s rhetorical 
appeals “newsworthy and legitimate” and as a result  provided favorable coverage 
and promotion of the administration’s goals, often by dramatizing the same copy 
points emphasized by government speakers. “U.S. elite media coverage acted and 
reacted to the ongoing struggle for international power with noticeable allegiance to 
the American administration’s pronouncements.”121 Many observers believe the use 
of public relations or “propaganda” techniques was an essential part of the run-up to 
the war in Iraq and officials in the United Kingdom and the United States framed the 
issues, story lines and slogans to serve their purposes.122   
Gershkoff and Kushner write that issue frames affect beliefs and the relative 
importance individuals attach to beliefs and the media have an opportunity to shape 
public opinion through tone, content manipulation, and issue frames. “Since much of 
the media coverage of any political event prominently features quotes from political 
leaders and excerpts of official speeches, such media coverage gives public officials 
a second venue, beyond their direct pronouncement, from which to propagate their 
message.”123 
In March of 2004, one year after the invasion of Iraq by U.S. and international forces, 
ABC News correspondent Ted Koppel was asked to reflect on his network’s coverage 
of Powell’s appearance at the United Nations. Koppel said he did not believe there 
was a failure of American or British journalism to more thoroughly question Powell’s 
evidence. “I really think that (Powell) came to the U.N. and I have spoken to him 
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since then, both privately and on camera, and I’m absolutely convinced that when he 
went to the CIA and talked to analysts, examining photographs and documents 
himself, that when he sat down before the U.N. General Assembly, he was saying 
what he believed to be the truth.”124  
 In March of 2004 Former NBC News anchorman Tom Brokaw was asked the same 
question. “It was our responsibility to report on what he had said that day and frankly I 
had nothing that I could point to that was contrary to what he was testifying to.”             
“Part of our obligation is not just to be skeptical, but to present other evidence and in 
fact we didn’t have anything that we could point to that said that he was dead 
wrong.”125 
Never-the-less, critics claimed the American press, by not more thoroughly 
questioning Powell’s claims, had been “duped”, and in doing so, had assisted the 
Bush administration in duping the American public.  Susan Moeller reported in her 
study of the media’s coverage of WMD, “The U.S. media typically confirmed the Bush 
administration’s political and diplomatic agenda setting. Through their reporting on 
the President, the media amplified the administration’s voice, so when Bush said to 
the country that Americans are vulnerable to WMD in the hands of terrorists, the 
media effectively magnified those fears.”126 
 
The Bush Administration’s News Agenda 
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If the coverage sample in the present study is any indication, the Bush administration 
appears to have been quite effective in setting the news topic agenda.  This is 
evidenced by the fact that during the week of Powell’s presentation, (Monday 
February 3rd through Friday, February 7th, 2003) the nightly newscasts in this study 
devoted 45% of their entire news coverage to Iraq, WMD and the possible march to 
war—including devoting nearly their entire broadcasts to Iraq on Wednesday, 
February 5th, the evening of Powell’s appearance at the U.N.127 
Dominating the news topic agenda is one thing, setting the frames for specific news 
content quite another. This study was conducted by means of viewing and 
transcribing videotaped recording of the selected evening newscasts as well as 
examining written transcripts accessed through Factiva. 
The objective of this analysis was to assess the degree to which the networks utilized 
the frames promoted by the Bush administration and whether or not the network 
newscasts endorsed these frames, were neutral toward the frames or expressed a 
degree of skepticism toward them.  
Identifying the Bush Administration’s Frames 
In order to identify the specific frames promoted and advanced by the Bush 
administration, I reviewed official government statements, news reports quoting 
official government sources and editorials authored by members of the Bush 
administration, all of which appeared in the days immediately before Powell spoke at 
the United Nations. For example, the following two statements reinforced the 
administration’s central theme: Saddam Hussein possessed WMD, is hiding them in 
violation of U.N. resolutions and war is merited unless he disarms.   
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On January 28, 2003, President George W. Bush went before a joint session of 
Congress to deliver the annual State of the Union Address. As he neared the end of 
the nearly one hour speech, Bush set the stage for what was to come the following 
week: 
“The United States will ask the U.N. Security Council to convene on February the 5th to 
consider the facts of Iraq's ongoing defiance of the world. Secretary of State Powell will 
present information and intelligence about Iraq's illegal weapons programs, its attempts to 
hide those weapons from inspectors and its links to terrorist groups. We will consult, but let 
there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm for the safety of our 
people, and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him”.128     
On February 3rd, 2003, an editorial by Colin Powell ran in the Wall Street Journal 
laying the foundation for what he would present to the United Nations in two day’s 
time. 
“On Wednesday, I will present to the Security Council U.S. intelligence showing further 
evidence of Iraq's pattern of deception...While there will be no "smoking gun," we will provide 
evidence concerning the weapons programs that Iraq is working so hard to hide. We will, in 
sum, offer a straightforward, sober and compelling demonstration that Saddam is concealing 
the evidence of his weapons of mass destruction, while preserving the weapons 
themselves”129 
 
 It was through public pronouncements such as these that the Bush administration 
set out what they hoped would be the news frames for Powell’s presentation.   
I determined the administration was pushing three main frames—the themes 
repeated most often in their preliminary statements: 
 
#1: Colin Powell is highly trustworthy, thoroughly prepared, effective and 
credible. 
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#2: Colin Powell will present/presented strong evidence that Iraq had or was 
acquiring WMDs. 
#3: Colin Powell will present/presented evidence of a link between the Iraqi 






The Origins of These Frames 
#1: Colin Powell is highly trustworthy, thoroughly prepared, effective and 
credible.    
In a preview of Powell’s presentation published in the New York Times on February 
2, 2003 unnamed senior Bush administration officials were quoted as stating there 
had been little dissension among the President’s top advisers about the information 
Powell would be presenting to the U.N. ''I haven't detected anyone who thinks this a 
not compelling case,'' the official said.130  The “compelling case” narrative was 
echoed by White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer in his February 3, 2003 press 
briefing.  Fleischer stated that Secretary Powell had been thoroughly engaged in a 
process involving America’s premier spy agencies. “We feel so strongly and know 
that Iraq has biological and chemical weapons.” Fleischer told the assembled White 
House press corps. “I think people will form their judgments, having watched the 
Secretary, and people will come to their conclusions about it. I think it will be 
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compelling.” 131  The “compelling” talking point was deployed yet again during State 
Department spokesman Richard Boucher’s February 3, 2003 briefing. “This 
presentation will, we think, be compelling. It'll be a straightforward explanation of the 
facts… Iraq is not cooperating, Iraq is concealing evidence, and Iraq is trying to 
preserve its weapons of mass destruction.”132   
 
 
Bush Senior Advisor Karl Rove Powell has since written of the Bush Administration’s 
faith in Powell’s effectiveness.  According to Rove, Powell, “Had wide bipartisan 
respect... he was not viewed as a "hawk." He had enormous credibility from having 
personally reviewed the evidence exhaustively.”133 
 
#2: Colin Powell will present/presented strong evidence that Iraq had or was 
acquiring WMDs. 
In his January 30, 2003 White House Press Briefing, Press Secretary Ari Fleischer 
was asked if the intelligence Powell would be presenting was contemporaneous.  
Fleischer replied, “It doesn't matter if it's new or old if it can still kill you. So whether 
there is information that is one day old, or one year old that Saddam Hussein has 
biological and chemical weapons, the impact is not whether the information is new or 
old; the impact is whether he has them or not.” 134 
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The Washington Post published an article on the morning of Powell’s presentation 
stating that CIA Director George Tenet would be at Powell’s side during his 
presentation in order to further underline the importance of Powell's appearance and 
the quality of the intelligence concerning transfer of banned technologies from other 
countries, and shifting of weapons systems within Iraq. “Satellite photos and other 
evidence would also be presented.”135 
 
 
 TIME magazine reported high level administration sources told them Powell would, 
“Attack on three fronts, presenting evidence of elusive weapons of mass destruction, 
persistent obstructions of inspections and links to terrorism. The drama is likely to 
come as much in the delivery--high-tech photos, raw audiotapes--as in the 
substance.”136  
#3: Colin Powell will present/presented evidence of a link between the Iraqi 
government and Al Qaeda.  
The New York Times reported on February 2nd, 2003 that in demonstrating there 
were links between Iraq and Al Qaeda, Powell would focus on intelligence about 
possible connections between Saddam Hussein, an Islamic militant group that may 
have produced poisons in a remote region of northern Iraq and an al Qaeda terrorist 
leader named Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi. 137 
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Time Magazine reported that in order to convince skeptics Saddam had formed an 
alliance with the same kind of terrorists who caused the Sept. 11 attacks Powell 
would disclose there were links between Baghdad and “the murky band of Kurdish 
fundamentalists called Ansar al-Islam.”  These government officials claimed Ansar 
was an al-Qaeda trained operation located in Afghanistan which harbored Al Qaeda 
refugees.  Time reported these officials were “also talking up the presence of al-
Qaeda bigwigs in Baghdad.”138 
 
 
Analysis of the Network Transcripts 
With these three official frames as reference points, I undertook a close reading of 
the newscast transcripts of Monday February 3rd, 2003 through Friday February 7th, 
2003.  This one week period encompassed the run-up to Powell’s presentation, the 
speech itself and the immediate aftermath.  First I collected and studied the 
“sentences” from each news story which mentioned frame number one. I tallied the 
number of these “sentences” that endorsed the frame, the number that disseminated 
the frame without editorializing and the number that raised questions about the 
validity of the frame. I went through the same process with “sentences” that 
mentioned frames two and three. In total, 708 “sentences” were analyzed.139 
By carefully assessing, categorizing and counting references to the frames, I hoped 
to draw clearer conclusions than would be possible with more impressionistic 
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assessments.  I therefore defined categories of analysis as precisely as I could.         
In 10 cases the same “sentence” reinforced two of the three frames—Frame #1, Colin 
Powell is highly trustworthy, thoroughly prepared, effective and credible and        
frame #2, Colin Powell will present/presented strong evidence that Iraq had or was 
acquiring WMDs.   In those instances I counted the “sentence” as representing both 
frames.  
For example, an ABC story that aired the night before Powell’s presentation reported, 
“Secretary Powell will play audiotapes of intercepted communications between Iraqi 
officials, who are said to be talking about "hiding things."140  This supports frame #1 
which states, “Powel would be thoroughly prepared”.  It also supports Frame #2 
which states, “Powell presented strong evidence”.  
The other coder and I disagreed on how a “sentence” should be categorized in 8 out 
of the 708 “sentences” under study. 141 (The three categories are described in detail 
in the following section.)  In those cases we consulted, we determined that one of us 
had erred and we then aligned our categorization 
I defined the three “sentence” categories as follows: 
1. Endorsed the frame.  
For the purpose of this study “sentences” were counted as endorsing the Bush 
administration’s frame when the reporter, interview subject or quoted source echoed 
the official line without attribution.  
Example:  “Terror ties. Piece by piece, the new case laid out today linking Iraq to 
Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network.” 142 
In this category when reporters repeated a Powell claim without attribution or did not 
assess its validity, they had abandoned their role as professional skeptics and were 
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acting as conduits helping the Bush administration frame the story and advance the 
case for war.  
In this category I also counted every on screen statement spoken by Colin Powell or 
other officials making the Bush administration’s case. I did so because in written 
transcripts, the words of the reporter and the words attributed to an official can 
appear very similar in tone. In television news stories, the tone of an on screen sound 
bite is generally quite different from the script lines spoken by the reporter. According 
to Gershkoff and Kushner’s study, “Media coverage prominently featuring quotes 
from political leaders and excerpts of official speeches offers those officials a second 
venue, beyond their direct pronouncement, from which to propagate their 
message.”143 
2. Merely disseminated information about the frame. 
Sentences were counted in this category if they conveyed the official frame with 
attribution to the source, but with no overt or implied endorsement or skepticism 
toward the frame. 
 Examples:  “He said”; “Powell went on to cite”; “Powell’s next point was that…” 
 
3. Raised questions about the frame.  
Sentences were counted in this category when the words of a reporter, interview 
subject or quoted source conveyed skepticism about the administration’s frame. 
Sentences containing skeptical attribution such as “he claimed” or “he alleged” were 
also counted in this category 
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Example: “In another blow to the U.S. case, sources in London tell ABC News that 
British intelligence is highly skeptical about a theory that al-Qaeda is connected.” 144 
 
I then compared the level of skepticism in the American and British coverage, looking 





Evaluating News Coverage of the Frames 
I will first list a White House frame as described in the previous section then assess 
whether or not the news organizations accepted or advanced that frame, were neutral 
toward the frame or raised questions about the frame.   
 
Official Frame #1   
Colin Powell is highly trustworthy, thoroughly prepared, effective and credible.   
George Bush reportedly said that only Powell had the "credibility to do this”, and 
Powell was in fact a widely popular public figure.145  A nationwide poll taken the day 
before the presentation found 63% of Americans choose Powell over the President 
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as the leader they trusted more to make decisions about U.S.- Iraq policy.146  The 
Bush administration heavily promoted a narrative detailing how Secretary Powell 
spent much of the week and weekend prior to his speech ensconced inside CIA 
Headquarters in Langley, Virginia pouring over highly classified information. They 
claimed it would be a rigorously prepared presentation which would also be, in their 
words, “compelling”.147 148 
At first it would seem this is a rather innocuous frame. After all, opinion surveys 
already showed most Americans believed Powell to be both trustworthy and credible.  
It would also not be unreasonable to expect him to be thoroughly prepared in 
advance of his appearance before the United Nations.   
However, the Bush administration clearly wanted news media to frame Powell in this 
way because by endorsing this frame the networks were helping the President push 
his war agenda.  The administration wanted the public to believe Colin Powell would 
come prepared with evidence and if he was convinced there was a case for war there 
very likely was a strong case for war.  When asked about Powell’s credibility, NBC 
anchor Tom Brokaw stated, “Secretary Powell (is) a figure of great integrity in this 
country (and) obviously has great influence and credibility.”149 
While all four broadcast networks, both British and American, utilized this frame as a 
component of their reports, ABC and NBC had more “sentences” which referred to it 
than the other two networks. (See Table 1)   
                                               
146
 Moore, David,  “Powell's U.N. Appearance Important to Public, Secretary of State enjoys more 
credibility on Iraq than Bush” Gallup News Service, (February 4, 2003)  
147
 Briefing by White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, February 3, 2003.  
148
 Briefing by State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, February 3, 2003. 
149
 Tom Brokaw was interviewed by ITN Channel 4 News on March 16, 2004 in his studio at 





ABC illustrated and endorsed Powell’s effectiveness by reporting, “The Secretary of 
State's presentation to the UN Security Council yesterday has had an effect on public 
opinion.  An ABC News - Washington Post poll finds that 71 percent of Americans 
aware of his speech at the U.N. yesterday think he made a convincing case for 
war.”150   
NBC endorsed his credibility. “We asked were the American people, were they 
convinced by Colin Powell? Look at these numbers, 66 to 11. High marks from the 
American public for Colin Powell... Look for this president, Colin Powell, who's a very 
important messenger because he's perceived as the one most reluctant to go to 
war… to campaign vigorously across this country, television airwaves saying, this is 
why we must take Saddam Hussein out now.” 151 
 
Martha Raddatz of ABC said Powell would come prepared with compelling evidence 
including, “Audiotapes of intercepted communications between Iraqi officials, who are 
said to be talking about "hiding things”.  Quoting an editorial Powell had written for 
the Wall Street journal in advance of his appearance Raddatz added it would be a 
"straightforward, sober and compelling demonstration that Saddam Hussein is 
concealing weapons of mass destruction.”152   
David Martin of CBS reinforced the notion that the Secretary was not only well 
prepared but that his speech would be effective. “Powell has drafted CIA director 
Tenet to appear with him before the U.N. Security Council tomorrow in what promises 
to be a turning point in the confrontation with Iraq.”153  
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Britain’s ITV, although endorsing this frame less often than ABC and NBC, did 
endorse Powell’s effectiveness.  Anchorman Trevor McDonald reported, “A poll on 
ITV suggests that Mr. Powell’s words had helped to make a convincing case for 
war.154 
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Official Frame #1 
Colin Powell is Highly Trustworthy Thoroughly Prepared, 
Effective and Credible 
 
 
 ABC  
29 “Sentences”         
CBS 
7 “Sentences”         
NBC 
64 “Sentences”         
ITV 
15 “Sentences”         
ENDORSED THE 
FRAME 




6 / 22% 4 / 57 % 
 
33 / 52% 4 / 27% 
RAISED QUESTIONS 
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Official Frame #2: 
 
Colin Powell will present/presented strong evidence 
that Iraq had or was acquiring WMDs. 
 
This was arguably the most important of the three frames because it focused on the 
specific claims and evidence Powell presented at the U.N. with the intent of 
persuading the world that armed intervention against Iraq was necessary.   
 
The function of the journalists covering this event was to put Powell’s presentation 
into context and report to their viewers.  Measured in percentage terms, Britain’s ITV 
did exhibit a greater degree of skepticism than the three American networks. 
However, ITV endorsed this frame more often than ABC.  In reporting on this frame, 
ABC merely disseminated information or was neutral more often than any of the other 
networks in this study. (See Table 2).  
 
This frame was most often endorsed by CBS and NBC.  For example in the February 
5th broadcast, John Roberts of CBS did not use qualifiers in portions of his report 
thereby presenting Powell’s evidence as fact. “(Powell) showed video of an Iraqi 
mirage fighter jet testing a biological sprayer.” (Colin Powel on screen): ‘Note the 
spray coming from beneath the mirage. That is 2,000 liters of simulated anthrax that 
a jet is spraying’. John Roberts: “But the most chilling moment came in this 
intercept, in which an Iraqi officer tells a subordinate to erase all references to nerve 
agents from over-the-air or wireless communications.”155 
NBC was inconsistent and, at times, offered no uniformity in their reporting.  Within 
the same news piece qualifiers were sometimes used and sometimes not.  For 
instance, Andrea Mitchell appeared neutral when she reported: “Powell said three 
defectors have told US intelligence Saddam has 18 trucks carrying mobile biological 
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weapons labs.  ...He showed a satellite photo he says reveal chemical weapons 
bunkers. He says those outlined in red contain active weapons” 156 
 
However, within that same news story NBC’s Mitchell was also guilty of giving 
credence to some of Powell’s claims and presented them as authentic.  She failed to 
state that the aircraft shown in Powell’s photos were “allegedly” able to spread 
chemical weapons and instead delivered her script line as if this were a fact. In 
another section of the same news piece, Mitchell neglected to raise any questions 
about the authenticity of the audio tapes Powell played for the chamber. Much like 
John Roberts of CBS, she described one of Powell’s exhibits as frightening in nature. 
 “Powell played a tape of a Mirage jet retrofitted to spray simulated anthrax and a 
model of Iraq`s unmanned drones, capable of spraying chemical or germ weapons 
within a radius of at least 550 miles.”  “They showed satellite photos, quoted 
defectors, played audiotapes of intercepted conversations. One chilling 
example...”157   
ABC merely disseminated information or was neutral more often than any of the other 
networks. For example, ABC’s Peter Jennings qualified all of the Powell quotes 
presented in his news piece. 
 “Mr. Powell said repeatedly that Iraq was doing everything it could to hide its 
forbidden weapons from UN inspectors. And he played a tape which he said were 
two Iraqi officers talking about an inspection they knew was coming.” “Mr. Powell 
said Iraq had sent several of its scientists into hiding, rather than talk to the United 
Nations….He showed artist's renditions of what he said were mobile laboratories for 
biological weapons. And using yet another prop, he said that Iraq had thousands of 
times the amount of anthrax that caused havoc and death at the US Capitol.” 158  
As was anticipated in this study’s hypothesis, Britain’s ITV raised several questions 
and exhibited a degree of skepticism concerning every aspect of Powell’s 
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presentation.  Anchor Trevor MacDonald opened the February 5th broadcast by 
announcing, “Colin Powell set out a case for the prosecution, a case for war. It was 
comprehensive, but was it credible?”159 Later in the broadcast Bill Neely reported: 
“A lot of it is open to interpretation, for example what exactly did those satellite 
photographs show...so suggestive yes, damning probably not.  The U.S. admitting a 
lot of this is circumstantial evidence. The big question for you as well as Paris, 
Moscow and everywhere else is circumstantial evidence enough to justify the war 
that the US thinks is coming.” 142 
While not as frequent as ITV, all three American networks did raise questions or 
exhibit skepticism about certain aspects of Powell’s claims. ABC’s Martha Raddatz 
reported: 
 “The satellite imagery is more open to interpretation. Secretary Powell said this 
was a satellite picture of a storage area for chemical or biological weapons... A 
satellite image taken two months later at the same area, Powell said, showed the 
vehicles gone, buildings bulldozed and, to keep inspectors from being able to sample 
the soil, he claimed, the top layer had been hauled away.”160 
CBS’s David Martin said, “Some of Powell`s examples were based on unnamed 
sources whose reliability can be challenged.” 161  
ITV, CBS and NBC also travelled to Iraq in order to present the Iraqi perspective of 
Powell’s evidence. ITV’s Jon Irvine reporting live from Baghdad:  
“We’ve just heard that there will be a point by point rebuttal by the Iraqis tomorrow. 
But tonite in general terms Saddam Hussein’s top advisor described Colin 
Powell’s claims as ridiculous and beneath a country supposedly leading the 
world.  On the issue of the telephone intercepts for example he said they could have 
been produced by a third rate intelligence outfit.  
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The Iraqi people are constantly being told that American claims about banned 
weapons are baseless, referring to the Washington government one newspaper here 
said today and I quote “ the nut cases in the administration of evil have no proof of 
their claims”.162 
Elizabeth Palmer of CBS reporting from Baghdad: 
 “Just two hours after Colin Powell`s speech ended, the Iraqis were on the offensive. 
An angry Gen. Amer al-Saadi, head of Iraq`s monitoring agency, told the 
world`s media that Powell`s evidence was manufactured. He was especially 
scathing about the telephone intercepts he said were not genuine. AL-SAADI: From 
what we have heard, any third rate intelligence outfit could produce such a 
recording.”163”   
NBC’s Ron Allen, also in Baghdad, reported: 
“General Amir Al-Saadi, the man Powell accused of heading a spy committee 
designed to deceive and frustrate the inspectors, called the charge against him and 
the rest of Powell's presentation "nonsense." General AMIR AL-SAADI: ‘This was a 
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percentage this represents and the category to which it applied 
Official Frame #2:  
Colin Powell will present/presented 







Official Frame #3 
 
Colin Powell will present/presented evidence of a link 
between the Iraqi government and Al Qaeda. 
  
In her book, No Questions Asked: News Coverage since 9/11, Lisa Finnegan 
reiterated a tenet of good journalism: 
“The American media was clearly taken with Powell’s presentation. Journalism 
professors and cranky editors working with novice reporters have been known to quip 
“If your mother says she loves you, check it out.”  In other words, never take anything 
at face value. Go and find out if it is true.”  165 
Along with assertions that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction, 
Bush administration officials claimed there existed a direct link between Saddam 
Hussein and Al Qaeda and therefore by association, a connection between Iraq and 
the September 11th terrorist attacks.  This claim of a link between Iraq, Al Qaeda and 
terrorism was a central justification used by the Bush administration in their attempts 
to convince the American people war was necessary.  The administration alleged ties 
between Saddam Hussein and Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a figure 
Secretary of State Powell claimed was a "collaborator of Osama Bin Laden.”  
Both ABC and NBC News extensively questioned this frame’s validity. (See Table 3).  
ABC’s Brian Ross investigated the Al Qaeda connection: 
“Powell showed a satellite photograph of what he said was a chemical weapons 
training center in Northern Iraq used by al-Qaeda and protected by a group called 
Ansar Al-Islam.  Their ties to Al-Qaeda are also well-documented. But they operate in 
a part of Iraq not controlled by Saddam Hussein and their leaders say they seek to 
overthrow Saddam Hussein and his government.”   
“The man considered the leader of Ansar Al-Islam told ABC news this week, his 
group opposes Saddam Hussein, because, unlike Osama Bin Laden, Saddam 
Hussein is not a good Muslim.” 
                                               
165





“In another blow to the U.S. case, sources in London tell ABC News that British 
intelligence, as well is highly skeptical about, a theory that al-Qaeda is connected 
to Iraq.”166 
NBC ran a news piece by Jim Miklaszewski which also questioned the validity of 
Powell’s claims of an Al Qaeda link: 
 “There was plenty of new detailed information about Iraq's alleged ties to terrorists. 
But a Pentagon official says when Powell got to possible links between Baghdad and 
al-Qaeda, he was skating on thin ice.”167 
Britain’s ITV did not report on this frame to the same degree as the three American 
networks. (See table 3). Interestingly, all three American networks also broadcast 
clips of the same critical Iraqi voice discrediting Powell’s Al Qaeda link claim. The 
voice belonged to Saddam Hussein himself and was delivered in the form of an 
interview conducted by anti-war British Politician, Sir Anthony Benn which ran on 
ITV’s sister network, Channel 4 News the night of Powell’s presentation.  In the clips 
of that interview broadcast by the networks, Benn asked Saddam Hussein, “Do you 
have links with al Qaeda?” Hussein answered, (through a translator): “If we had 
relations with the organization of al Qaeda, we would not be ashamed to admit it. 
Therefore, I would like to tell you directly, that we have no relationships with al 
Qaeda.” 168
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Table 3 Official Frame #3 
Colin Powell Will Present/Presented Evidence of a 






Summary of Framing Analysis  
The introduction to this thesis stated that in the years since the invasion of Iraq by 
U.S. and international forces, numerous books and academic studies have analyzed 
the media coverage of the run-up to the war, Powell’s presentation and the war itself.  
These books and studies frequently praised the skeptical and hard-hitting nature of 
the British coverage while at the same time criticizing the American press for being 
“incredibly soft” and “patsy-like”. The constant refrain was “why couldn’t American 
journalists have acted more British?”169  Some observers claimed that unlike their 
American counterparts, British journalists demonstrated “an unwillingness to accept 
official claims at face value”. 170 Others claimed British journalists reporting on the 
Iraq story seized the opportunity to corral facts and ask tough questions about hugely 
consequential events while American reporters viewed the war as an opportunity to 
present an "exciting" story within narrow limits.171 
The findings of this study suggest these blanket criticisms did not apply to broadcast 
network news coverage of Colin Powell’s pivotal U.N. appearance.  In fact the data 
suggests ABC News expressed a degree of skepticism virtually equal to that of 
Britain’s ITV in covering this story. 32% of the 162 “sentence” references to the three 
official frames in ITV stories raised questions or were skeptical of these frames while 
25.5% of the 180 sentences referenced in ABC stories were skeptical of the official 
frames.  Coverage by NBC and CBS was less skeptical, 21% of the 198 “sentences” 
in CBS stories raised questions or were skeptical.  (See Table 4) 
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NBC stories had the least number of skeptical sentences, but not by a significantly 
smaller margin than CBS.  20% of the 168 “sentences” counted in NBC stories raised 
questions or were skeptical while 21% of the 198 “sentences” counted in CBS stories 
were skeptical. 
The data also demonstrates the Bush administration’s effectiveness in dominating the 
news coverage. (See Table 5)   220 or 31% of all “sentences”  endorsed the three 
administration frames while 315 or 44 % of all “sentences” merely disseminated 
information about the three frames.  
In other words 75% of the “sentences” endorsed or were neutral toward the three 
frames the Bush administration was pushing.   
CBS and NBC endorsed the official Bush administration frames most frequently while 
at the same time appearing to be the least skeptical of the networks in this study.  
(See Table 4)  While British network ITV and American network ABC virtually 
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Table 4 
Total number of “sentences” that referenced one of the three official frames; the 
percentage associated with that number 











































Total Number of "Sentences" and 
their Assigned Frames 
Table 5 
708 Total “Sentences” 
220 or 31% of all “Sentences” Endorsed the 3 Frames 
315 or 44 % of all “Sentences” Merely Disseminated Information  
174 or 25 % of all “Sentences” Raised Questions 
 
75% of the “sentences” 
endorsed or were neutral 






Answers to the Research Questions 
1. How specifically did the Bush administration frame the story leading up to 
Colin Powell’s appearance before the United Nations Security Council on 
February 5, 2003? 
The Bush administration devoted extraordinary resources and expertise to framing 
the news coverage before, during and immediately after Powell’s presentation in an 
attempt to set the news agenda and advance their case for war. Central to their 
efforts was the choice of Colin Powell to push their war agenda. Powell was the 
crucial point man and provided "diplomatic cover” for the Iraq war plans of the 
administration as the White House deftly hyped Powell's "moderate" credibility. 172 
Officials hoped to foster a belief among the American people that, “If Powell was the 
front man, and it had to be true.”173 
The three frames the Bush administration pushed were: 
Colin Powell is highly trustworthy, thoroughly prepared, effective and credible. 
Colin Powell will present/presented strong evidence that Iraq possessed or was 
acquiring WMDs. 
Powell will present/presented strong evidence of a link between the Iraqi government 
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#2. To what extent did American television news coverage reinforce these 
frames? To what extent did this coverage raise questions about these frames?  
In percentage terms both NBC and CBS reinforced or endorsed the Bush 
administration frames at an equal rate. 37% of the “sentences” in CBS stories and 
36% of the “sentences” in NBC stories endorsed the frames set forth by the Bush 
administration. By contrast, ABC endorsed the frames 25% of the time.  
For example, John Roberts of CBS reported, “The most chilling moment came in 
this intercept, in which an Iraqi officer tells a subordinate to erase all references to 
nerve agents from over-the-air, or wireless communications.”174  As did NBC’s 
Andrea Mitchell. “They showed satellite photos, quoted defectors, played audiotapes 
of intercepted conversations. One chilling example.”175 When it came to questioning 
the Bush frames. CBS and NBC questioned the frames 21% and 20% respectively, 
while ABC raised questions at a slightly higher rate, 25%. ABC investigated Powell’s 
claims of an Iraq-Al Qaeda link.  “In another blow to the US case, sources in 
London tell ABC News that British intelligence, as well is highly skeptical about, a 
theory that al-Qaeda is connected.”176 
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# 3. To what extent did British television news coverage reinforce these 
frames? To what extent did this coverage raise questions about these frames? 
Britain’s ITV reinforced or endorsed the Bush administration frames in 25% of the 
referenced “sentences”. ITV raised questions about the Bush frames 32% of the time. 



















For example, ITV did endorse frame number one which stated that Powell would be 
well prepared with evidence: “Powell will have electronic intercepts indicating Iraqi 
deception and links to terror groups; satellite photos, including trucks the US says are 
mobile biological labs; proof of Iraq's attempts to purchase illegal weapon 
components.”177    But ITV also questioned the content of that evidence.  “A lot of it is 
open to interpretation for example what exactly did those satellite photographs 
show...so suggestive yes, damning probably not.”178 
 
                                               
177
 ITV News, February 3, 2003 
178
 ITV News, February 5, 2003 
Sentences that referenced one of the 
three official frames and the 






4.  How effective was the Bush administration in setting the news agenda via 
Powell’s presentation in the U.S. and British media?  
The data in this study suggests the Bush administration effectively managed to 
dominate the television news coverage of the four networks. 31% of all “sentences” 
endorsed the three Bush administration frames and 44 % of all “sentences” were 
neutral or merely disseminated information about the three frames. In other words 
over 75% of the “sentences” in this study endorsed or were neutral toward the 
information the Bush administration was pushing. 
 
5. Was the British television news coverage more skeptical than the American 
coverage? 
Measured in percentage terms and number of “sentences” counted as raising 
questions, Britain’s ITV raised more questions or was the most skeptical of the four 
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6. What are the most plausible explanations for similarities and/or differences 
in the news coverage? 
There were many similarities in the coverage of Britain’s ITV and America’s ABC.  
While both CBS and NBC did not mirror ITV as closely as ABC, in percentage terms 
these networks did produce similar reports to their British counterpart. 
 
 
This may have been due to the fact that even though there were literally life or death 
repercussions resulting from this event, Colin Powell’s presentation was covered in 
the same manner television news organizations routinely report on press conferences 
or other “official” government pronouncements.   The government is engaged in an 
institutionalized relationship with the television news media, which gives government 
officials the opportunity to establish the initial framing of the topic in question. This 
interpretation then “commands the field” in all subsequent treatments and sets the 
terms of reference within all further coverage or debate that takes place.179
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Never-the-less, ITV did offer a degree of skepticism greater than the American 
networks.   The effect of the September 11th terrorist attacks may account for this 
difference.  For instance, ITN’s Matt Frei told me the September 11th attacks were 
much more strongly felt in the United States than in Great Britain. “So to question the 
motives for war, the existence of WMD was considered by more in the U.S. as 
unpatriotic than it was in the U.K.”180   Susan Moeller suggests, “The US media 
presented relatively few alternative perspectives to those of the White House.” This 
was due in part to U.S. politicians and other Americans critical of the Bush 
administration not only substantially supporting President Bush’s declaration and 
articulation of the “War on Terror”, but doing so well into the summer and fall of 2003.  
By contrast, from the very beginning there was more consistent and vocal opposition 
among senior British political figures to some of the Blair government’s WMD 
policies.”181  In “Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraq War”, Kull, Ramsay and 
Lewis contend that lack of resources and money were the prime reason the U.S. 
media did not investigate the claims of the Bush administration more thoroughly.  
They contend it was considerably cheaper for the television news networks to adopt 
the talk show and infotainment formats than to engage in more traditional 
investigative reporting.182
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Avenues for Further Study 
In seeking differences and similarities between American and British journalistic 
practices, two distinct areas of interest continued to present themselves: 
1: The lack of a script approval process for British television journalists. 
2: The claim by the British journalists I interviewed that American reporters exhibited 
a deference to power which inhibited their ability to ask government officials tough 
and probing questions.   
Could either of these elements have made a difference in the manner in which each 
nation covered the events surrounding the Iraq War?  
 
#1 Script Approval 
 
Does the Lack of a Script Approval Process Allow British Journalists  
Greater Freedom When Reporting? 
 
“Scriptwriting 101” would define a news script as the document a reporter creates 
when writing a broadcast news story. My personal experience in producing news 
stories for American television news organizations and a British television news 
network has lead me to believe that the most basic and observable difference 
between the two centers on the script approval process.  Generally reports produced 
by British correspondents are not subjected to any level of script approval.  As a 
result, it is not uncommon for the executive producers and foreign editors based in 
London not to see the finished product until it airs on their evening newscasts. In fact, 
the British television news journalists I have worked with have only been required to 
submit their scripts for prior approval when legal questions arise.  Every British 
journalist I interviewed for this thesis believed script approval acts as a form of 
censorship.   Their rationale was that executive producers, sitting behind desks 
thousands of miles away from where the story is taking place, should not be in a 
position to approve or disapprove of what a reporter in the middle of the action is 





The polar opposite seems to be the case in the United States because script 
approval is a routine process in the American system. The American journalists I 
interviewed were equally as adamant that the American system of prior script 
approval simply provides a check and balance system which acts to catch any factual 
errors, which if aired, could not only prove embarrassing for the news organization 
and harm its reputation.  Mistakes or errors could also invite legal action.  
The limited scope of this thesis did not allow for a thorough study of whether or not 
the script approval process had an effect on the television coverage of the Iraq War. 
The British journalists believed that it did while the American journalists I spoke with 
were unwavering that it did not.  Lindsay Hilsum of ITN told me, “Much more trust is 
invested in the correspondents in the British system.” 183 ITV’s Bill Neely added, “The 
essence of journalism is that the journalist goes out, discovers things and tells the 
world, including the journalist’s own desk, what has happened.” 184 ITN’s David Smith 
told me, “I never once, in 25 years at ITN, I never had anyone approve a script.  I 
wasn’t having someone in London tell me what the story was.  But an American TV 
correspondent would always, at whatever level, need to submit their scripts for 
approval. No self respecting British correspondent would ever accept script approval. 
Why, because you were giving away control of the product to people who were not on 
the ground with you. And it’s a fundamental difference between the two reporting 
cultures.”185 
Further research into the script approval process is necessary to ascertain whether or 
not this is true. 
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#2 Deference to Authority 
All of the British journalists I spoke with believe British television news organizations 
asked tougher questions and were less reverential when interviewing government 
and military figures during the run up to the war. They said, unlike Americans, British 
journalists did not readily accept the government responses or positions.  
ITN’s David Smith explained, “The way journalists talk to British politicians is very 
different than the way American journalists talk to American politicians.  In Britain it is 
far more ‘in your face’.  It’s far more, ‘Where’s the evidence for that?’  ‘How can you 
say that?’  The way that the American reporter will speak to the figure in authority is 
considerably more deferential than in the U.K.    I was paid to be rude to Tony Blair; I 
was paid to challenge the British Foreign Secretary. This is because I would not wish 
to be seen as putting myself in a deferential position towards that person.  I don’t 
think that anyone who works for ABC News or CNN is going to win plaudits or pay 
raises for having a real go at the President.”186 
 ITN Channel 4’s Lindsey Hilsum told me that, “the Brits are much less reverent than 
the Americans. It's a big cultural difference - the British people voted for these 
politicians therefore they have the right to see them squirm under questioning. That's 
our job!  As British broadcast journalists, we are more skeptical of government than 
American broadcast journalists.  We do believe our government is lying unless they 
can prove otherwise and on the whole I think Americans think the government is 
telling the truth unless it becomes clear otherwise.187   
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NBC’s Kerry Sanders agreed—up to a point. He told me, “Brits are cynical. We are 
not as openly arrogant in our reporting because we choose to let the viewer at home 
draw the own conclusions rather than telling someone how to think.”188 
The public relies on the media to separate facts and tangible realities from 
assumptions and spin. Examining British and American broadcasts to determine if the 
British did indeed exhibit less deference to authority, therefore presenting a more 
balanced picture of the war would fill in another piece of this research.  The question 
to be answered: If American journalists were less deferential toward government 
officials would the public have been provided with a wider variety of questions and 
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 “The alliance between the United States and Great Britain is a partnership of the 
heart, bound by the history, traditions and values we share. But what makes our 
relationship special — a unique and essential asset — is that we join hands across 
so many endeavors. Put simply, we count on each other and the world counts on our 
alliance”.189 U.S. President Barak Obama and British Prime Minister David Cameron 
“Television news remains the most viewed, valued and trusted source of information 
in most countries around the globe....its journalism connects more regularly and 
compellingly with audiences than that produced by other news media.” 190 
This thesis explored whether there were similarities or, more importantly, 
fundamental differences in the approach taken by British and American television 
news organizations during their coverage of the pivotal moment in the run up to the 
Iraq War and Secretary of State Colin Powell’s February 5, 2003 presentation to the 
United Nations Security Council on Iraq’s weapons program.   
I was able to ascertain from my research that this is the first systematic comparison 
of American and British broadcast television news coverage of this pivotal event in 
the run-up to war with Iraq.  
The Bush administration heavily promoted Powell’s appearance as a high tech secret 
intelligence “show and tell”.  His speech was designed to provide definitive evidence 
that Iraq continued to produce and conceal an arsenal of weapons of mass 
destruction in open defiance of U.N. mandates that they destroy those deadly 
weapons.   
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Although Powell has stated he struggled to ensure all of his arguments were sound 
and backed by intelligence from several sources, we now know much of what he told 
the Security Council that day was untrue.  No weapons of mass destruction were 
found and no linkage between Saddam, Al Qaeda and the attacks of September 11, 
2001 has been proven.  For many critics Powell’s appearance has become the 
primary point of reference in the failure of U.S. intelligence leading up to the war with 
Iraq.191  
Widespread debate and controversy has also accompanied the role U.S. media 
played in reporting on this event. Many observers have criticized the American press 
for not exhibiting adequate skepticism toward the evidence Powell presented.  By 
contrast, British journalists have been praised for demonstrating, “an unwillingness to 
accept official claims at face value”.  192  
 My original hypothesis stated the three U.S. television network newscasts would 
strongly reinforce the frames pushed by the Bush administration in their reporting of 
the events surrounding Colin Powell’s appearance at the U.N. while British television 
news reporting would be relatively more skeptical of the administration’s narratives.  
The results of this study suggest this hypothesis was only partially correct. Although 
Britain’s ITV, as measured in terms of the percentage of skeptical “sentences” 
counted for this study, exhibited a degree of skepticism and raised questions about 
the Bush administration frames to a greater degree than the American networks, 
American television journalists reported on Powell’s appearance in a neutral manner 
and with a degree of skepticism more often than they endorsed the administration’s 
frames.  
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Much like their British counterparts, the American networks did not simply reinforce 
the Bush administration frames as they were defined by this study.  
In other words, the findings set out in this research report indicate that blanket 
accusations of a compliant American press are too sweeping. 
The results were not what I had expected to find -- for several reasons.  Post 
September 11, 2001, the Bush administration had clearly stated to the world “you are 
either with us or you are with the terrorists”,193 and that applied to media 
organizations as well.  As Susan Moeller suggests in her research, the U.S. media, 
U.S. politicians and other Americans not only substantially supported President 
Bush’s declaration and articulation of the “War on Terror” but did so well after Colin 
Powell’s presentation and into the summer and fall of 2003.  By contrast, there was 
more consistent and vocal opposition among senior British political figures to some of 
the Blair government’s WMD policies,” 194  This reflected public sentiment in Great 
Britain which was against going to war with Iraq.   
My surprise at these findings is also due to what I heard during the interviews I 
conducted with British journalists while researching this study. The British universally 
insisted a wide chasm existed between the skepticism exhibited by British reporters 
and their American counterparts. They were adamant that in their coverage of the 
Iraq War, they exhibited superior journalistic practices.  They believe British 
journalists are skeptical by nature and therefore did not take at face value what 
government officials were saying about Iraq.   
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For example, Lindsey Hilsum of ITN told me, “As British broadcast journalists we are 
more skeptical of government than American broadcast journalists.  We do believe 
our government is lying unless they can prove otherwise.  On the whole I think 
Americans think the government is telling the truth unless it becomes clear otherwise. 
It’s because that’s our job to think that everything’s a lie.”195  ITN’s Matt Frei echoed 
those sentiments. “There was a much greater skepticism in the British public and the 
British media about the reasons for going to war.  They bought none of the Al Qaeda 
bullshit that Powell was talking about. They just didn’t buy it. There is an instinctive, 
almost knee jerk skepticism in the British media. We just don’t believe what we’re 
told.”196 
American journalists bristled at the notion they failed to be skeptical and thorough 
and were equally as adamant that the coverage of the events surrounding Powell’s 
presentation was competent and matched that of their British counterparts. 
ABC’s Ted Koppel said criticisms, including a lack of skepticism on the part of 
American journalists, were unjustified given the unique nature of the situation.  “The 
sad reality of it is that when most of the world’s intelligence agencies are under the 
mistaken impression that Saddam Hussein still has weapons of mass destruction, it 
would take a fairly extraordinary journalistic enterprise to be able to say ‘you know 
something, they’re all wrong and I have proof that he does not have those weapons’.  
Proving a negative is an incredibly difficult thing to do.  The fact that 9/11 happened 
made it possible for an American President to say, ‘We have been assaulted as 
never before in this country and should anyone with access to WMD perform a similar 
act it would be so devastating that we cannot allow that to happen.” 
“I think lots of questions were raised beforehand... perhaps not enough.” 197 
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Tom Brokaw was interviewed by ITN in the studio of NBC Nightly News in New York City on 
March 16, 2004.  
 
Matt Frei was interviewed by Chris Shlemon in the ITN Washington D.C. News Bureau in 
March of 2011. 
 
Lindsey Hilsum was interviewed by Chris Shlemon in May of 2010 in the ITN Washington 
D.C. news bureau. 
 
Ted Koppel was interviewed by Chris Shlemon and an ITN colleague in the ABC Nightline 
studio of their Washington, D.C. Bureau in March of 2004.  
 
Bill Neely was interviewed by Chris Shlemon in the ITN Washington, DC Bureau in March of 
2011. 
 
Kerry Sanders was interviewed by Chris Shlemon via e-mail in June of 2011. 





The following are portions of interviews conducted with the principals directly 
responsible for producing American and British news coverage of the run-up, 
Powell’s appearance at the U.N. and the Iraq War that followed. 
For over 40 years Ted Koppel worked as a correspondent for ABC News—25 of 
those as anchor of ABC’s Nightline.  In 2003 he was embedded with the US Army’s 
3rd Infantry Division as it crossed from Kuwait into Iraq after the U.S. invasion 
began. A colleague and I interviewed Ted Koppel on March 16, 2004 the ABC 
Nightline studio of their Washington, DC Bureau as part of an ITN series we were 
producing on the one year anniversary of the invasion of Iraq.  We asked him about 







 Question:  Collin Powell’s Speech to United Nations: 
Ted Koppel: There is no doubt in my mind that he believed what he was saying at the time; 
there is no doubt in my mind that the president believed what he was saying; that Tony Blair 
believed what he was saying and I must confess based on what I thought I knew I believed 
that there were chemical weapons and biological weapons. I must tell you it was no joke to 
me a few months later when I was in Kuwait and we crossed the border into Iraq, believe me 
everyone one of us there soldier of journalist carried the gas mask on his hip, we were 
wearing biochemical suits, day and night, never took them off---and I was a true believer at 
the time. 
I was also one of those who asked “why now, what’s so urgent about it….what’s the rush, 
why do we need to go in there now?”  Looking back I have to ask myself “what would have 
happened if the UN weapons inspectors had been allowed to remain in Iraq, for another 3 
months, another 6 months, another 9 months, another year.  Do you really think that any of 
the people who believed there were weapons of mass destruction would have believed that 
the weapons inspectors had access to every to every place that they wanted to go?  Do you 
think that they would have been convinced?   The vice president, Dick Cheney, still claims to 
believe that there are weapons of mass destruction.  So how would the weapons inspectors 
ever have convinced the true believers otherwise even if they’d had another six or eight or 
twelve months? I’m not sure that was a failure of journalism here or in the UK because in 
order to be able to prove otherwise….had Colin Powell been coming in there with cooked 
material that he and the CIA knew to be inaccurate, 
I suppose eventually we might have been able to demonstrate that or someone might have 
leaked something to us.   But I really think that he came to the UN, and I spoke to him since 
then, both privately and on camera, and I’m absolutely convinced that when he went to the 
CIA and talked to analysts, examining photographs and documents himself, that when he sat 
down before the UN General Assembly, he was saying what he believed to be the 
truth.  Now it turns out that he was probably wrong, but I don’t think that he was lying.  I think 
he had bad information. 
Question: On a Possible Al Qaeda Connection?          
Koppel: I’ve been reporting it, didn’t believe it then, don’t believe it now.  I think the evidence 
that was put forth on the linkage between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda was always very 
very flimsy and those that wanted to believe it believed it and those who were more skeptical 
among us did not.  I don’t think that falls into quite the same category as the weapons of 







Question: How do you report on intelligence matters when you have to rely on 
politicians? 
Koppel: I’ve always maintained there’s a difference between facts and truth.  Journalism 
deals in facts—not truth.  There’s a big difference between the two.  If the CIA claims as it did 
that it has evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, then we in journalism are totally 
justified in reporting as a FACT that the CIA and MI6 and whatever other intelligence sources 
we may have, believes that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction.  That was a fact at the 
time, it remains a fact today…just didn’t happen to be true.  But if we’re going to wait until we 
can demonstrate the truth of everything we report, we’re never going to get on the air the 
newspapers are never going to get out.  We don’t deal in truth.  Truth takes much too long to 
affirm.  
The sad reality of it is that when most of the world’s intelligence agencies are under the 
mistaken impression that Saddam Hussein still has weapons of mass destruction, it would 
take a fairly extraordinary journalistic enterprise to be able to say “you know something, 
they’re all wrong and I have proof that he does not have those weapons.”  First of all proving 
a negative is an incredibly difficult thing to do.    
Question: We’re journalists muzzled and intimidated by the White House? 
Koppel: At a certain point one has to take one’s leaders at face value.  There were no voices 
of dissention coming from the British or the French at that point.  They weren’t arguing about 
the fact that there were WMD.  French intelligence thought that there were WMD; German 
intelligence thought that there were WMD.  The only questions that were being legitimately 
raised was “why now?”  We weren’t questioning where there were or were not weapons of 
mass destruction we were saying “somebody explain to us what the nature of this imminent 
threat is because we don’t quite get that.” 
And I think there were a lot of people who were raising it in terms of timing and in terms of the 
imminent danger to the United States, that was being questioned and I think that was the 
right question to ask at the time.  But the issue about the weapons, no I guess nobody 
questioned that. 
 The British people were far more perceptive in their general skepticism than the politicians 
were either in the UK or here.  
Question: What is your opinion on how the war was covered? 
Koppel: Anyone who suggests that the coverage of the war was limited to the tanks rolling 
across the desert clearly was not reading the New York Times, of the Wall Street Journal or 
the Washington Post or Time or Newsweek.  American television was reporting from the 
desert, from Washington, from Paris and Berlin.  People choose to look at one scene that 
was being reported by one reporter at the time and failing to remember that was one small 





One of the reasons that covering war or even understanding what is going on in war is so 
complicated is that the closer you are to the action the less you see of the broader 
picture.  And therefore it becomes necessary to put together both the reports from the 
correspondents on the battlefront with what is being reported by people giving more of an 
overview back at home.  I think by and large the press did an accurate job. I’m not sure what 
one would point at in the overall coverage that would cause people now to say the war wasn’t 
covered appropriately or as accurately as it can be. It’s reasonable enough to ask the 
question whether coverage is critical enough of what’s going on.  But when one can fairly say 
in retrospect that phase of the war, up to the capture of Baghdad was an enormously 
successful operation.  To look back and say there wasn’t enough criticism of it is another way 
of saying “it really went pretty much as planned”.  And from a military point of view it was a 
huge success. The failure happened once they took Baghdad and then it was sort of like 
“now what do we do?”  And there really was no effective plan and I think that has certainly 
been covered in enormous detail to the mounting fury of the Bush administration.   
Question: HOW DID THE TECHNOLOGY ON THE BATTLE FIELD AFFECT COVERAGE? 
Koppel:  I think the technology was brilliant…I have been arguing for many years we have to 
be careful of our own technology. That simply training a camera on an event and letting 
people back home watch it is a triumph of technology but it’s not journalism. Journalism 
requires selection, editing, prioritizing, some things are more important, some things are less 
important, some things have to be put in context and that takes a little bit of time you don’t do 
that live.  I think we were beaten by NBC technologically, but after the first couple of days the 
technology was less important than the actual reporting and eventually it’s always that way 
and eventually, even though the excitement of seeing a war on television is much greater 
than reading about it in a newspaper, if I really want to know what’s going on I will still pick 
up my copy of the New York Times or the Washington Post even a day after I have been 
covering something to see, what, if anything, I’ve missed.  And I’m always chagrined to learn 
that I’ve missed something.  
The technology is such that when you are moving with an invading army and when much of 
the killing is done at long range, it’s done by close air support, it’s done by artillery pieces of 
multiple rockets than travel a distance of 30 or 40 miles, you rarely see the consequences of 
the violence or at least you don’t see them until several hours later. When you are with an 
invading army, until that army moves into a city, you don’t really have a great deal of contact 
with the local population. So if you were going to ask me “did I do an adequate job of talking 
to Iraqis?”  Absolutely not, I barely saw any Iraqis from the time we crossed the border from 
Kuwait until we got to the outskirts of Baghdad.  So there wasn’t much of an opportunity for 
me to do man in the desert interviews. The problems with interpreters---and the language 







Question: HOW DO YOU KNOW IF A STORY IS TRUE? 
Koppel: Journalism is a continuum which is broken up into daily pieces—sometimes 
hourly.  I think the U.S. government at that point was desperate for a hero—at that time there 
were problems with the war for US sandstorms etc...  So when the Lynch story was 
reported—in the first round of any story telling you go with what the authorities tell you.  Then 
when you are able to check on it a little bit and to talk to other the story gets rectified as it 
goes along.  It turns out to have no basis in fact. It was a great story that turned out not to 
have the additional advantage of being true. Anyone over the age of 21 in journalism who is 
still trusting is probably in the wrong business.  It’s not a question of trusting.  I’m willing to 
bet that if you were out there when (Jessica Lynch) happened and if the authorities tell you 
that and you know that your competitors are all around you  and they’re going to go with that 
story tonight.  I don’t see picking up the phone and saying “hello, I really think that we ought 
to wait on this story for another 2 or 3 days because my nose tells me it’s not entirely 
accurate”.  You go with it the first day based on what the authorities have told you.  You 
quote your sources and you quote them accurately and then you go about checking.  That‘s 
always been one of journalism’s great problems. We have deadlines, we have to meet those 
deadlines and after the fact to go back and say “oh boy, were we taken in” it happens it’s 
going to happen again.  We try as best we can to avoid it but we’re not going to be able to 
entirely.  
It’s only mea culpa if you go around assuming that it’s your obligation everyday to be 
responsible for the truth of what you’re reporting.  I insist that what we deal in is not so much 
truth on a daily basis as facts.  We try to establish the facts.  We try to get sources. We try to 
get reliable sources.  We try to get more than 2 or 3 reliable sources.  But if what you 
presume to be your reliable sources are all lying to you or are themselves mistaken, you are 
going to report something that is untrue even though the facts were correct. 
Question:   AL QAEDA AND IRAQ BUSH WAS NOT CHALLENGED  
Koppel: I don’t know if anyone challenged the president directly, that is a difficult thing to do, 












ASSESS YOUR COVERAGE OF THE RUN-UP TO WAR  
Koppel: I think we did a fair to average job, I don’t think it was a great job.  I don’t think we 
adequately focused on what I think everybody really thinks was behind the war and the 
occupation, and that was the need to safeguard oil from the Persian Gulf.  That is one of the 
most strategically important areas of the world.  The United States lost its surrogate in Iran, 
appears to be in the process in losing its surrogate in Saudi Arabia and needs another one. 
The fact that 9/11 happened made it possible for an American President to say ‘we have 
been assaulted as never before in this country and should anyone with access to WMD 
perform a similar act it would be so devastating that we cannot allow that to happen” I think 
lots of questions were raised beforehand, perhaps not enough.    
Did we do a great job?  No but I’m not sure we ever do a great job.  Every once in a while a 
journalist of another does a great job.  As a group, I think we’re all pretty lucky to do average 
or slightly better than average.    
 
Tom Brokaw was anchor of NBC Nightly News for 21 years and had visited the Iraq 
region several times.  ITN Channel 4 News interviewed him on March 16, 2004 in his 
studio at Rockefeller Center as part of their coverage of the one year anniversary of 
the Iraq invasion.   
Question: Was coverage balanced enough in reporting on the administration’s run up 
to the war? 
Tom Brokaw: What we knew based on what they were saying is that we examined all of 
their claims and all their assertions about what was there, we presented other points of view 
as well, we carried live on the network the debate within the united nations, we covered pm 
Blair and the and the political difficulties that he was having at home; we put on all the 
experts that we could possibly find to determine whether or not this case added up and the 
way the admin claimed that it did.   
Question: They claimed it added up? 
Brokaw: They did claim that the case added up and many people believe who now don’t 
believe obviously that there were WMD there—believed that they were there at the time 
including Hans Blix who thought that there were still things that they could find if they were 
able to go in there in terms of WMD.I think that it is a little disingenuous to suggest that 
television somehow accelerated the rush to war or that it was complicit with the 






Question: DO YOU ACCEPT IF THAT YOU HAD BEEN MORE SKEPTICAL THE RUSH 
TO WAR MIGHT HAVE BEEN SLOWED DOWN OF WAR MIGHT HAVE BEEN 
AVERTED? 
Brokaw: I doubt it, I think that is assigning far too much influence to those of us who are at 
my job—the idea that the 12 million people who watch us every night take everything that I 
say and go and make all their decisions based on that.  I think that anyone who watched 
Nightly News during that time got a pretty good cross section of the views and the debate 
that was going on, 
Question: POWELL AT UN OF 5TH OF FEBRUARY, DIFFERENCES IN COVERAGE OF 
THAT EVENT BETWEEN U.S. AND EUROPE? 
Brokaw: Secretary Powell who is a figure of great integrity in this country, obviously has 
great influence and credibility, made by all accounts, even within the U.N. security council, 
what they felt was the best case that the administration had made so far it was still in my 
judgment a tenuous case because you had some radio intercepts you were talking about. 
That didn’t come down to the smoking gun at that point, but it was our responsibility to report 
on what he had said that day and frankly I had nothing that I could point to that was contrary 
to what he was testifying to. Part of our obligation not just to be skeptical but to present other 
evidence and in fact we didn’t have anything that we could point to say that he was dead 
wrong. 
He had the director of the CIA sitting behind him and the United Nations ambassador sitting 
behind him and he said this represents the best intelligence that we have. 
 
Question: BUSH MARCH 6 PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH HE MENTIONS 9/11 AND 
AL QAEDA 14 TIMES?  
Brokaw: That connection between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, we examined it and we 
kept saying on the air “show us the evidence of that, there is no evidence of that, we cited 
sources in the middle east and Europe---I went down to see Vaclav Havel in his last 
appearance in Washington and he said he had told the administration they had no evidence 
or hard intelligence that Atta had met with a member of Saddam’s regime in Prague.  That 
was reported very clearly here on NBC….we did the best job that we could of vetting 
everything that came up and putting it through the various filters that we had. 
Brokaw: My own strong impression is that the American audience takes in what we report, 
what CBS ABC, FOX, MSNBC, CNN, what they read in the New York Times what they read 
in their local newspapers, what they hear on radio, and they kind of make a stew out of all of 





It’s been kind of amusing to me to see reporters from the United Kingdom and from Europe 
generally coming here and finding criticism with American media about what happened in 
Iraq.  When at the same time you had your prime minister who was an ally of this country… 
but if you look at it piece by piece by piece, it was pretty strong reporting that went on here, it 
was not a polemic as some of the printed press that I saw in Great Britain. 
Question THE WAR ITSELF, ARE YOU PLEASED WITH COVERAGE OF THE WAR 
ITSELF? 
 Brokaw:  Taken as a whole, I think that it went pretty well in terms of the coverage, there 
was a lot of critical coverage about the looting and about the general chaos as soon as so 
called major combat was over or the arrival of the American forces in Baghdad, I think the 
American People had and understanding of that.  All of this is absorbed in a climate of some 
emotion, people are inclined to want their forces to do well they’ve got their sons and 
daughters over there.  This is a country that had gone through 9/11 and it had not worn off 
yet.  So our job is to try to provide a factual basis for people to make decisions but we can’t 
always control the spirit in which they’re going to receive that information. 
We tried to present a composite picture, we didn’t just leave it with the up close and personal 
from the embed reporters, we had maps and extensive graphic systems here, we had military 
analysts,  we were getting information from the pentagon and the state department and we 
were getting information from our own folks in Baghdad and in other areas.  So it just wasn’t 
just doing a video poster for the United States military, we really did try to put that into some 
kind of context. We were constantly trying to provide some kind of a balanced picture it 
wasn’t just getting up on a tank with a flag and waving it across the desert. 
Question: DID THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS CORPS DO THEIR JOB? 
Brokaw: It’s a tricky piece; I don’t think you can put the whole burden on the White House 
Press corps obviously that’s a unique situation.  This is a very controlling White House, 
there’s no question about that, they have a strong message, the president doesn’t appear 
very often on spontaneous occasions and we’ve made that clear, we’ve said that to our 
audience. I don’t think the American television audience was bamboozled, I think they had a 
pretty strong sense about why this president felt that he had to go to war.  We also raised 
real issues on the other side.  “why couldn’t the inspections go on longer, why couldn’t you 
take 3 more months and try to do the diplomacy…all these issues were raised in one way or 
another but you could say that the administration did a very skilful job of getting their political 
point of view across. 
The coverage of News is not just judged on a 24 hour basis, it’s over a long term, this is a 
very complex situation, I’ve been doing this for 40 years and Iraq is about as complex as any 






The British Perspective 
Bill Neely is currently the International Editor for ITV News.  He has reported for ITV 
as their Bureau Chief in Washington D.C. as well as from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, 
Mexico and Sri Lanka. He was embedded with British forces in Iraq in 2003. I 
interviewed him in the ITN Washington, D.C. bureau in March of 2011 and asked him 
about his thoughts on how the press reacted to Powell’s presentation to the U.N. you 
need to get your science correspondent on it you need to probe absolutely 
everything.” 
Question: Did you “go native” as an embed.   
Bill Neely:  I was o.k. with it as long as the reporter understands that they were ‘embedded’ 
but not ‘in bed with’. You have to maintain your independence and that is hard, that’s a 
struggle because you come to rely on the military for your food and for your survival.  You are 
at their mercy in some respects.  You need to be very very vigilant about your own journalism 
and  
Question: DO YOU THINK THAT BRITISH JOURNALISTS MUCH MORE SKEPTICAL 
THAT AMERICAN JOURNALISTS? 
Neely: Absolutely, 100 percent true.  And since I arrived here (in the U.S.) twenty years ago, 
I’ve been struck with how “deferential “is the wrong word, but it is approaching deference.   
The attitude of reporters, especially to the president. The president is the head of state; you 
might ask different questions to the prime minister than you would to the head of state. But 
when you ask questions to the prime minister, yes you respect him or her and you respect 
the office, but we’re damned if we’re gonna ask wimpy questions. 
It not seen to appear macho or anything, this is important stuff and if we don’t hold the head 
of state or of the government to account, who will?  That’s our job…to speak truth to power.  
And for the first two years of the Iraq war, nobody in American journalism spoke truth to 
power, nobody had the guts to ask George Bush some of the key questions some of the key 
questions about Iraq.  It was a couple of years before American journalism really got it that 
the Iraq war was really not going well at all, was maybe a mistake in the first place, that 
maybe the intelligence was maybe skewed or just plain wrong. And maybe that there had 
been deception involved. 
Question:  Did you think any of those things before you went into Iraq? 
Neely: Yes, I can tell you that 50% of the troops that I was with thought that maybe the war 
wasn’t justified and that they said that privately.  They said don’t quote me on that, they said 
that’s not my job anyway, we’ve been given a task to do and we’re gonna do it damn well.  
But the homeland, America was attacked in 2001 so the reaction after that, at least for the 





doubts about the homeland security issue and about whether we were going about this the 
right way.  You were seen as being unpatriotic because the Bush administration had said 
“you were either for us or you were against us” and that applied to media organizations as 
well.  For British journalists it was equivalent to covering the IRA campaign over 30 years.  I 
don’t think that all British journalists were neutral in that.  One of the first experiences I had as 
a young journalist was watching news editors spike stories that had statements from the IRA.  
British journalists did not cover themselves in glory covering “the troubles”.  There was a 
great deal of willful self censorship.  It is not unique to American journalists that when the 
homeland is threatened you are just as robust with your own government as you are with the 
enemy. 
The attitude of a journalist to a politician should be that of a dog to a lamp post.   
I was at the UN, many U.S. journalists did not probe far enough what Colin Powell said at 
UN. If Colin Powell holds up the vial and says there is enough in here to kill thousands…then 
you need to get your science correspondent on it you need to probe absolutely everything. 
You need to be aggressive and antagonistic and that is certainly what a lot of American 
reporters are not. They are much less aggressive than British reporters who are not just the 
dog peeing against the lamppost...they’re barking and snapping and being a pain in the ass. 
Question: WHY IS THAT .WHAT IS DIFFERENT IN OUR CULTURES? 
Neely: American journalists have bought the national myth that America is the just the 
greatest country that the world has ever known and therefore most of the things America 
does, it does for really good reasons and even if your propping up corrupt regimes, or 
sending guns to Latin America even if you’re in bed with the Saudis who are politically 
repressive it’s ok because there is a greater goal and we’re the good guys. Just remember 
we’re the good guys.  In Britain and France we’re tarnished by hundreds of years of bad 
things.  There were times when we were on the right side of history and times when we’ve 
clearly been on the wrong side of history. We’ve lost an empire, we’ve been humbled, and 
the French have been invaded.  In Europe we know we’re not the greatest country the world 
have ever known and we chuckle at American arrogance.  
Neely: A British journalist thinks someone is lying, or trying to pull the wool over our eyes.  
Skepticism, even cynicism is our first thought.  I think Skepticism ought to be the first thought 











Lindsey Hilsum is ITN Channel 4 News International Editor, and the author of 
“Sandstorm; Libya in the Time of Revolution, an account of the fall of Colonel 
Gaddafi.”  She covered the Iraq War for ITN including the invasion of Baghdad by 
U.S. forces and the U.S Marine assault on Fallujah in November of 2004. She has 
covered  the "Arab Spring" from Egypt and Bahrain, was stationed in Belgrade in 
1999 when NATO bombed Serbia, Her reports from Africa, the Middle East and 
Russia have earned her several awards. I interviewed her in the spring of 2010 at the 
ITN Washington, D.C. Bureau and asked about her experiences reporting from Iraq.  
Lindsey Hilsum: I got to Baghdad on February 6th, the day Colin Powell made his 
presentation at the U.N. It was extraordinary because we watched it in the Ministry of 
Information in Baghdad which was the only place where you could see it. With the Ministry of 
Information officials.  It was surreal.  The next day one of the officials took us out to one of 
the places Colin Powell had mentioned to try and proved to us that what he had said wasn’t 
true.   
The way that presentation was put together initially was quite convincing.  You had the 
graphics the satellite photographs and the whole way it was done. And because as 
journalists we didn’t trust what Saddam Hussein and his regime said because we knew that 
they lied. The point where I finally realized that what the Americans were saying wasn’t true 
was just a few days before the war started.  When Bush and the other started to bang on 
about how an airborne drone might be used for spraying chemical weapons. The Iraqis took 
us to see this drone.   This drone was like a small balsa wood model airplane. We also found 
one that the Iraqis had painted pink which the Iraqis had taken to an air show in Jordan in 
order to try to sell them.  This was not a secret weapon. 
The AP correspondent that was with us said that “it had an engine the size of a weed 
wacker”. Our Iraqi driver came up to me and said quizzically “is this airplane a very big 
problem for America?”And I looked at him and we burst out laughing. 
Question: Did you investigate the Claims that Colin Powell made before the UN? 
Hilsum: We were restricted in what we could do by Saddam…you couldn’t travel freely in 
Iraq you had to go where they took you to or where they let you go.  The system of secret 
police and minders meant that it was extremely difficult to get away from that.  So it was hard 
to investigate. 
 As British broadcast journalists we are more skeptical of government than American 
broadcast journalists.  We do believe our government is lying unless they can prove 
otherwise.  On the whole I think Americans think the government is telling the truth unless it 





It’s because that’s our job.  It’s our job to think that everything’s a lie. It’s a cultural difference.  
In Britain when we have an election, people will support whoever is elected until he’s elected 
whereupon we immediately loathe him and want to bring him down. We support someone 
until they are the leader, then we want to get rid of him. 
On the Iraq war we were all too credulous. Many of us believed there was some truth in what 
the government said and we believed Saddam Hussein probably had weapons of mass 
destruction.  We didn’t necessarily believe that those would be dangerous. We didn’t 
necessarily believe that he could blow up the world. But from travelling to Iraq for many 
years, I knew that Saddam once had WMDs and he was still acting as though he still had 
WMDs so it was his action that made us suspicious, rather than believing what our 
government told us. 
Question: WMD ON THE PRESS LEAVING BEFORE THE WAR BEGAN? 
Hilsum: The Pentagon told them “get out”, don’t stay, it’s too dangerous you might be taken 
prisoner. We can’t promise that we won’t bomb the ministry of information.  There was huge 
pressure on them to leave.  I think they buckled under that pressure.  I believe the pentagon 
didn’t want them there because they didn’t want them to report that side of the story.  I can’t 
prove that but that’s what I think.  Of course the Pentagon couldn’t guarantee their safety, it’s 
a war and you can’t guarantee safety.  But it was also convenient for the pentagon to not 
have them there. The British government never said anything to us.Because if they did we’d 
tell them to piss off we wouldn’t take the slightest bit of notice. 
I had one minor pressure from our foreign editor at the time who said that he had heard from 
somewhere that women might be in more danger so that perhaps women should leave.  I 
didn’t appreciate that. But we had made a calculation to stay.  We knew there was going to 
be a war; we knew that Bagdad was going to be bombed, we knew what Saddam was like 
we knew something of what the military campaign was going to be. There was no new 
information in the week leading up to the war to make us take a different decision.  It was a 
calculated risk and we thought it was worth it. 
 
Hilsum: We in Britain separated September 11 from Iraq.  There was no connection.  We 
could see there was no connection.  In the broadcast media in America they blurred it.  And 
that was hugely misleading. There was not much knowledge in American about the 
differences between Iraq and Afghanistan.  I don’t think that many people in America knew 








JOHN IRVINE INTERVIEW 
 
John Irvine broadcast nightly reports for ITV News and NBC News from Baghdad 
during the intense aerial bombardment at the start of the war. He was the first foreign 
correspondent to greet the arriving US troops to Baghdad.  He was awarded the 
Royal Television Society Journalist of the Year award in 2003 for his coverage of the 
invasion.  I interviewed him at ITN’s Washington, D.C. Bureau on January 30, 2009. 
John Irvine: The Iraqis were in control of Baghdad until the Americans arrived on April 9 
2003.  The Americans had started air raids about 3 weeks earlier, so there was a 3 week 
period (after the initial invasion) where Baghdad was still under the control of Saddam’s 
regime.  Immediately before the Americans arrived in Baghdad.  We were worried that we 
could be taken hostage or killed in the 24 hour period when we were on our own—the 
apparatus of the regime broke down completely and everybody did a runner. We were 
reporting the war from Baghdad from their perspective.   
I spent most of my time in Baghdad because we knew it (the war) was coming.  From 
October 2002 onwards the drumbeat for war got louder and louder and louder and we saw 
the UN stuff happening and we just knew it was coming. I thought it said a lot about the 
American psyche that news managers were probably only really interested in one side of the 
war and that was the American invasion force side of the war. 
GREETING THE MARINES IN BAGHDAD. 
Irvine:The Americans called it “Thunder Run”.  We could see the Americans several miles 
away through our long camera lens.  Everyone was reluctant to leave the safety of the hotel.  
We decided to go out and have a look for ourselves.   We drove out and saw some looting 
going on.  We saw Saddam’s pictures everywhere and people throwing cans of petrol and 
their shoes at Saddam’s pictures setting his pictures on fire.  There was a celebratory air.   
We eventually came to this overpass and cars were reluctant to pass over it.  We decided to 
cross it and se stopped when I saw a group of Iraqis. The Iraqis started cheering when an 
American humvee came rolling by.  We could see an American checkpoint several miles 
away outside the Canal hotel which had been the headquarters for the UN weapons 
inspectors which had a certain irony to it.  We shouted that “we’re from British TV, can we 
come up?” They waved us up.  I walked over and shook the hand of a marine and started 
chatting to the marines.  They were actually arresting Iraqis who had been trying to steal UN 
cars. We decided to say that we were the first to report on the Americans arriving in Baghdad 
until somebody proves us wrong. 
 I walked up to them and said “hello my name is John Irvine from ITV TV…I said welcome to 
Baghdad”….  Sergeant welcome to Baghdad.  I didn’t realize its importance for me at the 
time. 





David Smith was an award-winning TV correspondent with ITN Channel 4 News. In 
January 2008, The Daily Telegraph identified him as one of the most influential 
Britons in America. He is currently Deputy Director of the United Nations Information 
Office in Argentina.  He was based in Washington D.C. during the early years of the 
Iraq War and covered Colin Powell’s presentation to the U.N. for ITN. I conducted this 
interview on April 18, 2009 at his home in Washington, D.C. 
David Smith: In the days immediately after 9/11 it was very obvious we had a Washington 
press corps which, in my terms, was “supine” or accepting, buying whatever the White House 
line was.   The press was saying that in a sense “we are all in this together” and the Bush 
White House created an environment in which it was possible in that period immediately after 
9/11 –for 2 to 3 years afterwards, where the attitude of the White House press corps was 
very much quiescent adoption, tacit acceptance, quiet acceptance of whatever the White 
House gave them.  
WHY DID THAT HAPPEN?  
Smith: Because there had been an attack on the American mainland, the like of which we’d 
never seen in this country and never experienced before.  There were attacks not only on the 
innocents on the 37th floor of the twin towers, but also on the people who tried to go and save 
them.  A kind of brutal, naked, modern technological onslaught on an edifice in the heart of 
the financial capital of the world, specifically against the superpower. A superpower which for 
years had been convincing itself that it would never face that that sort of threat again.  Just 
like in Britain in 1941, the journalist feels like he is now a part of the national struggle.    
Smith: 9/11 created an environment for the American journalist that said “you’re with us or 
you’re against us”.  Just as the President had made that statement to the countries of the 
Middle East.  American correspondents were reporting the necessity to go to war as seen 
through the eyes of the Bush Administration. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the 
President and National Security Advisor Condi Rice with her mushroom clouds.  But the 
perspective from Europe was “what’s the evidence? What’s the reasoning?  What’s the 
rationale?”So there was obviously a dichotomy, a split right there. Part of it was about the 
moment, Europe had not seen terrorism yet.  The London subway bombings and Madrid train 
bombings had not happened yet.   
Part of it is a much more rooted cultural difference.  The media in Great Britain, even at a 
time of war, feels its duty is to always challenge authority, to question authority, to put 
authority through its hoops, rather than just accept that quiet adoption of what the 
administration was saying.   
 
 





WHY IS THERE A DIFFERENCE IN APPROACH? 
Smith: At home, the way journalists talk to British politicians is very different than the way 
American journalists talk to American politicians.  In Britain it is far more “in your face”.  It’s 
far more, “Where’s the evidence for that?  How can you say that?”  These are questions that 
day in and day out you will hear across the British airwaves. The way that the American 
reporter will speak to the figure in authority is considerably more deferential than in the 
U.K.    I was paid to be rude to Tony Blair; I was paid to challenge the British Foreign 
Secretary.  I don’t think that anyone who works for ABC News or CNN is going to win plaudits 
or pay raises for having a real go at the President.  I would never say to the Prime Minister or 
Foreign Minister or the Queen…I would never say “Sir” or “Madame” on my television camera 
and yet I routinely hear American Journalists saying “Mr. President” or “Madame Secretary”.  
This is because I would not wish to be seen as putting myself in a deferential position 
towards that person.  We would ask a no holds barred conversational question.  
SO DOES THIS MEAN THAT AMERICAN JOURNALISTS WILL NEVER ASK TOUGH 
QUESITONS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS? 
Smith: I think questions were asked but were asked in such a deferential manner that it was 
hard to know what the question was.   For instance, during the Rumsfeld Pentagon briefings 
it was very “chummy” almost boys clubish atmosphere. There is then this very open 
dichotomy between two reporting cultures-- and it’s heading into war.  The interesting thing is 
that we were co joined at the hip.  Prime Minister Blair clearly agreed with Bush that Britain 
will be there for this adventure. 
Smith: That creates a special moment where British journalists could not buy whatever the 
line was from the White House even though it might be in sync with whatever was being said 
by the government in London. Our audience would have given us hell and said “It is not your 
place to be buying into this; it is your place to be questioning.” 
When Powell was at the UN making his masterful presentation, it’s why you would have seen 
me and others carefully writing what I think of as “health warnings”, “disclaimers”.  My script 
said “The Americans say this…but it’s based on intelligence and Iraqi defectors”. And I 
quietly said to my audience, “Nudge, wink, are we to buy this?” The most important element 
is that American television ran very little of the nay sayers, the doubting Thomas’s, the 
skeptics, lead by the French, but also the Chinese and the Russians. I remember vividly 
saying to my producer that we must have a big chunk of the French, because the UN 
Security Council is the supreme court of the world—and there’s nothing more important than 
war and peace.  And a major player in that Security Council was saying volubly, not once, but 
repeatedly “This needs more time.  This is hasty. This is no moment to do this”    
The people around Bush were extraordinarily good.  I was on the receiving end some of their 
calls.  The people around Bush were extraordinarily effective at pounding their 
message.  Making journalists feel that if they didn’t pound on that message they were not 
with the program, not with the story, and somehow missing it.  They were very good.  Karl 
Rove and Karen Hughes were very very good, and real pros at one message, keep pounding 





guys who aren’t telling it the way you want it told and giving them a very stern 
message.  They were very good at that side of the business.  All of which is modern political 
hardball. 
 I’m not sure the American press corps, particularly TV was really armor plated enough to 
stand up and say “That’s not what I do”.  “I’m not here to be a cheer leader”.  “The head 
cheer leader is called war and suddenly the press corps was cheerleading with it. 
POWELL MAKES HIS PRESENTATION, AND BECAUSE HE WAS SO WELL 
RESPECTED NO ONE QUESTIONED THE CONTENT OF WHAT HE WAS SAYING?  
Smith:  The American media had been carefully seduced by the presence of Colin 
Powell.  Why?  Because, if General Powell was on board then this must be 100 percent for 
real.   I think again that this was political hardball, political savvy.  The Bush administration 
never dealt with the public glare without considering that.  The choice of Colin Powell was a 
way of inoculating them against anybody saying “not credible”.  If Powell was the front man, it 
had to be true. So when people saw a formidable case being laid out by the dove of the 
administration that was a very careful calibration on the part of the White House to make sure 
the media bought into the idea. 
IS ANY OF THIS BECAUSE WASHINGTON IS SO INCESTUOUS, EVERYONE—
REPORTERS AND POLITICANS,  GOES TO THE SAME COCKTAIL PARTIES, 
EVERYONE IS VERY BUDDY BUDDY? 
Smith:   I think we underestimate the pressure that the modern TV reporter comes under to 
get it all into 2 ½ to 3 minutes.  We also forget the pressure TV reporters come under to 
reflect what the New York Times and the Washington Post are saying. At that time the heavy 
weights were saying “full speed ahead to war”.  The New York Times and the Washington 
Post lead the charge—all of which plays into the way that TV editors think.   
 So in a sense, going into the Powell presentation, the question is for the American media, 
“how good was his performance going to be?” The question for British reporters was “Has he 
got the goods?”   From an American TV perspective, it was treated as a piece of theatre.  It 
was not treated as an event that needed scrutiny and no holds barred questioning.  It was 
treated as an event where people asked “How did he do?” The Bush White House has 
played into that and carefully manipulated it by choosing the consummate performer—And 
he happened to be the one dove, who might stand up to the hawks—so if he’s bought on 
then it must be true.  
What do you think about SCRIPT APPROVAL  
Smith:  I never once, in 25 years at ITN, I never had anyone approve a script.  I wasn’t 
having someone in London tell me what the story was. But an American TV correspondent 
would always, at whatever level, needs to submit their scripts for approval. It actually means 
that the New York grid, the New York center, says “The story is XYZ” That’s based on what 





briefing, what you heard from the old intelligence hand that you had lunch with…it has all 
those elements written into it This as opposed to the story that the person on the ground who 
is paid and educated and primed to call it the way he or she sees it.  The American 
correspondent is paid to deliver that which New York Center, or Atlanta or Burbank believes 
IS the story.  
And it’s a fundamental difference between the two reporting cultures.  No self respecting 
British correspondent would ever accept script approval. Why, because you were giving away 
control of the product to people who were not on the ground with you.  
So the narrative is always going to be hard hitting, the questions are always going to be 
tougher, the summary is always going to be more objective if it is done by one person seeing 
it with a clear, well informed field of vision rather than a central committee of people who 
have different views or read different things and want to see a composite. 
Question: WAS THIS A PERFECT STORM ALL THINGS CAME TOGETHER IN BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION, PRESS AND THE IRAQ WAR? 
Smith: You cannot underestimate the shock factor of 9/11. You cannot underestimate an 
administration that had a rotten first day and then realized what was out there for them if they 
got their act together. You can’t underestimate an American media under the gun of numbers 
showing initial outrage followed by blanket support for a hard line administration response. 
 What seems in hindsight to have been an inept period of leadership, at the time was 
extremely conscious of winning control of the news cycle.  Governance in the days after 9/11 
was about controlling the news cycle and using the news cycle to get to the political end they 
had in mind. They were extremely good at going into every week with a clear idea of where 
they wanted to be by the end of the week in terms of the message, how the message related 
to the goal, how the president was perceived at the center of that goal and then executing 
it. They put a primacy on controlling the news cycle and governance was primarily about 
having control of that news cycle this was a very effective machine at work, knowing how to 
pull the levers, not only in the US but around the world, in terms of presenting arguments and 










Matt Frei is ITN Channel 4’s Washington correspondent following a long career at 
the BBC as correspondent and anchor of “BBC World News America”.   I interviewed 
him in the ITN Washington, D.C. Bureau in March of 2011. 
MATT FREI: 9/11 was much more strongly felt in the United States than in Great Britain. So 
to question the motives for war, the existence of WMD was considered by more in the U.S. 
as unpatriotic than it was in the U.K.The popular mood was much more against the war in the 
U.K. than it was in the U.S.  The adversarial culture of the press in the U.K.   The 
parliamentary system in the U.K. is adversarial.  The members of Parliament face each other, 
they face off every day.  The opposition party is called “Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition”.  It is 
a much more adversarial system than in the U.S.  We take bitter division for granted, it’s the 
way we like things.   
Frei: There is an inbuilt deference in American society, much more than there is in Britain. 
There is deference in the institutions vested in the power of the people.  
When I interviewed Bush my American executive producer said to me “Remember that you 
are interviewing the President of the United States, you can’t interrupt his answers, you can’t 
give him a hard time, you’ve got to be polite” You would never do that with a British Prime 
Minster, you just hammer them.   However, we do show deference to our Queen.  There is a 
knee jerk skepticism in the British media...we just don’t believe what we’re told. 
You go to an interview with a Prime Minister and you assume he is going to lie thru his teeth.  
When you go to an interview with the President you think he might lie, but you give him the 
benefit of the doubt.  
 “There was a much greater skepticism in the British public and the British media about the 
reasons for going to war.  They bought none of the Al Qaeda bullshit that Powell was talking 
about. They just didn’t buy it. There is an instinctive, almost knee jerk skepticism in the British 
media. We just don’t believe what we’re told. So to get a feel for when this is the case and 
when you are being spun a lie is essential. The British public and the British media were in 
concert with that. There was a feeling that with WMD there was something fishy, something 
didn’t quite smell right. It was a war of choice after all.  We were not invaded. It took a year to 
prepare people for that war. The key difference was that in Britain they smelled something 
was fishy and in the U.S. they didn’t.”  “But ultimately the Brits went to war with America and 











SENTENCES CHOSEN FOR FRAMING ANALYSIS 
1. Endorsed the frame. For the purpose of this study sentences were counted as endorsing 
the Bush administration’s frame when the reporter, interview subject or quoted source 
echoed the official line without attribution.  
Example:   “Terror ties. Piece by piece, the new case laid out today linking Iraq to Osama 
bin Laden's al-Qaeda network.”  
In this category I also counted every on screen sentence uttered by Colin Powell or other 
officials making the Bush administration’s case. Critics argue that the basic content of 
Powell’s presentation was not questioned or thoroughly scrutinized in many of the American 
television news reports and that allegations made by Powell were treated as though they 
were facts.  When reporters simply repeated Powell’s claims and did not assess their validity 
they had abandoned their role as professional skeptics and were acting as conduits helping 
the Bush administration frame the story and advance the case for war.  
 
2. Merely disseminated the frame. Sentences were counted in this category if they 
conveyed the official frame with attribution to the source, but with no overt or implied 
endorsement or skepticism toward the frame.  
 
Examples:  “He said”; “Powell went on to cite”; “Powell’s next point was that…” 
3. Raised questions about the frame. Sentences were counted in this category when the 
words of a reporter, interview subject or quoted source conveyed skepticism about the 
Administration’s frame. Sentences containing skeptical attribution such as “he claimed” or “he 
alleged” were also counted in this category 
Example: “In another blow to the U.S. case, sources in London tell ABC News that British 
intelligence is highly skeptical about a theory that al-Qaeda is connected.”  
 




















#1 Colin Powell is highly trustworthy, thoroughly prepared, effective and credible. 
 
E:  Endorsed the frame 
M:  Merely disseminated the frame 
R:  Raised questions about the frame 
 
FEBRUARY 3, 2003   
NBC NEWS 
M And TARGET: IRAQ. Secretary of State Powell now concedes there will be no smoking 
gun in Wednesday's speech to the UN, 
M but says the case is strong against Saddam.  
E MITCHELL: But the diplomacy, the inspections, the war all are on hold until the world hears 
from Colin Powell on Wednesday.  
M Today he tried to lower expectations for his UN appearance.  
M MITCHELL: In a Wall Street Journal column today, Powell wrote, "There will be no 
smoking gun," but said he would provide evidence Saddam is cheating 
M. And Richard Haass, a top State Department official, told an Egyptian newspaper, "We will 
not present pictures of 30,000 stockpiled warheads if that's what you mean by evidence."  
M Mr. RICHARD BOUCHER (State Department Spokesman): We're not trying to hype this 
presentation.  
E MITCHELL: Why the rush to downplay the evidence? Partly concern over a Newsweek 
report describing Powell's case as "nearly open and shut." 
M US officials say it is far more subjective.  
**E Powell will have electronic intercepts indicating Iraqi deception and links to terror groups; 
satellite photos, including trucks the US says are mobile biological labs; proof of Iraq's 
attempts to purchase illegal weapon components.  
R But officials warn it is all open to interpretation.  
R Mr. DAVID KAY (Former UN Weapons Inspector): Almost always it is ambiguous because 
it's trying to read from a picture or pick out a voice communications information.  
E MITCHELL: So will Powell persuade other members of the Security Council like Russia, 
whose president, for the first time today, said he might back a second resolution authorizing 
force against Iraq.  
ITV NEWS 
M The United States says it will present some of that evidence to the United Nations on 
Wednesday. 
R So Colin Powell will try to convince the UN security council,  
M Today he promised compelling proof that Iraq is hiding evidence of its weapons. 
E Ari Fleischer (White House spokesman) press conference SOT - I think it (evidence of 
weapons) will be compelling, but I think these will be judgments that people make and that is 
exactly why the President wants this done in public  
**E Colin Powell will use surveillance photos and transcripts of secretly recorded 
conversations to try to show that Iraq is hiding weapons documents and laboratories in 
schools hospitals and even mosques.  
**E He’ll highlight one phone conversation in which an Iraqi official is heard mocking the UN 





R but there’s no guarantee that this will convince anyone. 
M Mr. Powell admitted today “there will be no smoking gun” and just in case he can’t 
convince the UN, he warned “we will not shrink from war” 
R Terrence Taylor a leading UN inspector in Iraq for 4 years says Powell’s evidence will be 
circumstantial.  
“R  Taylor:  it’s a very very important week., I think its very hard to look as if it is like a court 
with evidence delivered in the same way. And proving beyond all reasonable doubt  
R  Taylor  I think that s a standard by which one would expect in a court of law. We’re not in 
that kind of situation. What we’ll have is a mass of circumstantial evidence  
 
 
FEBRUARY 4 NBC News: Nightly News 
Profile: Secretary of State Colin Powell prepares for tomorrow's speech before UN 
Security Council  
M COUNTDOWN: IRAQ. The secretary of state, less than a day away from a critical 
speech at the UN,  
E TOM BROKAW, anchor: NBC News IN DEPTH tonight, the showdown with Iraq, and the 
countdown to a speech by Secretary of State Colin Powell at the UN tomorrow that could 
move the world closer to war.  
Andrea Mitchell tonight, IN DEPTH.  
Offscreen Voice: Mr. Secretary?  
Secretary of State COLIN POWELL: Hi.  
R Voice: Are you confident you will make your case, sir?  
E Mr. POWELL: You'll see.  
ANDREA MITCHELL reporting:  
E The day before his make-or-break UN appearance, Colin Powell came to New York to 
practice his speech.  
E He also tried to soften up Security Council skeptics like China, one of five members who 
can block UN support for war with Iraq.  
**E MITCHELL: Powell will try to make that point tomorrow using equipment brought in to the 
Security Council today so he can show satellite pictures and play audio of intercepted 
communications between Iraqi officials.  
M President Bush called Russia's President Putin today to give him a preview. Tony Blair did 
the same with France's President Chirac, but failed to change his mind about the war option.  
M Here in the Security Council tomorrow, France will be the hardest sell. 
M But US officials believe if Colin Powell's evidence is strong enough to win over France, 
then other critics, even Russia, may follow.  
R How good will the evidence be? 
E But officials say Powell is convinced he can still establish a pattern that will be an 









CBS NEWS FEBRUARY 4 
M DAN RATHER, CBS ANCHOR: So just what will Secretary Powell tell the Security Council 
tomorrow, and how might a conflict with Iraq affect the ongoing war on terror    
M DAVID MARTIN, CBS NEWS (voice-over): Secretary of State Powell arrived in New York this 
evening to begin the final push to convince members of the U.N. Security Council Saddam Hussein 
must go. 
E Powell has drafted CIA director Tenet to appear with him before the U.N. Security Council 
tomorrow in what promises to be a turning point in the confrontation with Iraq. 
E Powell will display diagrams of mobile biological weapons vans, based on eyewitness descriptions 
from Iraqi defectors.  
E He will also release transcripts of intercepted conversations between Iraqi officials talking about 
hiding materials from the U.N. weapons inspectors. 
PETER JENNINGS, ABC NEWS 
ABC FEB 3 
M The Secretary of State Colin Powell is still going to lay out the case for war as scheduled in 
his speech to the United Nations speech on Wednesday.  
M Raddatz: (VO) Secretary Powell is trying to lower expectation about his UN speech,  
E writing in "The Wall Street Journal" today that he has no smoking gun, rather a 
"straightforward, sober and compelling demonstration" that Saddam Hussein is concealing 
weapons of mass destruction. 
E Will there be any surprises? RICHARD BOUCHER, STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN 
”Generally, no.”  
 
ABC Feb 4 
M They are focusing on the presentation of Secretary of State Colin Powell, the one that he 
will make tomorrow to the United Nations. 
E It has become a very significant milestone on the road to a possible war.  
ABC's Martha Raddatz is at the United Nations tonight. Martha, you came up from 
Washington with the Secretary today. What gives? MARTHA RADDATZ, ABC NEWS 
E Well, Peter, this speech is the result of days of negotiations over what to declassify.  
E The presentation will end up being about 90 minutes long and will be divided into several 
parts. 
** E (VO) In one segment, Secretary Powell will play audiotapes of intercepted 
communications between Iraqi officials, who are said to be talking about "hiding things." 
 M The tapes are in Arabic and will be translated during Powell's speech. 
E It is highly unusual for audio intercepts to be released 
M it has not happened since 1983, when the US played tapes of Soviet officers 
acknowledging they had shot down a Korean Airlines jet 
E  Secretary Powell is trying to lower expectations about his UN speech, writing in "The Wall 
Street Journal" today that he has no smoking gun, 
 E rather a "straightforward, sober and compelling demonstration" that Saddam Hussein is 
concealing weapons of mass destruction 
**R  The high-tech presentation will include satellite imagery allegedly showing Iraqi efforts 
to hide banned weapons.  
E The CIA continues to fight the release of some materials. 
E  Powell vetoed some of the evidence, especially some evidence presented by the 





E  he didn't think it was strong enough. 
E  Thanks very much, Martha. Martha Raddatz, who's here in New York tonight. A lot of 
people are gonna listen to this. We will broadcast it live at about 10:30 Eastern time tomorrow 
morning. 
**E  Third, defector testimony. Powell will rely on the word of some Iraqi defectors who say 
that Saddam Hussein has mobile biological labs that are easily hidden throughout the 
country. 
 
ABC 5 February 2003 
PETER JENNINGS, ABC NEWS 
R Mr. Powell, as we said, was talking to many audiences. Some are inclined to believe him, 
others to doubt him.  
REMEMBERING ANOTHER DRAMATIC UN PRESENTATION ADLAI STEVENSON 
CONFRONTED USSR  
E (We cannot say whether Secretary Powell's appearance at the UN today will go down in 
history, though it may be a milestone on the road to war. 
E But when he made his presentation with pictures, we thought, briefly, of another American 
official who used the Security Council to give a stunning performance. It was 1962, on the 
brink of war between the superpowers. 
M  That's our report on the broadcast. Tomorrow, we will test in Washington, around the 
country and overseas, to what degree Secretary Powell made a convincing case against 
Iraq. I'm Peter Jennings, thank you for joining us and good night.  
R JIM SCIUTTO, ABC NEWS (OC) Peter, here in Europe, Secretary Powell's address 
emboldened the hawks, but did little to persuade the skeptics. Britain called on the Security 
Council to face up to its responsibilities.  
 
FEBRUARY 5 2003  NBC NEWS 
E TOM BROKAW, anchor: Secretary of State Colin Powell has given a lot of important 
speeches in his lifetime to a lot of large audiences, but no speech was more important than 
the one he gave today, and no audience was more attentive.  
Andrea Mitchell: 
E Powell came prepared, with CIA Director George Tenet.  
M Working together until late last night and over the weekend at CIA headquarters, the two 
men tried to build a case of Iraq's deception and denial.  
M Roger O'NEIL: The grad student at Georgia State University, like many college students, 
sweating through StairMasters and workouts, but not consumed by war talk. Powell's speech 
to the Security Council did capture their attention, though. 
E O'NEIL: The speech was intended for skeptical countries, but also for a doubting America. 
And today, the ears of the nation were tuned in. Roger O'Neil, NBC News, Savannah 
TOM BROKAW, anchor: Also on the NIGHTLY NEWS, IRAQ WATCH tonight. 
M As you might expect, Secretary Powell's speech at the UN is the lead story on television 
newscasts around the world. How's it playing? 
M A German newscast describes Powell as a prosecutor presenting charges to a court.  
E and they are more confident after Powell's presentation today they will get crucial support. 





E On Capitol Hill, lawmakers glued to their televisions. Almost all, Republicans and 
Democrats, praising the strength of Powell's case.  
E Senator JOHN WARNER (Republican, Chairman, Armed Services Committee): He laid the 
facts out in such a way that I don't know how reasonable men and women can differ with 
regard to the threat.  
E Senator DIANNE FEINSTEIN (Democrat, Select Intelligence Committee): This is a shift for 
me. This was a very impressive chain of evidence.  
M BROWN: But even supporters challenge the president to make the most of this moment 
and win UN backing.  
E Senator JOSEPH BIDEN (Democrat, Foreign Relations Committee): That his presentation 
will embolden leaders who have been reluctant to risk any political capital in their own 
countries.  
 
CBS NEWS FEB 5   
  
M RATHER: The Powell report is by far the most comprehensive and detailed argument the 
United States has offered yet for going to war with Iraq. But how convincing was it? 
M DAVID MARTIN, CBS CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): With CIA Director Tenet 
looking over his right shoulder, Secretary Powell gave an abject lesson in both the power and 
the limitations of intelligence. 
 
ITV NEWS  February 5 
E It was the moment the world has waited for. 
E Americas best case against Iraq made by its top diplomat.  
M Colin Powell produced 90 minutes of evidence and one conclusion 
E Trevor McDonald: A poll on ITV suggests that Mr. Powell’s words had helped to make a 
convincing case for war. 
 
ABC NEWS Feb 6 
E ABC PETER JENNINGS, The Secretary of State's presentation to the UN Security Council 
yesterday has had an effect on public opinion.  
E An ABC News- Washington Post poll finds that 71 percent of Americans aware of his 
speech at the UN yesterday, think he made a convincing case for war 
E Peter, reviews of the Powell speech here have generally been favorable. 
E The Turkish government had been looking for help in making its case to a skeptical public 
about supporting the United States in a possible war with Iraq. And so, this certainly helped 
 
 
FEBRUARY 6 2003  NBC News: Nightly News 
M TOM BROKAW, anchor: First team. The president and Colin Powell, side by side, selling 
the case on Iraq.  
M A new NBC News poll shows the American public more persuaded about going to war.  






M TOM BROKAW, anchor: On Capitol Hill, Secretary Powell's presentation to the UN and his 
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today softened resistance to the 
idea of war against Iraq. 
R But, as NBC's Norah O'Donnell tells us tonight, members of both parties continue to raise 
troubling questions.  
NORAH O'DONNELL reporting:  
M With 150,000 US troops expected to be in the Persian Gulf by next week, today Secretary 
of State Colin Powell told senators that removing Saddam Hussein would be worth the cost 
of war. E COLIN POWELL: “Even though there may be some difficulties in--in the days of a 
conflict or even in the--in the months after a conflict, I think there is also the possibility that 
success could fundamentally reshape that region.”  
M O'DONNELL: But many in Congress worry the president has not yet told the public what it 
will cost in time and money to rebuild Iraq.  
 
6 February 2003 
NBC News: Nightly News 
M TOM BROKAW, anchor: The administration's best one-two punch, President Bush and 
Secretary of State Powell, appeared together late today to warn that within weeks the Iraq 
situation would be brought to a conclusion one way or another, and they held out the 
prospect of a new UN resolution authorizing military action. 
R But at the same time, the French continued to say they were not yet persuaded. There 
were major developments across a broad front today and we're going to begin tonight with 
NBC's Campbell Brown, who's at the White House. Campbell:  
M CAMPBELL BROWN Tom, today the strongest signal yet from the White House that 
military action may be close at hand, with the president now focused on giving the UN 
Security Council one last chance.  
E Building on Secretary of State Powell's presentation to the UN, the president emphasized 
the danger Saddam poses even to US troops who may have to take him on.  
E President GEORGE W. BUSH: We have sources that tell us that Saddam Hussein recently 
authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons.  
M BROWN: The president, trying to take advantage of new momentum to win support for a 
second UN resolution authorizing military action, an idea the president has not fully 
embraced publicly until today.  
E Pres. BUSH: Having made its demands, the Security Council must not back down when 
those demands are defied and mocked by a dictator.  
M BROWN: White House sources say the target of his words, France, with veto power over 
any resolution. They fear the French will use the negotiations in the next few weeks to delay 
action.  
M The president today set no firm deadline for a UN vote, but made it clear he believes 
inspections won't ever work, and the US is ready for war.  
E Pres. BUSH: The game is over. All the world can rise to this moment. The community of 
free nations can show that it is strong and confident and determined to keep the peace. \ 
M BROWN: A key turning point will be February 14th. That's when UN weapons inspectors 
are scheduled to give their next briefing to the Security Council.  
M White House officials are banking if that report is negative, few countries will be able to 







Newscast: President Bush's, Secretary Powell's favorable rating on rise since State of the 
Union address, Powell's speech to UN  
TOM BROKAW, anchor: I'm joined now by NBC's Washington Bureau chief and moderator of 
"Meet the Press," Tim Russert. Tim, NBC News was in the field last night after Colin Powell's 
presentation. What are the American people saying about the president now?  
E TIM RUSSERT Tom, the president's favorable rating has gone from up from 54 to now 61 
percent to 31 percent negative. Why? The State of the Union message and the presentation 
Colin Powell made to the United Nations. 
E We asked were the American people, were they convinced by Colin Powell? Look at these 
numbers, 66 to 11. 
E High marks from the American public for Colin Powell. 
M BROKAW: And what about the role of the United Nations if there is to be a war? The 
American people still want the UN to be involved?  
M RUSSERT: Do they ever. This is a key question. Look at this. The American people 
believe 51 percent that the United States should take action against Iraq militarily only with 
UN support.  
M RUSSERT: The American people have heard a lot about Iraq, but they want to know what 
is going to happen after the military action.  
M Forty-nine percent believe that the administration has prepared us for war; 46 believe not 
quite so. The president has a lot of work to do with the American people.  
E RUSSERT: Look for this president, Colin Powell, who's a very important messenger 
because he's perceived as the one most reluctant to go to war, Donald Rumsfeld, 
Condoleezza Rice, to campaign vigorously across this country, television airwaves saying, 






#2: Powell would present / presented strong evidence that Iraq had or was acquiring 
WMDs. 
E:  Endorsed the frame 
M:  Merely disseminated the frame 
R:  Raised questions about the frame 
 
FEBRUARY 3, 2003 NBC NEWS 
 
E ANDREA MITCHELL A blinding sandstorm as US troops exercise on the Iraqi-Kuwait 
border today, while UN inspectors find old missile parts near Baghdad.  
M The British say they have solid evidence of Saddam's deception.  
E Mr. TONY BLAIR (British Prime Minister): The evidence of cooperation withheld is 
unmistakable.  
M US officials say it is far more subjective.  
R But in Baghdad, Saddam Hussein was not waiting for Powell's speech. In his first interview 
in 12 years, airing tonight on British TV, he told an anti-war British politician he has no links to 





R President SADDAM HUSSEIN: (Through translator) Iraq has no weapons of mass 
destruction whatsoever. We challenge anyone who claims that we have to bring forward any 
evidence and present it for public opinion.  
**E Powell will have electronic intercepts indicating Iraqi deception and links to terror groups; 
satellite photos, including trucks the US says are mobile biological labs; proof of Iraq's 
attempts to purchase illegal weapon components.  
M MITCHELL: Today Hans Blix said Iraq must do more to cooperate, and said, ominously... 
Dr. HANS BLIX (Chief UN Weapons Inspector): Isn't there five minutes to midnight in your 
political assessment?  
E MITCHELL: ...as weapons inspectors found another empty chemical weapons warhead, 
undercutting Saddam's denials.  
E Mr. DONALD RUMSFELD (Secretary of Defense) This is a case of--of the--the local liar 
coming up again and people repeating what he said and forgetting to say that he never--
almost never--rarely--tells the truth.  
ITV NEWS  Feb 3rd 
M SUCHET The Prime Minister (Blair) talked today in ominous terms about the Iraq crisis we 
are entering the final phase he told MPs today, 
M briefing them on his talks with president bush. He says the president has agreed to wait for 
a second UN resolution but not if it’s a delaying tactic 
E Prime Minister Tony Blair MP speech SOT - We are entering the final phase of a 12 year 
history of the disarmament of Iraq/ 8 weeks have now passed since Saddam was given his 
final chance, 600 weeks have passed since he was given his first chance/ the evidence of 
co-operation withheld is unmistakable 
R  TREVOR America claims to have tapes of Iraqi officials mocking the failure of UN 
inspectors to find some of their weapons. 
M Our international editor Bill Neely reports now on the American intelligence briefing aimed 
at ending any doubt. 
E  George Bush has seen all he wants to, he’s convinced Iraq has weapons of mass 
destruction. 
R The rest of the world is looking for proof 
 E US President George W.Bush speech SOT – “We know our enemies have been working 
to acquire weapons of mass destruction, that is a fact” 
R And there’s the problem…Mr. Bush SAYS it’s a fact, a skeptical world wants evidence. 
M The United States says it will present some of that evidence to the United Nations on 
Wednesday. 
M  For months now the White House has said it knows Iraq has weapons of mass 
destruction. That it has evidence.  
R But so far it has produced none.  
R This is the week it must put up or shut up-- the week Iraq’s fate could be sealed 
**E Colin Powell will use surveillance photos and transcripts of secretly recorded 
conversations to try to show that Iraq is hiding weapons documents and laboratories in 
schools hospitals and even mosques.  
**E He’ll highlight one phone conversation in which an Iraqi official is heard mocking the UN 






FEBRUARY 4TH  ABC NEWS 
PETER JENNINGS, 
 M (OC) But the other big story in all of our lives is the potential for war with Iraq.  
M And the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, has given his first television interview today to a 
non-Iraqi in 12 years.  
M It was conducted by a former member of the British Parliament, Tony Benn, one of 
England's most famous and outspoken politicians. It's also been broadcast in the Middle East 
and in Britain. And our man in Baghdad, Dan Harris, has the details. 
DAN HARRIS, ABC NEWS 
R (VO) Speaking slowly and calmly, alternately sipping his coffee and playing with his pen, 
Saddam Hussein rejected the central allegation the US has leveled against him. 
R SADDAM HUSSEIN, IRAQI PRIME MINISTER I tell you, as I have said on many 
occasions before, that Iraq no weapons of mass destruction whatsoever. 
 R He also played down the difficulties between Iraq and the UN weapons inspectors. 
R SADDAM HUSSEIN It is in our interest to facilitate their mission to find the truth.              
R The question is, does the other side want to get to the same conclusion? Or are they 
looking for a pretext for aggression? 
M He did not, however, make any suggestions for addressing the inspectors' outstanding 
complaints, such as failure to set up private interviews with Iraqi scientists or surveillance 
flights using U-2 spy planes. 
M Tony Benn said he conducted this interview to stop the war.  
M While Saddam Hussein said repeatedly that he wants peace, he offered no compromises, 
accused the US of wanting to control Iraqi oil and, by extension, the entire world.  
M And said, if invaded, the Iraqis will defend themselves. Dan Harris, ABC News, Baghdad. 
R JENNINGS Some people now think the US case is stronger. Others say, again, the 
Administration is in too much of a hurry for war and that some of the evidence this morning is 
thin. 
 **E (VO) In one segment, Secretary Powell will play audiotapes of intercepted 
communications between Iraqi officials, who are said to be talking about "hiding things." 
**R  The high-tech presentation will include satellite imagery allegedly showing Iraqi efforts 
to hide banned weapons.  
**E  Third, defector testimony. Powell will rely on the word of some Iraqi defectors who say 
that Saddam Hussein has mobile biological labs that are easily hidden throughout the 
country. 
 
NBC NEWS FEBRUARY 4TH 
**E MITCHELL: Powell will try to make that point tomorrow using equipment brought in to the 
Security Council today so he can show satellite pictures and play audio of intercepted 
communications between Iraqi officials.  
 
CBS NEWS FEB 4 2003 
 
E and it is a possibility that Saddam would give Osama bin Laden a weapon of mass 
destruction which the administration says makes Iraq so dangerous. 
M Powell will display diagrams of mobile biological weapons vans, based on eyewitness 
descriptions from Iraqi defectors.  
E He will also release transcripts of intercepted conversations between Iraqi officials talking 





DAN RATHER, ANCHOR: With the U.S. military possibly just weeks away from launching 
an attack to drive him from power, Saddam Hussein sat down this week for a rare interview, 
broadcast today on British television. Correspondent Bob Simon in New York has some 
excerpts tonight -- Bob. 
R SIMON: But beyond any links to al Qaeda, the Bush Administration claims Saddam may 
be close to building nuclear weapons and probably has chemical and biological weapons, 
charges he continues to deny. 
R SADDAM HUSSEIN (through translator): These weapons are not aspirin pills that one can 
hide in his pockets. And it`s easy to work out if Iraq has weapons or does not have weapons. 
Chemical, nuclear and biological. 
R Saddam Hussein: And we have said many times before, and we say it again today, that Iraq 
is free of such weapons. 
E PITTS: A key component of the training here: biological and chemical weapons Saddam 
Hussein may have, and may well use, if there`s a war with Iraq. 
M And it`s for that very real possibility that at least two American schools in Kuwait have 
decided to close their doors for six weeks 
 
FEBRUARY 5  ABC NEWS 
 E On "World News Tonight" the Secretary Of State at the United Nations making the Bush 
Administration's case against Saddam Hussein. 
E COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE “Saddam Hussein and his regime will stop at 
nothing until something stops him.”’ 
E PETER JENNINGS (VO) The Administration's evidence, audio tapes, satellite photos. 
M More than an hour of accusation, trying to convince the skeptics. 
PETER JENNINGS, ABC NEWS 
M (OC) Good evening, everyone. We're going to begin tonight with show and tell about 
deadly business. 
M  In the United Nations Security Council this morning, the Secretary Of State, Colin Powell, 
took almost an hour and a half to make the Bush Administration's case against Saddam 
Hussein. 
M PETER JENNINGS  Mr. Powell was talking to many different audiences, at home and 
overseas. 
M It was the Bush Administration's justification for attacking Iraq if the Iraqi leader cannot be 
dealt with any other way. 
M PETER JENNINGS (VO) First, let's listen to some of Mr. Powell as he tried to make a 
connection between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda. 
E  COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE “Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq 
and Al-Qaeda together, enough so Al-Qaeda could learn how to build more sophisticated 
bombs and learn how to forge documents.” 
E  POWELL: “And enough so that Al-Qaeda could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise 
on weapons of mass destruction.” 
M Mr. Powell said repeatedly that Iraq was doing everything it could to hide its forbidden 
weapons from UN inspectors. 
M And he played a tape which he said was two Iraqi officers talking about an inspection they 
knew was coming. 
E  COLIN POWELL "I'll come to see you in the morning. I'm worried. You all have something 





E  Powell: “We don't have anything left." Note what he says, "We evacuated everything." We 
didn't destroy it. “ 
E  Powell; “We didn't line it up for inspection. We didn't turn it into the inspectors. We 
evacuated it to make sure it was not around when the inspectors showed up.” 
PETER JENNINGS 
M (VO) There were several photographs described by Mr. Powell as evidence that Iraq 
was constantly moving weapons it shouldn't have. 
E COLIN POWELL “At this ballistic missile facility, again, two days before inspections began, 
five large cargo trucks appeared along with a truck-mounted crane to move missiles. We saw 
this kind of house cleaning at close to 30 sites.” 
PETER JENNINGS 
M (VO) Mr. Powell said Iraq had sent several of its scientists into hiding, rather than talk to 
the United Nations.  
M That Iraq was still trying to develop nuclear weapons.  




M And using yet another prop, he said that Iraq had thousands of times the amount of 
anthrax that caused havoc and death at the US capitol. 
E COLIN POWELL “And Saddam Hussein has not verifiably accounted for even one 
teaspoon- full of this deadly material.” 
PETER JENNINGS 
M (VO) Mr. Powell said the United Nations had no choice but to act. 
E  COLIN POWELL “Iraq has now placed itself in danger of the serious consequences called 
for in UN Resolution 1441.”  
E Powell “And this body places itself in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to 
defy its will without responding effectively and immediately.” 
PETER JENNINGS 
. Our correspondents in New York and Washington and Baghdad have been working this all 
day. We're going to begin here in New York, at the United Nations, with ABC's Martha 
Raddatz. Martha? 
 
EVIDENCE AGAINST IRAQ OPEN TO INTERPRETATION 
5 February 2003 
MARTHA RADDATZ, ABC NEWS 
R (OC) Peter, clearly, a lot of this evidence is open to interpretation  
M but the intelligence community believes the most compelling evidence is the intercepts 
because they are new and because it is the kind of evidence that is rarely released. 
M (VO) Intelligence experts say there are several remarkable aspects to these intercepts.  
M First, the timing. Secretary Powell said some were recorded as recently as last week.  
M Second, the specific reference to nuclear inspector Mohamed El-Baradei and the direct 
references to chemical agents. 
E COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE "Nerve agents. Nerve agents. Wherever it 
comes up. Got it." 
MARTHA RADDATZ 
M (VO) Powell says the officers also speak of removing what they call a modified vehicle 





E TONY CORDESMAN, MILITARY CONSULTANT  “This was a large production facility 
used for both chemical and biological weapons, and also had, at some point, elements of 
nuclear program, as well.” 
MARTHA RADDATZ 
R (VO) The satellite imagery is more open to interpretation. 
M Secretary Powell said this was a satellite picture of a storage area for chemical or 
biological weapons with a decontamination vehicle and heavy cargo trucks nearby. 
 M A satellite image taken two months later at the same area, Powell said, showed the 
vehicles gone, buildings bulldozed and, to keep inspectors from being able to sample the 
soil, 
R he claimed, the top layer had been hauled away. 
R JONATHAN TUCKER, FORMER UNSCOM INSPECTOR  “We have to, of course, take 
Secretary Powell on faith, to some extent, about the significance of the images because 
they are very difficult for a layman to interpret.” 
MARTHA RADDATZ 
M (OC) Many people were asking today why this intelligence wasn't released to inspectors 
before.  
M The US insists it was. But, Peter, they say it was only intelligence that the inspectors could 
act on. 
 
POWELL'S SPEECH TO THE UN OFFICIAL IRAQI REACTION 
5 February 2003 
PETER JENNINGS, ABC NEWS 
R (OC) The Iraqis were dismissive of Mr. Powell's presentation.  
R They essentially said the evidence was either fabricated or unreliable and proved nothing.  
 M ABC's Dan Harris has the reaction tonight, the official one, anyway, from Baghdad. 
DAN HARRIS, ABC NEWS 
M (VO) The Iraqis set up televisions for reporters to watch Secretary Powell's presentation. 
R Then came out to dismiss it using terms such as ridiculous, baseless and unfounded. 
RAMIR AL-SAADI,SCIENTIFIC ADVISOR TO SADDAM HUSSEIN “This was a typical 
American show, complete with stunts and special effects.” 
DAN HARRIS 
M Handling the defense for the Iraqis, Amir Al-Saadi, Saddam Hussein's Chief Science 
Advisor.  
R Secretary Powell singled out Al- Saadi today as being part of a high-level committee 
created to monitor and mislead the inspectors. 
R AMIR AL-SAADI: “That's absolute nonsense. Simply not true. The order given to me from, 
from early is to tell everything as it was.” 
DAN HARRIS 
R (VO) As for the satellite photos Powell displayed? Al-Saadi said they proved nothing. 
R And the recordings of conversations between Iraqi officials, he said any third-rate 
intelligence outfit could produce such manufactured evidence. 
M Both Al-Saadi and Iraq's ambassador to the UN, who addressed the Security Council 
today, asked why this evidence wasn't given first to the inspectors. 
M (VO) A report whose goal, they say, was simply to sell the idea of aggression against Iraq. 









M (OC) Okay, let's go back to the United Nations, now, today, where Mr. Powell was trying to 
make an aggressive push to convince, at least three nations, Martha Raddatz, Russia, 
China, France. How did he do? 
MARTHA RADDATZ, ABC NEWS 
R (OC) Well, I guess he didn't do so well, Peter, because all of those countries said the, the 
evidence that Mr. Powell presented today was reason to continue the inspections. 
R In fact, in fact the French said that they believed the inspections should triple in size, triple 
the number of inspectors should be used.  
RThey offered helicopters, they offered airplanes. So, it looks like the Administration still has 
a bit of work to do. 
FEBRUARY 5 2003  NBC News: Nightly News 
E TOM BROKAW, anchor: Text, lies, and videotape. 
M Secretary of State Powell tells the UN Saddam hides weapons, deceives inspectors and 
supports terrorists. 
R Reaction from Europe, Baghdad, and across America. Did Powell's presentation convince 
the world it's now time for war? 
 
NBC News: Nightly News 
Secretary of State Colin Powell delivers speech to UN, provides evidence of Iraqi 
deception 
5 February 2003   
M The setting was the UN Security Council, but the audience was the world as he spelled out 
with visual aids and a prosecutor's rhetoric the administration's case against Saddam 
Hussein.  
E  It was a masterful performance. But was it enough? We're going to begin tonight with 
NBC's Andrea Mitchell.  
Andrea:ANDREA MITCHELL reporting: 
M Tom, armed with America's best intelligence, Colin Powell tried to persuade the world 
that Saddam Hussein will never let UN inspectors find his hidden weapons.  
M Working together until late last night and over the weekend at CIA headquarters, the two 
men tried to build a case of Iraq's deception and denial.  
E They showed satellite photos, quoted defectors, played audiotapes of intercepted 
conversations. One chilling example: 
(Excerpt played of recording of men speaking foreign language) 
E Mr. COLIN POWELL (Secretary of State): (Reading transcript): "Remove." "Remove." "The 
expression." "The expression, I got it." "Nerve agents." "Nerve agents, wherever it comes 
up." The senior officer is concerned that somebody might be listening. Well, somebody was. 
E TEXT:COL: Captain Ibrahim? CAPT: I am with you, Sir. COL: Remove. CAPT: Remove. 
[Repeats instructions]COL: The expression. CAPT: The expression.COL: "Nerve 
agents."CAPT: "Nerve agents." COL: Wherever it comes up. CAPT: Wherever it comes 
up.COL: In the wireless instructions. CAPT: In the instructions.COL: Wireless.CAPT: 
Wireless. 
 
E  MITCHELL: Powell played a tape of a Mirage jet retrofitted to spray simulated 
anthrax, and a model of Iraq's unmanned drones, capable of spraying chemical or 
germ weapons within a radius of at least 550 miles. M He showed a satellite photo he 
says reveal chemical weapons bunkers. 





E Mr. POWELL: “How do I know that? The truck you also see is a signature item. It's a 
decontamination vehicle in case something goes wrong.”  
E Powell: “Now look at the picture on the right. The bunkers are clean when the inspectors 
get there. They found nothing.” 
M MITCHELL: Powell said three defectors have told US intelligence Saddam has 18 trucks 
carrying mobile biological weapons labs. 
M  And Powell said while the UN was debating its first resolution against Iraq... 
E Mr. POWELL: “...the missile brigade outside Baghdad was disbursing rocket launchers and 
warheads containing biological warfare agents to various locations.” 
E MITCHELL:  What he didn't say, but NBC News has learned, the US knows that from a 
spy inside Iraq.  
E As evidence Iraq was cheating the inspectors all along, Powell played a conversation 
taped the day before they returned to Iraq last November. 
E Two top officers are overheard plotting to deceive chief nuclear inspector Mohammed El 
Baradei... 
E Unidentified Voice: (Foreign language spoken)...Mohamed El Baradei 
E TEXT:COL: Peace. We just have a small question. GEN: Yeah.COL: About this committee 
that is coming...GEN: Yeah. Yeah. COL: ...with Mohamed El Baradei [Director, International 
Atomic Energy Agency] 
E Mr. POWELL: “But they're worried. "We have this modified vehicle. What do we say if one 
of them sees it?" 
M MITCHELL: Finally, Powell said Iraq has failed the test, and so might the UN. 
E Mr. POWELL: “This body places itself in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to 
defy its will without responding effectively and immediately.” 
R MITCHELL: But opponents, like the French foreign minister, didn't budge. 
R Mr. DOMINIQUE de VILLEPIN (French Foreign Minister): There is room from ***(as 
spoken)*** enhancing the inspections regime. 
R Mr. KOFI ANNAN (United Nations Secretary General): I still believe that war is not 
inevitable, but a lot depends on--on President Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi leadership. 
R MITCHELL: And the Russian foreign minister, who met with Powell later, said the 
inspections must continue.  
R US officials believe that the opponents to military action were reading from scripts prepared 
before Powell's presentation.  
M If he can't win them over now, he made it clear today that the US is ready to go to war with 
Iraq without the UN. Tom: 
BROKAW: Thanks very much. NBC's Andrea Mitchell tonight. 
NBC's Ron Allen is in Baghdad tonight with more on that. Ron:  
RON ALLEN reporting:  
R Tom, tonight, Iraq is dismissing Powell's presentation as nothing new: baseless allegations 
complete with cartoon films.  
M Today, one of the few places to hear Secretary Powell's speech in Baghdad was the Iraqi 
press center.  
R It's what you might expect: strong, even mocking of the United States.  
M In an unusual move, the UN session was broadcast live here, but for a very select 
audience only: Iraqi government ministers, sympathetic European legislators and anti-war 
activists.  
R Later, General Amir Al-Saadi, the man Powell accused of heading a spy committee 
designed to deceive and frustrate the inspectors, called the charge against him and the rest 





R General AMIR AL-SAADI (Iraqi Presidential Advisor): “This was a typical American show, 
complete with stunts and special effects. “ 
M ALLEN: The satellite photos, he said, Iraq has seen before.  
M He insists the inspectors already have checked out numerous similar sites and found 
nothing.  
M As for the intercepted conversations between Iraqis discussing hiding weapons, Al-Saadi 
says any third-rate intelligence agency could have produced such fabrications.  
R Gen. AL-SAADI: “It is simply untrue and not genuine. The reason is simple: because we 
have nothing to hide, therefore, we don't talk about hiding anything.”  
M ALLEN: Iraq plans a detailed written response for the Security Council, and officials here 
are hoping they can convince the UN's chief inspectors that they're doing enough to come 
clean during two days of crucial talks this coming weekend. Tom:  
E President GEORGE W. BUSH: We have sources that tell us that Saddam Hussein recently 
authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons.  
 
Newscast: Americans listened to Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to UN 
5 February 2003  NBC News: Nightly News 
M TOM BROKAW, anchor: Secretary of State Colin Powell's immediate audience today was 
the UN Security Council. 
M  But of course, he was also speaking to Congress and especially the American people, 
many of whom have expressed reservations about the prospect of war, especially without UN 
participation. We've asked NBC's Roger O'Neill to give us a sense of the nation following the 
secretary's remarks. 
E Mr. COLIN POWELL (Secretary of State): (From television) “Iraq promised the 
inspectors...” 
ROGER O'NEIL reporting: 
M Eggs, hash browns and a plateful of evidence against Iraq was on the menu at Felipe's 
Diner in Los Angeles. 
E Mr. POWELL: (From television) ...” job is not to cooperate, it is to deceive”. 
M O'NEIL: Regulars here are generally supportive of the president's tough stand against Iraq, 
so the table talk after the satellite photos and intercepted phone calls Secretary Powell 
showed the Security Council was mostly hawkish. 
M Unidentified Man #1: I think that the money used and spent in a war could better--has 
better uses here, especially here at home. 
M O'NEIL: Kevin Dikse says America has now taken all the steps, even though he's against a 
war. 
M Mr. KEVIN DIKSE: I don't think Saddam is going to give up. He--he--he's going to put up a 
fight, and that probably means that war is imminent. 
M nidentified Woman #1: I just think it gives us more reason to go to war. 
E Mr. POWELL: (From television) Saddam Hussein... 
O'NEIL: ...hearing the sounds... 
E Mr. POWELL: (From television) ...are concealing the... 
E O'NEIL: ...the Powell presentation swayed. Perhaps America has made its case. 
 M Few high school students will sit still for 90 minutes. But at Johnson High in Savannah, 
they did today.+++++ 







CBS NEWS FEBRUARY 5 2003 
M In a dramatic session of the Security Council, Secretary Powell presented, what he called, 
"irrefutable" audio and photographic evidence that Saddam is hiding weapons of mass 
destruction. 
R  Iraq`s ambassador called the allegations -- and I quote -- "utterly unrelated to the truth." 
M With the United States preparing to forcibly disarm Iraq, if necessary, Security Council 
members China, France, and Germany said the inspectors should be given more time. 
M  It was the secretary of state as prosecutor today, Colin Powell appearing before a skeptical 
jury. 
E COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE: Indeed, the facts and Iraq`s behavior show 
that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of 
mass destruction. 
R ROBERTS: With no smoking gun, Powell was forced to connect a set of circumstantial 
dots for the Security Council. 
E POWELL: You will now hear an officer from Republican Guard headquarters, issuing an 
instruction to an officer in the field. 
M ROBERTS: In the rarest of moments, he played super-secret communications intercepts, he said, 
painted a clear picture Iraq was moving something. 
E POWELL: We sent you a message yesterday to clean out all the areas -- the scrap areas, the 
abandoned areas. Make sure there is nothing there. 
E ROBERTS: Recently declassified spy satellite photos showed a chemical weapons lab surrounded 
by cargo trucks and a forklift. 
M A bunker, Powell said, was cleared out just before a convoy of inspectors -- seen in the lower right 
corner of the photo -- arrived.  
R Clear evidence, he claimed, that Iraq was sanitizing inspection sites. 
E And he left little doubt as to why UN officials have not found one scientist who will talk to them in 
private, or outside the country.  
E POWELL: They were forced to sign documents acknowledging that divulging information is 
punishable by death. Anyone who agreed to be interviewed outside Iraq would be treated as a spy. 
M ROBERTS: It was quite a show. On 10-by-10 video screens, Powell explained for the world how 
Iraq is allegedly producing biological weapons in up to seven different mobile labs, 
E and he showed video of an Iraqi mirage fighter jet testing a biological sprayer.+++ 
 E POWELL: Note the spray coming from beneath the mirage. That is 2,000 liters of simulated 
anthrax that a jet is spraying. 
E ROBERTS: But the most chilling moment came in this intercept, in which an Iraqi officer tells a 
subordinate to erase all references to nerve agents from over-the-air, or wireless communications. 
E POWELL: Why did he focus on wireless instructions? Because the senior officer is concerned that 
somebody might be listening. 
R Well, somebody was. 
E POWELL: Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more 
months or years is not an option; not in a post-September 11 world. 
R RATHER (voice-over): And to those who say, Well, there`s no smoking gun -- would you argue 
with that? 
E POWELL: What do you mean by smoking gun? How about lots of smoke? 
E POWELL: I think, I put forward a case today that says, there`s lots of smoke. There are many 





E POWELL: When we say that he has had thousands of liters of anthrax -- and we know it, he`s 
admitted it, it`s a matter of record, there`s evidence; there`s no question about it -- is that a smoking 
gun? 
 E POWELL: Is it a smoking gun that he has this horrible material somewhere in that country, and 
he`s not accounted for it? 
E POWELL: The very fact that he has not accounted for it, I say, it could be a smoking gun.  
E POWELL: It`s been a gun that has been smoking for years. And I think, the evidence that I 
presented today, the information that I presented today, suggests that he has not stopped in any of his 
efforts to develop these weapons of mass destruction. 
R POWELL: Iraq responded quickly to the Secretary Powell`s U.N. presentation, with indignant 
denials and angry accusations. 
R GEN. AMER AL-SAADI, IRAQI PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR: This was a typical American show, 
complete with stunts and special effects. 
R ELIZABETH PALMER, CBS CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): Just two hours after Colin 
Powell`s speech ended, the Iraqis were on the offensive. An angry Gen. Amer al-Saadi, head of Iraq`s 
monitoring agency, told the world`s media that Powell`s evidence was manufactured. 
R He was especially scathing about the telephone intercepts he said were not genuine.  
R AL-SAADI: From what we have heard, any third rate intelligence outfit could produce such a 
recording. 
R PALMER: As for the satellite photographs, al-Saadi says the U.N. inspectors have already seen and 
investigated them. 
R AL-SAADI: Everything was explained, and it is in their reports. So that, again, was something that 
was absolutely unfounded. 
R PALMER: Al-Saadi reserved special contempt for Powell`s allegation that the Iraqis had falsified 
the death of a key scientist. 
R AL-SAADI: It is really below the level of a country leading the world, now to come up with such 
allegations and ideas. 
R PALMER: Time and time again over the past 20 years, the Iraqi government has proven its skill at 
hiding the truth behind official smoke screens. 
 M So it`s impossible to know, how big a shock Colin Powell delivered to Saddam`s officials today. 
R (on camera): But one thing is clear. Although the Iraqis say they`re preparing for an attack, they`re 
also playing for time.  
M They`ve accused Colin Powell, himself, of violating the U.N. Resolution by presenting his evidence 
in public, instead of giving it to the inspectors to be checked out.  
M And they hope that an appeal to Secretary General Kofi Annan will slow down the march to war. 
CBS News national security correspondent David Martin has a reality check. 
E POWELL: What you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behavior. 
R MARTIN: With no smoking gun to unveil, Powell tried to piece together a giant jigsaw puzzle of 
suspicious behavior. 
 M First, a satellite photo of a bunker which, he said, had the tell-tale signs that chemical weapons 
were stored inside. 
E POWELL: Inside that facility are special guards and special equipment to monitor any leakage that 
might come out of the bunker. 
M MARTIN: Then the same bunker, after it had been cleaned up. 
E POWELL: It was done on the 22nd of December, as the U.N. inspection team is arriving, and you 





E MARTIN: That doesn`t prove Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons, but it certainly looks like 
he`s hiding something from the inspectors.  
E The closest thing to undeniable proof was that intercepted conversation, in which an Iraqi colonel 
dictated a message with an unmistakable meaning to a junior officer. 
E UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Remove.Remove.The expression.The expression.I got it.Nerve 
agents.Nerve agents. 
E MARTIN (on camera): When confronted with hard evidence like that, Iraq can only claim, the tape 
was fabricated.  
R But some of Powell`s examples were based on unnamed sources whose reliability can be 
challenged, l 
R Like this statement about how Iraq is preventing U.N. weapons inspectors from 
interviewing scientists. 
E POWELL: On orders from Saddam Hussein, Iraqi officials issued a false death certificate 
for one scientist, and he was sent into hiding. 
E MARTIN (voice-over): But it fits the pattern described by all those pictures and intercepts.  
M Other members of the Security Council now have to decide if the intelligence justifies going 
to war, but with more than 100,000 troops now surrounding Iraq, that is exactly where the 
United States is headed. 
M RATHER: Powell, apparently, did persuade some countries to support a U.S. led war with 
Iraq. The White House today released a joint statement to that effect, signed by the foreign 
ministers of 10 East European countries, from Estonia in the north, to Albania in the south. 
M But, as CBS`s Richard Roth reports, much of the rest of the world, including some 
important U.S. allies, seem to remain unconvinced. 
M RICHARD ROTH,): China, Russia and France all found America`s case a convincing 
argument for doing more of what`s already being done. 
M DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN, FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER (through translator): Let us 
double, let us triple, the number of inspectors; let us open more regional offices; let us go 
further than this. 
M ROTH: But let`s not go to war, said France.  
M Britain said time`s running out. But the British government`s already pledged support for 
the United States, and didn`t need convincing. 
M Nor did America`s strongest Middle East ally, Israel. 
M BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER: I think, the case was 
overwhelming for Saddam`s disarmament, either peacefully if Saddam so chooses, or 
through military action if he doesn`t. 
M But in Saudi Arabia, the government said it`s urging the Security Council to consider an 
alternative, perhaps including an amnesty for Saddam`s top generals, to induce them to 
stage a coup. 
E ANDREWS: Dr. Jerrold Post, the former chief of profiling at the CIA, says Saddam`s 
perception of victory in the `91 war made him more, not less, determined to have weapons of 
mass destruction. 
E POST: After this triumph in 1990-91, he was a world class leader. World class leaders 
have world class weapons. Big boys have big toys. And... 
E POST: That`s one of the things, and I think, it`s inconceivable for him to give up such 
weapons. 
E ANDREWS (voice-over): So, to those who know him, Saddam is clearly toying with the 
U.N. inspectors. Abbass Al Janabi, who until he defected four years ago was in Saddam`s 
family inner circle, says Saddam`s game is to hide his weapons. 





E ABBASS AL JANABI, IRAQI DEFECTOR: How can he implement his ambition without 
them? This is an hitch inside himself. 
E ANDREWS: Saddam, remember, used mustard gas against Iranian soldiers, and nerve 
gas against Kurdish civilians. Most experts believe, he will do it again, and they think they 
know when. 
E POLLACK: If, at some point, he does conclude that his fate is sealed, he is likely to lash 
out with everything he has -- nuclear, biological, chemical -- whatever he has got he will 
M CBS ANCHOR: President Bush appeared before a nationwide television and radio 
audience late today, and said four ominous words: Quote -- "The game is over" -- a clear 
message to Iraq, war is near. 
M Here is the latest in the quickening showdown with Saddam: The president said, Saddam 
has told Iraqi commanders to use chemical weapons if war comes. 
E BUSH: That Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical 
weapons -- the very weapons the dictator tells the world he does not have. 
M Before then, the White House fully expects Saddam to make another play for time by 
showing more cooperation with weapons inspectors. 
E BUSH: No doubt, he will play a last-minute game of deception. The game is over. 
M MARK PHILLIPS, CBS CORRESPONDENT: That an Iraqi scientist has finally talked 
privately with a U.N. inspector here, has been attributed by the Iraqis to a change of heart on 
the part of the scientist in question.  
M  It`s unclear whether this also represents a change of heart on the part of the Iraqi regime. 
M  (voice-over): The scientist is Sinan Abdul-Hassan (ph), described as a biologist, here 
leaving the hotel where his three-and-a-half hour meeting with the U.N. inspectors took 
place.UNIDENTIFIED MALE: No comment. 
R PHILLIPS: The commenting was left to advisor to Saddam Hussein, Amer al-Saadi, who 
denied Colin Powell`s allegations, point by point,  
R and who accused the U.S., essentially, of inventing the evidence Colin Powell presented. 
M on camera): There`s been no indication whether today`s first private session with an Iraqi 
scientist will be followed by any others. 
M  And no indication either, whether the Iraqis will be any more forthcoming when Hans Blix 
arrives here this weekend for what`s looking more and more like their last chance to come 
clean. 
M MARK PHILLIPS, CBS CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): With all roads seemingly 
heading toward war here, an increasingly desperate Iraqi regime is making concessions it 
has previously refused to make, and is trying even harder to convince a skeptical world it is 
not working on forbidden weapons. 
M Exhibit A was the al-Rafah missile test facility, and its brand new and much larger, rocket 
engine test stand. It`s here, Colin Powell told the U.N. this week, that the Iraqis are 
developing an illegal long-range rocket. 
E COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE: The one on the right is clearly intended for 
long-range missiles that can fly 1,200 kilometers. 
R PHILLIPS: But the Iraqis insisted that all work here, including a test firing this week, has 
been under U.N. supervision, and that the new missile will be limited to the permitted 90-mile 
range. 
M (on camera): The charge that Iraq is still producing prohibited weapon systems, and what`s 
become the ritual denial here, have become the background noise to this countdown to war.  
R There is only one admission the Iraqis can make that would put that countdown on hold, 





E (voice-over): While the U.N. searched the chemical warehouse, the Iraqis still refuse to 
account for their missing weapons stocks or detail where, when, and how those stocks were 
destroyed. Instead the regime is making small concessions,  
M today allowing three more scientists to be interviewed privately without the presence of 
government minders. The U.N. wants to talk to hundreds. 
M Hans Blix knows he`s got to come away from his weekend meetings here with significant 
new information from the Iraqis, or the inspection process is doomed. His only hope is that 
the Iraqis agree. 
Mark Phillips, CBS News, at the al-Rafah missile test site, Iraq.  
M (voice-over): Secretary of State Powell`s briefing at the U.S. was meant to expose Iraqi deceptions, 
but it also exposed American blind spots.  
E Satellite photos showed the Iraqis had cleaned up a chemical weapons bunker just before the U.N. 
inspectors arrived, but where did the weapons go? 
 E And where are those biological weapons vans? 
R The U.S. has detailed drawings based on eyewitness accounts, but no photos because it doesn`t 
know where they are.  
R The U.S. has yet to spot any of Iraq`s 30,000 chemical artillery rounds, 
E but it does show one thing about these weapons of mass destruction: Saddam has already 
ordered his generals to use them if attacked 
ITV News   February 5 
R Trevor: Good evening, America made its case for war against Iraq to the world today with 
what it claimed was proof that Saddam Hussein has not told the truth about his weapons 
program. 
 M Speaking to the United Nations security council, Secretary of State Colin Powell showed 
satellite images and played tapes of Iraqi military phone calls. 
R  Although tonight it looks as though he’s changed few minds at the Security Council and 
Baghdad rejected his claims. From New York here’s Bill Neely 
R Neely: While it was the most dramatic presentation at the United Nations in half a century 
the question being debated here and in Paris and Moscow and elsewhere tonite is this. 
R Did Colin Powell produce enough proof here to justify a war? 
E Colin Powell (US Secretary of State) speaking – “Saddam Hussein and his regime have 
made no effort no effort to disarm as required by the international community “ 
E Then dramatically he played secretly recorded tapes of Iraqi officers discussing how to hide 
weapons from UN inspectors. 
E Sound from tape Iraqis speak Screen displaying translated transcript of conversation 
between Iraqi officals, with one line underlined  
M He showed satellite photographs of suspected weapons sites to show Iraq had cleaned 
them up before inspectors arrived 
E  Colin Powell(US Secretary of State) speaking  “we saw this kind of house cleaning at 
close to 30 sites”  
E From an Iraqi defector he produced drawings of mobile biological weapons factories.  
E Then video of the war planes that would spray chemicals on an enemy.  
E Colin Powell (US Secretary of State) speaking SOT – “why should anyone give Iraq the 
benefit of the doubt, I don't and don't think you will either after you hear next interception”  
R Another tape from last month. Of Iraqi officers allegedly hiding chemical weapons.  
E audio of speaking and Screen displaying translated transcript of conversation between 





E Itself not damning evidence, but part of a pattern 
E Colin Powell (US Secretary of State) speaking SOT – “Clearly Saddam Hussein and his 
regime will stop at nothing until something stops him “‘ 
M Iraqi Ambassador, Mohammed Aldouri, wrote furiously, as Powell demonstrated how little 
anthrax it takes for mass murder.  
E Colin Powell  – “Saddam Hussein has not verifiably accounted for even one teaspoonful of 
this deadly material”  
R Then to the sceptics, the Russians the French and others, this direct challenge. 
E Colin Powell (US Secretary of State) speaking  “How much longer are we willing to put up 
with Iraq's non compliance before we at UN say enough enough” 
R Iraq called all of this accusations, not proof.  
R Mohammed Aldouri (Iraqi Ambassador to UN) press conference– “Inspections are working 
and other means should not be allowed “ 
RThe French called it all suspicions, not proof they called for more inspectors.  
R Dominique de Villepin (French Foreign Minister) press conference –“it is  necessary to 
double or triple number of inspectors .” 
R Jack Straw MP (Foreign Secretary) interview – “We could quadruple number of inspectors, 
can extend time they're inspecting for another 3 years and won't get to truth, on other hand if 
have active co-operation today we can resolve this in about a week's time “ 
E But time says Colin Powell, is running out fast.  
R Trevor MacDonald: Bill, Colin Powell doesn’t seem to have changed many minds at the 
security council itself though does he?                                                                                      
R Bill Neely: No and Powell admitted himself there was not Smoking gun here no single fact 
that would justify a war.  
R A lot of it is open to interpretation for example what exactly did those satellite photographs 
show..so suggestive yes, damning probably not  
R t he US admitting a lot of this is circumstantial evidence but as Jack straw told me in that 
interview, people are convicted on circumstantial evidence.  
R  The big question for you as well as Paris Moscow and everywhere else is is circumstantial 
evidence enough to justify the war that the US thinks is coming. 
M Trevor: America’s Colin Powell has unveiled intelligence information to try to prove that 
Iraq is hiding its weapons. 
The UK View 
**R TREVOR Mc Donald:   What do experts here think of the evidence of hidden weapons 
and about Colin Powells claims that there are now links between Iraq and al qaeda links that 
stretch as far as Manchester and the murder of Steven Earl.  
M James Mates: Chemical bunkers, recorded intercepts nuclear bomb parts and the threat of 
germ warfare, 
M Colin Powell set out a case for the prosecution, a case for war. 
 R It was comprehensive, but was it credible? 
R If he was to shift world opinion in favour of war, Powell would have to convince people that 
images like this one claimed to be a chemical weapons bunker before and after the Iraqis 
sanitized it, are genuine.  
E One former weapons inspector told ITV news tonite that it certainly looked familiar  
E Garth Whitty (Royal United Services Institute) “ All sorts of activity taken place there/ that 
would have aroused suspicion that there had been chemicals stored there that had been 





M He showed video of chemical weapons delivery systems but it went further, not just 
chemical and biological weapons said Powell, but captured parts for making a nuclear 
warhead.  
E They could have been for conventional weapons but some experts doubt it.  
E Dr Alexandra Ashbourne (Defence Analyst) interview  The  key point that Colin Powell 
made is that Iraq has acquired aluminium tubes that are reinforced for beyond Americas civil 
or military specifications.He is also trying to acquire magnets/ he has two of three 
components necessary to build nuclear weapon  
M Colin Powell has put Washingtons’ case.  
M He hopes it will be enough to win him a second UN resolution.  
R But in coming back to the UN he is now asking their blessing , not their permission. James 
mates ITV News 
 
OPINION POLL 
M Trevor:  Tonite ITV news has the first snap shot of public opinion since Colin Powell’s 
presentation.  So, has it made a difference?  
M The number of doubters who are not convinced that Saddam Hussein is sufficiently 
dangerous to justify military action against him has fallen from 58 percent to 52 percent.  
M And lastly the number for people who believe that Saddam Hussein does have chemical 
and biological weapons has gone up from 71 percent to 80 percent 
UK GOVERNMENT VIEW 
M TREVOR:  So what America has described as hard evidence does seem to have 
persuaded some people but how has it gone down with politicians and opinion makers lets 
join our political editor Nik Robinson. 
EVENING NEWS: NICK ROBINSON 
M Robinson: I don’t think this was ever going to be a mind changing day it was instead a step 
in a long argument, that George Bush and Tony Blair have been making for a year now and 
that’s no surprise really . 
R Not only was there no smoking gun as Bill Neely was saying, there was no body.  
R What Colin Powell claimed there was was a big pile of freshly dug earth and a spade and 
he hoped people would focus hard on what that might mean 
M That means in our poll those opposed outright to war have dropped from about a third to 
about a fifth of the population and that’s reflected amongst opinion formers.  Here in 
Westminster  and in the newspapers too 
E Iain Duncan Smith MP (Conservative Leader) interview – “For those of open mind the 
evidence today adds to evidence already in existence/ indicates clearly that Saddam is linked 
to terrorist organisations that threaten UK but also he has been hiding his weapons from 
inspectors and breaching UN resolution/ UN must now act “ 
E Charles Kennedy MP (Liberal Democrat Leader) interview – “Saddam has to realise that in 
international opinion the pressure is building from all quarters/ more he's willing to co-operate 
fully the less its likely to have to resort to military means to resolve this”  
RPiers Morgan (Editor, Daily Mirror) interview – “Where is hard evidence that he has 
weapons of mass destruction and that he intends to use them/ found the al-Qaida link 
laughable” 
M TREVOR: Nik, Hans Blix is coming to London tomorrow. This entire weapons inspection 
regime is beginning to look more like and irrelevance now.  
M Robinson:  well yes Trevor, although Hans Blix holds in his hands the key to the next step.  





M Because on valentines day he will have to make another report to the united nations. 
 M if he declares that the Iraqis are still not cooperating that in effect will be a declaration of 
war.   
M If instead he says the first signs are they are moving, that will be a declaration that there 
can after all be some hope for the inspectors.   
RTREVOR:  Lets go now to Baghdad and join our correspondent Jon Irvine.  Jon given the 
detailed nature of what Colin Powell was saying today, were you surprised at the blanket 
rejection of Iraq’s response. 
M Irvine: We’ve just heard that there will be a point by point rebuttal by the Iraqis tomorrow.  
R But tonite in general terms Saddam Hussein’s top advisor described Colin Powell’s claims 
as ridiculous and beneath a country supposedly leading the world.   
R On the issue of the telephone intercepts for example he said they could have been 
produced by a third rate intelligence outfit.  
R The Iraqi people are constantly being told that American claims about banned weapons 
are baseless, referring to the Washington government one newspaper here said today and I 
quote “ the nut cases in the administration of evil have no proof of their claims”. 
M Trevor: Dr Blix arrives in Baghdad over the weekend…quite frankly its difficult to see that 
being terribly fruitful now. 
M  Irvine: I think it is, Hans Blix is the man appointed by the world to be judge and jury on the 
issue of Iraqi weaponry.  
M He’s unhappy with the Iraqis at the moment he says their level of cooperation with the 
weapons inspectors in unsatisfactory, he’s here to persuade them that they must do more.   
E And frankly if he’s nothing positive to report on February 14th its difficult to see how this 
whole thing can be resolved peacefully. 
 
FEBRUARY 6 2003  NBC News: Nightly News 
BROKAW And also on NBC NIGHTLY NEWS tonight, on our Iraq watch, as part of the 
buildup of US troops in the Persian Gulf, the Army's elite 101st Airborne Division now has 
gotten its deployment orders. That deployment is expected in the next few days and will 
include some 23,000 troops and 270 helicopters. 
M Also for the first time, an Iraqi scientist, a biologist, was interviewed today by UN 
inspectors inside Iraq for more than three hours with no other Iraqi official present.  
M The interview took place just a few hours after the UN's chief nuclear inspector demanded 
a drastic change in Iraq's cooperation.  
E Much more on the Iraq watch, including this question: If Iraq does have nuclear weapons, 
could inspectors find the evidence?  
 
FEBRUARY 6 CBS NEWS 
CBS News: Evening News with Dan Rather 
M President George W. Bush warned Saddam Hussein that "the game is over."  
E U.S. forces are moving in on the region, and it appears nothing, not even recent interviews 
with Iraqi scientists, can prevent war. 
M DAN RATHER, CBS ANCHOR: President Bush appeared before a nationwide television 
and radio audience late today, and said four ominous words: Quote -- "The game is over" -- 
a clear message to Iraq, war is near. 
E Here is the latest in the quickening showdown with Saddam: The president said, Saddam 






M Turkey finally agreed to let the U.S. establish ground force bases on Iraq`s northern 
border, but France again declined to support war with Iraq.  
M And President Bush announced he wants the U.N. Security Council to approve another 
resolution that would authorize the use of force. But he does not consider such an additional 
resolution absolutely necessary before he acts. 
John Roberts at the White House has the details behind today`s headlines -- John. 
E JOHN ROBERTS, CBS CORRESPONDENT: Dan, CBS News has learned that President 
Bush wants a very simple second resolution from the United Nations Security Council -- no 
deadlines, no fancy language -- one that simply points out, in very plain language, that 
Saddam Hussein has failed to comply with U.N. demands to disarm. 
M ROBERTS (voice-over): That would trigger serious consequences. That would mean war. 
E GEORGE W. BUSH, PESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: The dictator of Iraq is making 
his choice. Now the nations of the Security Council must make their own. 
M ROBERTS: President Bush all but said time is up for Saddam. But he declared his 
intention to keep working through the U.N. -- a move designed to give cover to leaders of his 
coalition of the willing -- under pressure at home not to blindly follow the U.S. to war. 
M And, echoing his secretary of state`s presentation yesterday, said there`s no question, 
Saddam is deceiving the world. 
E BUSH: That Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical 
weapons -- the very weapons the dictator tells the world he does not have. 
M ROBERTS: As for when the U.S. will push for a vote on the second resolution, Colin 
Powell said this weekend`s visit to Baghdad by the U.N. inspection chiefs will likely tell the 
tale. 
E COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE: It`ll start to come to a head when Dr. Blix and 
Dr. ElBaradei return from Baghdad, and we see, whether or not, there is any chance of 
serious progress. 
M ROBERTS: In fact, sources say the U.S. could introduce a resolution soon after Blix and 
ElBaradei`s next report to the U.N., On February 14. 
M Before then, the White House fully expects Saddam to make another play for time by 
showing more cooperation with weapons inspectors. 
E BUSH: No doubt, he will play a last-minute game of deception. The game is over. 
R ROBERTS: Security Council members France and Russia restated their opposition to war 
today.  
M But diplomatic sources say tonight, they are confident that Russia will sign on with the 
United States, and they say, there are indications that France is beginning to move their 
way, too -- Dan. 
M Germany seems set in opposition. But France and Germany aside, most European 
countries now say they will support a U.S.-led war against Iraq. 
M RATHER: President Bush predicted today that Saddam will now -- quote -- "begin another 
round of empty concessions" -- unquote. 
E And in Baghdad, right on cue, the Iraqis abruptly reversed themselves and let U.N. 
inspectors interview a selected scientist with, for a change, no government minder listening 
in. 
CBS`s Mark Phillips is in the Iraqi capital. 
M MARK PHILLIPS, CBS CORRESPONDENT: That an Iraqi scientist has finally talked 
privately with a U.N. inspector here, has been attributed by the Iraqis to a change of heart on 





M It`s unclear whether this also represents a change of heart on the part of the Iraqi regime. 
M (voice-over): The scientist is Sinan Abdul-Hassan (ph), described as a biologist, here 
leaving the hotel where his three-and-a-half hour meeting with the U.N. inspectors took 
place. 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: No comment. 
R PHILLIPS: The commenting was left to advisor to Saddam Hussein, Amer al-Saadi, who 
denied Colin Powell`s allegations, point by point,  
R and who accused the U.S., essentially, of inventing the evidence Colin Powell presented. 
 M( on camera): There`s been no indication whether today`s first private session with an 
Iraqi scientist will be followed by any others. 
M  And no indication either, whether the Iraqis will be any more forthcoming when Hans Blix 
arrives here this weekend for what`s looking more and more like their last chance to come 
clean. 
Mark Phillips, CBS News, Baghdad. 
M RATHER: For the first time ever, the U.S. State Department is warning American civilians 
overseas that al Qaeda and other terrorists could target them with -- and I quote -- "non-
conventional weapons."  
M This worldwide caution says, such weapons -- again, quote -- "including chemical or 
biological agents, must be considered a growing threat" -- unquote. 
 
ITV NEWS  FEBRUARY 6 
WASHINGTON DAY AFTER POWELL APPEARANCE 
M TREVOR: good evening, yesterday it was his secretary of state, this evening President 
Bush himself weighed in to remind the world of the urgent need to bring down Saddam 
Hussein’s regime. 
 M Speaking at the white house in the last few minutes he said “the Iraqi leader had one last 
chance to save himself. But was throwing it away.”  
M He urged the united nations not to lose its resolve 
M An offer earlier today by Iraq to let UN weapons inspectors interview Iraqi scientists 
unaccompanied appears to have cut no ice with Mr Bush  
M Robert Moore in Washington: A short time ago President Bush and secretary of state 
Colin Powell met at the white house to discuss the next few weeks diplomacy.  
M And the message very clearly from President Bush, If the United nations hesitates to act, 
the US will act instead.  
M VIDEO:  The president is making clear that following America’s presentation to the United 
nations yesterday, time is rapidly running out.  
M Within the last 30 minutes, Mr. Bush, after meeting with Coin Powell issued his strongest 
warning so far that diplomacy could only achieve so much.    
E George Bush : “We will not wait to see what terrorist states could do with chemical 
biological radiological or nuclear weapons.”   
E George Bush:, “Sadam Hussein can now be expected to begin another round of empty 
concessions transparently false denials, no doubt he will play a last minute game of 
deception the game is over.”   
E George Bush:, “All the world can rise to this moment the community of free nations can 
show that it is strong and confident and determined to keep the peace.”   
E George Bush:, “Saddam Hussein has the motive and the means and the recklessness and 





M Moore: Colin Powell had himself been talking to senators earlier today.  
M He is taking some encouragement from the fact that opinion polls show that show a small 
increase in support among Americans for military action.  
M Following his presentation at the UN yesterday the next crucial date will be in 8 days time 
as UN inspectors provide their latest and and almost certainly final report on iraqs 
disarmament.   
M Another round of military deployments have just been ordered. Sending thousands more 
troops to the Persian gulf. In every order being given and every speech being delivered . 
M Mr. Bush is now bracing the American people for war.  
Robert Moore ITV News Washington 
M Trevor: Robert, given the president’s resolve tonight, it really undercuts anything the 
weapons inspectors might do in Baghdad later on because as he said –the game is over.  
M Moore:  Well the White house made it very clear they are expecting some tactical 
concession from the Iraqis possibly over those private interviews with Iraqi scientists.  
M Or Saddam Hussein possibly permitting the UN to operate U-2 spy planes. But president 
bush saying its too late for that.   
M And indeed Colin Powell here on capitol hill saying very much the same, telling senators 





M Trevor: Lets go now to Baghdad and join our correspondent Jon Irvine. Jon, the timing of 
this decision by Iraq to allow scientists to talk to the weapons inspectors now without 
supervision, without their minders…is interesting…but might get them precisely nowhere.  
M John Irvine: Yes isn’t it interesting Trevor, just hours after the chief weapons inspectors 
come out of 10 downing street saying Iraqi cooperation must improve dramatically the Iraqis 
announce this concession.   
M Some scientists are prepared, we’re told, to be interviewed by the UN in private. The 
testimony of these experts is seen as vital.  
M Metaphorically speaking they’re supposed to know where the bodies are buried when it 
comes to banned weaponry.  
M And of course that none of these interviews have taken place up til today at least has been 
used by the white house in particular as a stick to beat the Iraqis with in terms of a failure to 
comply and cooperate. 
M Trevor: But it does look as though president Bush has already made up his mind so this is 
to some extent irrelevant really.  
M Irvine: Well the Iraqis don’t regard it as being irrelevant and certainly the UN here is quite 
pleased they say it’s a good move but that they will not be satisfied until they can speak to 
scientists of their choosing rather than just to volunteers.  
M But the Iraqis believe they have breathed new life into the inspection process they believe 
they’ve given hans blix something positive to say when he reports to the UN again Friday 
week. 
R Nick Robinson:  the prime ministers receptions was equally frosty.   A television debate 
showed once again that the public aren’t with him, and he knows it.  





E Tony Blair MP (Prime Minister) speaking “Supposing there were a second resolution, would 
that make a difference?” 
M Woman says “Yes” 
M Nick Robinson: It may not be the easy thing to do to confront Iraq he said, but it is the right 
thing. 
MS Blair sat next to Newsnight host Jeremy Paxman  
E TonyBlair speaking “Even if I am the only person left saying it, I am going to say it - it is a 
threat and a danger we have to confront”  
M Robinson:  Echoing Tony Blair in London today, the UNs chief weapons inspectors. Their 
next stops Baghdad and their message couldn’t be plainer.  
E Mohamed El Baradei (Head of the International Atomic Energy Authority) speaking to 
press, “Iraq is not cooperating fully needs to show drastic change in terms of cooperation”  
 
 
FEBRUARY 6 ABC NEWS 
M On "World News Tonight", President Bush says the game is over with Saddam Hussein. 
ROAD TO WAR IRAQ PLANS 
PETER JENNINGS, ABC NEWS 
 M (OC) Good evening, everyone. President Bush said today the game is over with Saddam 
Hussein.  
M And in the strongest language he's used so far, Mr. Bush all but said that war was 
inevitable.  
M The President made a brief appearance at the White House with the Secretary of State, to 
put some pressure on members of the UN Security Council. 
M After he said the game is over with the Iraqi leader, he said the United Nations, having 
demanded that Iraq give up any weapons of mass destruction or suffer the consequences, 
must not back down. 
M  Actually, Iraq did bend a little today, and we'll get to that in a minute.  
M But if you heard the President today, bending a little was not going to make any difference. 
ABC's Terry Moran is at the White House. Terry, they think they have momentum. 
TERRY MORAN, ABC NEWS 
M (OC) They do, Peter. One day after Secretary of State Powell's presentation at the UN, 
they feel some diplomatic momentum and are pressing what they consider to be their 
advantage.  
TERRY MORAN 
M (VO) Flanked by Secretary of State Powell, Mr. Bush described Saddam Hussein as a 
mortal threat to the US. 
E PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, UNITED STATES: “Saddam Hussein has the motive 
and the means and the recklessness and the hatred to threaten the American people. 
Saddam Hussein will be stopped.” 
TERRY MORAN 
R (VO) Referring to Powell's presentation yesterday of pictures of an Iraqi jet, apparently 
outfitted to disperse chemical weapons, Mr. Bush claimed the regime's unmanned aerial 
vehicles, or UAVs, could target America directly. 
E PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, “A UAV launched from a vessel off the American coast 









M (VO) US intelligence sources say that scenario is not likely. 
M But the White House argues the risk is real.  
M The President also used sharp language to challenge the UN Security Council. 
E PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH “Now, the Security Council will show whether its words 
have any meaning.” 
E PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH “Having made its demands, the Security Council must 
not back down when those demands are defied and mocked by a dictator.” 
TERRY MORAN 
M (VO) Testifying before Congress today, Secretary Powell made clear the administration is 
not willing to wait long for the UN to act. 
E COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE “We are reaching an endgame in a matter of 
weeks, not a matter of months.” 
 
BAGHDAD UN INSPECTIONS 
February 6 2003 
PETER JENNINGS, ABC NEWS 
M (OC) In Baghdad today, the Iraqis gave in to one of the UN inspectors' longstanding 
demands. 
M They allowed the inspectors to interview an Iraqi scientist in private. ABC's Dan Harris in 
the Iraqi capital tonight. 
DAN HARRIS, ABC NEWS 
M (VO) About an hour and 15 minutes into a news conference, called to rebut Colin Powell's 
presentation, the Iraqis announced that some of their scientists are now willing to meet 
privately with the weapons inspectors. 
M GENERAL AMIR AL SAADI,SADDAM HUSSEIN'S CHIEF SCIENCE ADVISOR “One of 
them, today, in fact, as we are speaking, is being interviewed, alone.” 
DAN HARRIS 
M (VO) That scientist, identified only as a biologist by the name of Dr. Sinan, met with the 
inspectors at their hotel for more than three hours tonight.  
M (OC) Even while the interview was taking place, however, a senior UN official was playing 
it down, saying the Iraqi government suggested the Dr. Sinan be interviewed, and that one 
private interview does not constitute a trend. 
M (VO) The chief weapons inspectors, who stopped in London today on their way to 
Baghdad for high-level meetings this weekend, indicated they want much more. 
E MOHAMED ELBARADEI,DIRECTOR GENERAL, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 
AGENCY, “I think the message coming from the Security Council is very clear, that Iraq is not 
cooperating fully, that they need to show drastic change in terms of cooperation.” 
DAN HARRIS 
M (VO) The inspectors assume that the issues of private interviews and U2 surveillance 
flights will both be resolved this weekend.  
M The real question, said one UN official, is what else the Iraqis have to offer. Dan Harris, 











OPINION WAR WITH IRAQ 
ABC  NEWS 
M But Prime Minister Tony Blair still faced tough questions today during a town hall meeting 
on Iraq. 
E TONY BLAIR, BRITISH PRIME MINISTER “I do really believe, I may be wrong in believing 
it. But I do believe it.” 
JIM SCIUTTO 
R (OC) In France, no change at all to the government's position, say officials. They want 
more time and money for UN inspectors.  
R It's the same in Germany. And in one of the more interesting expressions of anti-war 
feeling, in Italy, members of Parliament opposed to war disrupted a speech by the Italian 
Prime Minister.  
R Across Europe, there's clearly a large segment of the public that remains unconvincedBOB 
WOODRUFF, ABC NEWS 
R  (OC) Peter, most of the Arab world reacted with a great deal of skepticism to the speech, 
calling the evidence "unconvincing."  
R Some newspapers around the region wondered if the recordings and photos were 
fabricated.  
R And there is a widespread view in many Arab countries that the war is now inevitable and 
that the speech was just an attempt to get the world ready. 
 M But here in Kuwait, a very different reaction. Because this country is so close to Iraq, the 
speech frankly scared a lot of people.  
M When Colin Powell showed that video of how the Iraqis could use an aircraft to spray 
anthrax on populated areas, people really reacted to that. And many have started to leave 
the country. 
6 February 2003 ABC NEWS 
M PETER JENNINGS, ABC NEWS(VO) Just a brief review of the main story, President Bush 
said today the game is over with Saddam Hussein.  
M And in the strongest language he has used so far, Mr. Bush all but said that war with Iraq 
was inevitable. T 
M the Secretary of State Colin Powell told the Congress today that the situation is reaching 
what he called an endgame, and it would be a matter of weeks and not months. 
FEBRUARY 7 NBC NEWS 
E If Iraq does have nuclear weapons, could inspectors find the evidence? 
 
February 7 ABC News 
ENGLAND INTELLIGENCE JUST PLAGIARISM?  
PETER JENNINGS, ABC NEWS 
M (VO) The British Prime Minister is struggling with a major embarrassment in his campaign 
to discredit Saddam Hussein.  
R Today, the British government admitted that one of its damning reports about Iraq was 
largely copied, often word for word, from already published academic papers, some of them 
here, the report was cited by Colin Powell in his address to the United Nations the other day. 
R Britain's apparent plagiarism has cast doubt on the credibility of its intelligence, and the 
British public is already deeply opposed to war.  
E PETER JENNINGS Finally this evening, some notes about things to keep an eye on. The 
UN weapons inspectors go back to Baghdad this weekend, they have not been happy with 
Iraqi cooperation so far.  





M The President was more outspoken about war this week than he has been before. Game 
over, he said.  
M Next Friday, the weapons inspectors come back to report to the UN Security Council, look 
for a lot of talk in the days ahead about another Security Council resolution, which says that 
Iraq has failed to meet its obligations and should face serious consequences. 
M That's a euphemism for being attacked.  
 
7 February 2003  NBC News: Nightly News  
M TOM BROKAW, anchor: And with these increased warnings about terrorism, the 
momentum continues to build on the possibility of war with Iraq.  
M As the chief arms inspectors head back to Baghdad, President Bush, impatient with the 
United Nations, said today it better make up its mind soon about whether to side with the 
United States.  
R Baghdad, meanwhile, is putting out its own message. And NBC's Ron Allen is there.  
R Today an Iraqi counterattack. It's show and tell at two suspicious missile sites to rebut 
Secretary of State Colin Powell's charge that Iraq is deceiving the inspectors.  
E Mr. COLIN POWELL “ At this ballistic missile site on November 10, we saw a cargo truck 
preparing to move ballistic missile components.” 
R ALLEN: Today, the plant manager insisted Powell's photos only showed what happens 
every day. 
R`This is a factory,' he said. `It takes parts from one place and ships them to another.'  
R Iraq insists numerous UN inspections and even the test firing of a missile here have proved 
these weapons comply with UN restrictions. But tomorrow, the chief inspectors will arrive with 
a warning.  
E Mr. MOHAMED ELBARADEI (International Atomic Energy Agency):” We need to show 
quick progress and we need to show drastic change on the part of Iraq in terms of 
cooperation in all these areas.”  
M ALLEN: In Washington, President Bush said it's all up to Saddam Hussein.  
E President GEORGE BUSH, “He's treated the demands of the world as a joke up to now, 
and that's his choice to make. He's the person who gets to decide war and peace.”  
M ALLEN: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld rallied hundreds of US troops in Italy today 
as he continued to build a coalition for war.  
M But council members Russia, China, and France continue to press for more time.  
M Late tonight, Iraq is claiming four weapons scientists now have been interviewed privately 
by the inspectors, apparently beginning to meet a key UN demand as the chief inspectors 
prepare to give Iraq what may be a last chance to fully comply and disarm. Ron Allen, NBC 
News, Baghdad.  
 
 
CBS NEWS FEB 7 
Iraq Attempts Concessions 
M DAN RATHER :Iraq is speeding up attempts to prove that it is cooperating, as the 
United States military continues to increase its presence in the Persian Gulf. 
R DAN RATHER, President Bush spoke by telephone today with the leaders of France 
and China, seeking support for a new U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing war 
with Iraq. They said, no. 
R In a related development, France`s U.S. ambassador predicted two- thirds of 





R Russia says, it too, opposes authorizing war, and wants inspections to go on. 
E But the chief U.N. nuclear-arms inspector feels time is running out. He warned 
Iraq today, it must make -- quote -- "quick progress" to avoid war. 
CBS`s Mark Phillips is in Baghdad. 
R MARK PHILLIPS, CBS CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): With all roads 
seemingly heading toward war here, an increasingly desperate Iraqi regime is 
making concessions it has previously refused to make, and is trying even harder 
to convince a skeptical world it is not working on forbidden weapons. 
R Exhibit A was the al-Rafah missile test facility, and its brand new and much 
larger, rocket engine test stand.  
E It`s here, Colin Powell told the U.N. this week, that the Iraqis are developing an 
illegal long-range rocket. 
E COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE: The one on the right is clearly 
intended for long-range missiles that can fly 1,200 kilometers. 
R PHILLIPS: But the Iraqis insisted that all work here, including a test firing this 
week, has been under U.N. supervision, and that the new missile will be limited to 
the permitted 90-mile range. 
R The charge that Iraq is still producing prohibited weapon systems, and what`s 
become the ritual denial here, have become the background noise to this 
countdown to war. 
 M There is only one admission the Iraqis can make that would put that 
countdown on hold, and that`s the one the one they refuse to deliver. 
E While the U.N. searched the chemical warehouse, the Iraqis still refuse to 
account for their missing weapons stocks or detail where, when, and how those 
stocks were destroyed.  
M Instead the regime is making small concessions, today allowing three more 
scientists to be interviewed privately without the presence of government minders. 
The U.N. wants to talk to hundreds. 
M Hans Blix knows he`s got to come away from his weekend meetings here with 
significant new information from the Iraqis, or the inspection process is doomed. 
His only hope is that the Iraqis agree.=== 
M RATHER: If war does come, the Iraqis will face a big force, but much smaller 
than used in the Gulf War of the 1990s. More than 100,000 U.S. military 
personnel are already in position to strike now; many more are on the way. 
E CBS`s David Martin has more about those troops, and what the Iraqis may or 
may not be preparing to meet them. 
M DAVID MARTIN, CBS CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): The 101st Airborne 
Division flies its helicopters into Florida, where they will be put aboard ships for 
the long ride to the Persian Gulf. 
 M The American preparations for war are highly visible.  
E The Iraqi preparations, at least ones the United States worries about, are not. 
M Saddam Hussein has four Republican Guard divisions stationed around 
Baghdad. One has moved out to cover the western approaches to the city. 
M A regular army division has moved south to defend Basra. But the last time 
these units fought the American Army, they either surrendered or were destroyed.  
M American satellites have watched the Iraqis build fighting positions in rings 
around Baghdad, but they are mainly earthen berms which might slow a ground 





E Pentagon officials say they see nothing in Iraqi troop deployments that 
concerns them. It`s what they don`t see that worries them. 
E Secretary of State Powell`s briefing at the U.S. was meant to expose Iraqi 
deceptions, but it also exposed American blind spots.  
E Satellite photos showed the Iraqis had cleaned up a chemical weapons bunker 
just before the U.N. inspectors arrived, but where did the weapons go? 
E And where are those biological weapons vans? 
E The U.S. has detailed drawings based on eyewitness accounts, but no photos 
because it doesn`t know where they are. 
E The U.S. has yet to spot any of Iraq`s 30,000 chemical artillery rounds, 
E but it does know one thing about these weapons of mass destruction: Saddam 
has already ordered his generals to use them if attacked. 
 
M The United States Army is ready to fight and win in a war against Iraq, 
according to a top commander. 
E HARRY SMITH, CBS CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): Ready to fight, and 
ready to face poison gas, if necessary. 
E MCKIERNAN: We are. We train in that type of environment, and it would be 
dramatically difficult conditions, but it would not stop a coalition military effort. 
SMITH (on camera): How do you assess the enemy right now? 
E MCKIERNAN: We watch the regime, and we watch his military capability every 
day. Our situational awareness of what Iraqi military forces can do and can`t do is 
pretty darn good right now. 
E SMITH (voice-over): The U.S. military allowed CBS an exclusive first look inside 
the command center at Camp Doha, Kuwait -- an eye-popping, high-tech war 
room that maintains contact with virtually every unit in the field. It will be tested 
next week in a classified dress rehearsal for combat called "Lucky Warrior." 
M McKiernan says his forces will have a huge technological advantage, but that`s 
not how wars are won. 
 
ITV News 
 FEBRUARY 7 2003  IRAQ: REPORTERS VISIT WEAPONS SITE/INSPECTORS: 
M To try to head off that threat of American action, Iraq stepped up its propaganda offensive 
today. 
R Western reporters were shown a missile site to prove it wasn't concealing illegal weapons, 
as America had claimed at the UN on Wednesday. The UN chief weapons inspector,  
M  Hans Blix, says that Iraq is beginning to "make an effort" to co-operate with his team.  
R A Convoy of cars carried Iraqi officials and journalists to a site alleged by the US to have 
been used for testing missiles . 
R We climbed onto alleged missile test bed  
R It is alleged was used to test missile engines  
R The roof on skeleton of building,  the USA claim it is to shelter a missile test site from spy 
satellites  
M An Iraqi scientist entered this car after a private interview with UN weapons inspectors  
E Prime Minister Tony Blair MP “ We are entering the final phase of a 12 year history of the 
disarmament of Iraq/ 8 weeks have now passed since Saddam was given his final chance, 
600 weeks have passed since he was given his first chance/ the evidence of co-operation 





E - Prime Minister Tony Blair MP “Seeing the back of Saddam not just good for the peace 
and security of the world but the first beneficiaries of it will be the people of Iraq” 
R Charles Kennedy MP (Liberal Democrat Leader) standing speaking –“Government have 
still to make a credible case and that case has to be based on credible evidence”  
ITV News  IRAQ: GOVERNMENT DOSSIER PLAGIARISM CONTROVERSY: 
R 'We all have lessons to learn' - Number Ten today after it was forced to admit an 
intelligence dossier published on Monday was not all it pretended. 
R A spokesman confessed that it should have credited the authors of the articles it used in 
the document, particularly Ibrahim Al Marashi - he's the graduate student who's thesis was 
copied, grammatical errors and all.  
R The controversy, revealed exclusively on Channel 4 News last night, has put the 





#3 Powell would provide evidence of a direct link between Saddam Hussein and the Al 
Qaeda terrorist network 
E:  Endorsed the frame 
M:  Merely disseminated the frame 
R:  Raised questions about the frame 
 
FEBRUARY 4   
ABC NEWS 
M  A second segment, Powell will present evidence that the US believes shows a link 
between Iraq and al-Qaeda,  
M detailing the movements of al-Qaeda associates, who have allegedly taken refuge in Iraq 
R ABC DAN HARRIS The Iraqi president likewise denied any connection with al- Qaeda. 
R SADDAM HUSSEIN If we had a relationship with al-Qaeda, and we believed in that 
relationship, we wouldn't be ashamed to admit it. 
NBC NEWS 
M But US officials believe if Colin Powell's evidence is strong enough to win over France, 
then other critics, even Russia, may follow.  
R How good will the evidence be?  
R Today Powell was still reviewing whether they can prove significant links between Saddam 
and al-Qaeda.  
E But officials say Powell is convinced he can still establish a pattern that will be an 
indictment of Saddam Hussein 
M  But in Baghdad, Saddam Hussein was not waiting for Powell's speech.  
R In his first interview in 12 years, airing tonight on British TV, he told an anti-war British 
politician he has no links to al-Qaeda and no illegal weapons.  
E NBC Terror ties. Piece by piece, the new case laid out today linking Iraq to Osama bin 








CBS NEWS FEB 4TH 
David Martin 
M Tenet is on record as saying Iraq has "provided training to al Qaeda members in the areas 
of poisons and gases,"  
E and it is a possibility that Saddam would give Osama bin Laden a weapon of mass 
destruction which the administration says makes Iraq so dangerous. 
M But none of what Powell plans to unveil tomorrow touches on the most pressing threat: 
new intelligence picked up within the past few weeks that al Qaeda is preparing to conduct 
terrorist attacks against the U.S. with the specific intent of causing mass casualties. 
M Intelligence analysts believe these attacks would be intended to take advantage of 
America`s seeming preoccupation with preparing for a war against Iraq and the rising tide of 
anti-Americanism those preparations are using. 
M Although there have been recent arrests of al Qaeda operatives in Europe, intelligence 
officials do not believe they have broken up the plots, which appear to be targeted against 
American interests, both overseas and in the U.S. 
M Officials say there is no specific evidence al Qaeda plans to use chemical or biological 
weapons, and that another attack could take the form of the night club bombing in Bali or the 
attempt to shoot down an Israeli airliner in Kenya. 
M Whatever al Qaeda is planning, the intelligence that something big is in the works has 
prompted both the FBI and the new Department of Homeland Security to begin discussions 
on issuing a nationwide alert. 
R ANTHONY WEDGEWOOD BENN, BRITISH POLITICIAN: Do you have links with al 
Qaeda?SADDAM HUSSEIN, PRESIDENT OF IRAQ (through translator): If we had relations 
with the organization of al Qaeda, we would not be ashamed to admit it. Therefore, I would 
like to tell you directly, that we have no relationships with al Qaeda. 
M ROBERTS: Powell also laid out suspected ties between Saddam and al- Qaeda,  
R claiming a bin Laden lieutenant, Abu al Zarqawi, was running a European al-Qaeda 
network from Baghdad, and had set up this poison factory in northern Iraq. 
M Saddam`s ties to terrorism, Powell said, are a threat the world cannot let stand. 
M there were similar denials that Iraq was harboring al Qaeda operative Abu Musa`ab Al-
Zarqawi.  
M They say, he was last known to be in northern Kurdish-controlled Iraq, an area they can`t 
get into because of the U.S. patrolled no-fly zone. 
 
FEBRUARY 5  ITV NEWS 
M  And he said there was a link between Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist network.  
R TREVOR Mc Donald:   What do experts here think of the evidence of hidden weapons and 
about Colin Powells claims that there are now links between Iraq and al Qaeda. 
M Llinks that stretch as far as Manchester and the murder of Steven Earl. 
R The third part of Powells speech was about the links he claimed Saddam has with al 
qaeda.  
M  Pointing the finger at this man, Powell said Al Zarqawi was is based in Baghdad  
M he linked Zarqawi to al qaeda and to the ricin. 
M DC Stephen Oake (killed while carrying out terrorism inquiry) 
E Colin Powell (US Secretary of State) speaking  “British unearthed a cell there last month. 
one British police officer was murdered during the disruption of the cell” 
R Although tonight it looks as though he’s changed few minds at the security council and 







M  First, let's listen to some of Mr. Powell as he tried to make a connection between Saddam 
Hussein and Al-Qaeda. 
R But is there really a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda? 
 M  An ABC News exclusive tonight, we talk to the man who is accused of working with the 
Iraqis. 
LINK BETWEEN IRAQ AND TERRORISM BUSH ADMINISTRATION INTENT ON MAKING 
THE CASE 
PETER JENNINGS, ABC NEWS 
M (OC). The Bush Administration was very intent today to establish a link between Iraq and 
terrorist activity, most notably Al-Qaeda. ABC's Brian Ross has been looking into the link for 
us. Brian? 
BRIAN ROSS, ABC NEWS 
M (OC) Peter, the Secretary Of State said today there was a sinister nexus between Iraq 
and the Al-Qaeda terrorist network.  
M The nexus being a small, little-known terrorist group, now at the center of the US case. 
M (VO) Powell showed a satellite photograph of what he said was a chemical weapons 
training center in Northern Iraq used by al-Qaeda and protected by a group called Ansar Al-
Islam.(PH) graphics: Weak Link? 
E COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE “Baghdad has an agent in the most senior 
levels of the radical organization, Ansar Al-Islam.”  
BRIAN ROSS 
M (VO) There's no doubt Ansar Al-Islam(PH) is a radical Islamic terror group.  
M Their own videos show it.  
M Their ties to Al-Qaeda are also well-documented. 
R But they operate in a part of Iraq not controlled by Saddam Hussein and their leaders say 
they seek to overthrow Saddam Hussein and his government. 
R MULLAH KREKAR, ANSAR AL-ISLAM “They are our enemy. Really, they are also our 
enemy.” 
R (VO) The man considered the leader of Ansar Al-Islam lives openly in Oslo, Norway, where 
he sought asylum after he says Saddam Hussein tried to kill him. 
R Mullah Krekar told ABC news this week, his group opposes Saddam Hussein, because, 
unlike Osama Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein is not a good Muslim. 
R MULLAH KREKAR: “ We believe that Saddam Hussein, him and his group and his 
ministers also, they are outside of Islamist zone.” 
M (VO) Secretary Powell said today that this Al-Qaeda leader, Abu Zarkawi,(PH) had 
brought together the men of Mullah Krekar and the others groups, in a joint alliance against 
the West. 
R MULLAH KREKAR, “I didn't meet him. I didn't contact him. I didn't speak with him also.” 
R (OC) In another blow to the US case, sources in London tell ABC News that British 
intelligence, as well is highly skeptical about, a theory that al-Qaeda is connected, 
Peter, to Iraq. 
R ABC DAN HARRIS (OC) Beyond calling it untrue, the Iraqis didn't have much of a 
response today to Powell's charge that they have links to Al-Qaeda.  
R That will come tomorrow, they say, when they provide a detailed response to every point 








NBC NEWS  FEBRUARY  5 
Newscast: Bush administration provides details of alleged link between Saddam 
Hussein and al-Qaeda  
M TOM BROKAW, anchor: And today for the first time, the administration provided details for 
what it has always insisted was a connection between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.  
R How strong is that case? 
 Here's NBC's Jim Miklaszewski at the Pentagon now.  
Jim: JIM MIKLASZEWSKI reporting:  
M Tom, there was plenty of new detailed information about Iraq's alleged ties to terrorists.  
R But a Pentagon official says when Powell got to possible links between Baghdad and al-
Qaeda, he was skating on thin ice.  
R In making his case, Powell claimed the ties between Osama bin Laden and Saddam 
Hussein go back nearly 10 years, and the threat continues today.  
E COLIN POWELL (Secretary of State): “A nexus that combines classic terrorist 
organizations and modern methods of murder.”  
M MIKLASZEWSKI: But the strongest terrorist link made today was not with bin Laden, but 
with this man, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, who Powell described as a bin Laden collaborator.  
M Powell claimed that Zarqawi and his lieutenants helped establish this terrorist training 
camp in northern Iraq that is producing the deadly toxin ricin and other poisons, and that  
M members of Zarqawi's network have been arrested recently in London and Paris, plotting 
terrorist attacks.  
R Powell also claimed that two dozen Islamic extremists with ties to al-Qaeda have set up a 
base in Baghdad to coordinate the flow of people, money and supplies.  
E COLIN POWELL: “Iraqi officials deny accusations of ties with al-Qaeda. These denials are 
simply not credible”.  
M MIKLASZEWSKI: The most direct terrorist link between Iraq and bin Laden apparently 
comes from a senior al-Qaeda leader now in custody.  
M According to Powell, the detainee says in December, 2000, bin Laden turned to Iraq for 
help in developing chemical and biological weapons, and got it.  
R In his detailed testimony, however, Powell did not link Saddam Hussein to any current 
terrorist activity.  
E But in a follow-up appearance, British Foreign Minister Jack Straw came close. 
E British Foreign Minister JACK STRAW: “It defies imagination that all of this could be going 
on without the knowledge of Saddam Hussein.”  
R MIKLASZEWSKI: But US officials stress there is no evidence that links Saddam Hussein to 
9/11 here in the US, or any other terrorist attacks. Tom:  
R***The Arab network, Al-Jazeera--which carried the speech live--suggested that Powell's 
allegations of a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda are designed to manipulate support from as 
many nations as possible.  
 
FEBRUARY 6  ABC NEWS 
M The President is now saying he has no doubt that Iraq is in league with al Qaeda,  
M  and bluntly told the members of the UN Security Council they risked irrelevancy if they 
don't support war. 
CBS NEWS FEB 6 
R There were similar denials that Iraq was harboring al Qaeda operative Abu Musa`ab Al-
Zarqawi.  
R They say, he was last known to be in northern Kurdish-controlled Iraq, an area they can`t 





The United Nations News Center Summarized Powell’s presentation in a news 
release published following his appearance. 
UNITED NATIONS NEWS CENTRE  FEBRUARY 5, 2003 
Powell presents U.S. case to Security Council of Iraq's failure to disarm                                  
Armed with satellite images, transcripts of intercepted telephone conversations and other 
intelligence data, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell today presented the United 
Nations Security Council with what he called "solid" evidence that showed Iraq still has not 
complied with resolutions calling for it to disarm. 
"My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These 
are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid 
intelligence," Mr. Powell told the ministerial-level session of the 15-member body. Before 
hearing Mr. Powell's presentation, the Council members decided to grant Iraq's request to 
allow its representative sit at the Council table and make a statement at the end of the 
meeting.   
The U.S. Secretary of State stressed that Iraq still poses a threat and remains in "material 
breach" of Council resolutions. "Indeed, by its failure to seize its one last opportunity to come 
clean and disarm, Iraq has put itself in deeper material breach and close to the day when it 
will face serious consequences for its continued defiance of this Council," he said. "We must 
not fail in our duty and our responsibility to the citizens of our countries."  
"This body places itself in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will 
without responding effectively and immediately," Mr. Powell warned. "The issue before us is 
not how much more time we are willing to give the inspectors to be frustrated by Iraqi 
obstruction, but how much longer are we willing to put up with Iraq's non-compliance before 
we say: 'Enough!'"  
Referring to the audio-visual evidence he presented to the Council, Mr. Powell said the 
material had U.S. and foreign origins, and came from technical sources, such as intercepted 
telephone conversations and photos taken by satellites. "Other sources are people who have 
risked their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to," he said.  
"I cannot tell you everything that we know, but what I can share with you, when combined 
with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling," Mr. Powell said. "What 
you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behaviour. The facts and 
Iraq's behaviour demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort - no 
effort - to disarm as required by the international community. Indeed, the facts and Iraq's 
behaviour show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce 





The satellite photos shown by Mr. Powell reflected what he called "concealment" activity 
undertaken in response to the resumption of UN inspections last November, while other 
images depicted suspected manufacturing sites for biological and chemical weapons. Mr. 
Powell also played tapes of intercepted conversations between Iraqi military personnel that 
he said indicated a concerted effort to hide or destroy evidence of weapons of mass 
destruction. Mr. Powell also said there has been no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever 
abandoned his nuclear weapons programme. According to testimony provided by defectors, 
Iraq already possesses two of the three key components needed to build a nuclear bomb, a 
cadre of scientists with the necessary expertise and a bomb design. "Since 1998, his efforts 
to reconstitute his nuclear programme have been focuses on acquiring the third and last 
component - sufficient fissile material to produce a nuclear explosion," he said.   
    
Turning to terrorism, Mr. Powell said Iraq had a long history of supporting terrorist 
organizations and that there was a potentially "more sinister nexus" between Baghdad and 
the Al-Qaida network. He said Iraq's denials of any ties with the organization are not credible.  
"None of this should come as a surprise to any of us," Mr. Powell said. "Terrorism has been a 
tool of Saddam for decades. Saddam was a supporter of terrorism long before these terrorist 
networks had a name, and this support continues. The nexus of poisons and terror is new; 
the nexus of Iraq and terror is old. The combination is lethal."  
"We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction and 
make more," Mr. Powell said. "Given Saddam Hussein's history of aggression, given what we 
know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations, and given his 
determination to exact revenge on those who have opposed him, should we take the risk that 
he will not someday use these weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his 
choosing - at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond?" Mr. Powell 
said the United States "will not - we cannot - run that risk to the American people. Leaving 
Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or 
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